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Dissent through American Popular Culture
Edited by Timothy M. Dale and Joseph J. Foy
The Simpsons consistently questions what is 
culturally acceptable, going against the grain of
popular culture by showcasing controversial issues
like homosexuality, animal rights, the war on 
terror, and religion. This subtle form of political
analysis is entertaining and great for television 
ratings, but it also can be an effective means of
changing opinions and attitudes on a large scale.
To consider another example, what does Star Trek
teach viewers about feminist politics? Do comedy
programs like The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and
Saturday Night Live advance democracy in ways
the mainstream news media cannot? Can horror
films contribute to a contemporary understanding
of environmentalism?
Homer Simpson Marches on Washington: Dissent
through American Popular Culture explores how
popular culture influences political agendas,
frames audience perceptions, and changes values
and ideals on both the individual and collective
levels. Editors Timothy M. Dale and Joseph J. Foy
have assembled a top-notch team of scholars from
the fields of political science, history, women’s 
and minority studies, film and media studies,
communication, music, and philosophy to 
investigate the full spectrum of popular culture 
in a democratic society.
Homer Simpson Marches on Washington examines
television shows such as Star Trek: The Next 
Generation, The X-Files, All in the Family, The
View, and The Colbert Report, as well as movies
and popular music, demonstrating how covert 
political and social messages affect the cultural
conversation in America. The contributing authors
investigate a wide range of controversial topics, 
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Foreword
The Influence of Captain Janeway
Kate Mulgrew
One Thursday afternoon, the phone rang. I picked it up and an unfamiliar 
voice said, “Captain Janeway, I just wanted to be the first to welcome you 
aboard. Shooting starts Monday at the crack of dawn. Get some rest. You’re 
going to need it.” This voice belonged to the mastermind behind the Star 
Trek franchise, Rick Berman, and though we would occasionally lock horns 
over the next seven years, it was essentially a love affair. He knew how to 
work, and so did I. At no point during the entire run of the series did either 
of us admit defeat. It was a matter of pride, a matter of two type As in silent 
competition, the confidence of experience pitted against the confidence of 
conviction. Most important, it was the first time in the history of this mul-
tibillion-dollar franchise that a woman had been voted into the captain’s 
seat. Both Paramount and Star Trek stood to lose vast sums of money if 
I failed to attract their most devoted demographic: young men between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five—you know, the guys in charge of the 
remote control (and the mortgage and the bank account). For the brand-
new network labeled UPN, Star Trek: Voyager was its flagship show, and I 
was the first female captain to walk onto the bridge of a starship and issue 
the signature command, “Engage.” I was also the first captain to have more 
than seven hairdos within a season, a corset sewn into my space suit, and 
a bra that resembled an alien species. I was puffed and shorn and stuffed 
and lit and scrutinized by every executive on the lot. I was criticized and 
cajoled, alternately patronized and petted. It’s as if they had all gone out of 
their way to find this exotic animal who could, in fact, walk and talk and act 
at the same time, and yet when she appeared on deck, they were stunned to 
discover that under that feline coat was, God help us, a feline. They set about 
trimming and coaxing and battling this gender problem as only men who 
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stand to lose megabucks do: by straightening my hair, strapping my breasts, 
raising my heels, and encouraging me to lower my already full and throaty 
voice. They surrounded me with cohorts of various colors and creeds, but 
I noted almost immediately that all the men were over six feet tall and the 
two supporting women were small and trim. Then came the real moment of 
truth. Within six months—hardly enough time to have established that we 
were lost in an unknown quadrant of space and unlikely to find a gas station 
anywhere nearby—they sent me a script in which I become stranded on an 
alien planet for an indeterminate amount of time with my first lieutenant, 
a strapping, gorgeous Latino named Chakotay. We must do our best to sur-
vive, find food, fool around with all things spacelike, befriend a tiny monkey, 
and, of course, make love. It’s a perfect time to make love, one would think: 
one’s ship and its complement of 165 crew are lost in the Delta Quadrant, 
their organs are being harvested by the Vidians, the Borg queen has threat-
ened to assimilate us all, there is very little food left, and some have already 
died on shuttlecraft missions. It therefore seems absolutely plausible—if 
not ideal—that Captain Janeway should lie down on something curiously 
resembling Astroturf and make mad, passionate love to a Maquis who was 
her sworn enemy only months before but who now seems to want nothing 
more than to brush her long and extremely glossy hair and look longingly 
(read lustfully) into her beautifully lit blue eyes.
Well now, I may have been the first woman starship captain, but I am 
not the first idiot to have read a script and seen the writing on the wall. So 
I called a meeting. I asked Rick Berman to gather the key players in his 
office, and there, on a sunny autumn afternoon, we held our first showdown. 
I presented my argument quickly and passionately. I said that as a female 
captain of childbearing age, it was inappropriate to have me cavorting on 
some planet with my first lieutenant, signifying to the audience that I was 
not only a negligent and despicable leader but a bimbo to boot. I argued 
that the male demographic would go elsewhere for their kicks if all we 
served them was crap, that they were smarter than we were and knew their 
science fiction, that they loved their captains and understood the nature of 
epic peril and that this simply would not fly, and that if they persisted in 
pursuing this absurd line of drama, I would be forced to resist. Some wit 
mumbled, “Resistance is futile,” which was meant to bring down the house 
but didn’t. “Gentlemen,” I said, “don’t make me plead for what you know is 
right and correct—give me a chance to lead this crew, to be a captain in my 
own right, and to inspire the audience to follow me because of my ability 
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to command bravely and authentically, without gender-specific pacifiers 
or throwbacks. Let’s just give it an all-out shot for the rest of the season,” I 
said, “and if, at the end of that time, I have failed to win them over through 
my merits as a leader, I will agree to revisit this conversation.” Rick Berman 
looked long and hard at me, smiled that slow and naughty smile I would 
come to love, and held up six fingers. I had six months to prove it. The 
gauntlet had been tossed.
At first, there was a dip in the ratings. I sensed an underlying tension, 
but I held my ground and worked hard to endow Janeway with humor and 
passion and keen intelligence. I studied the Okuda bible, I visited NASA, 
I read Feynman and Einstein with a view to understanding the scientific 
mind and its eccentricities. I took the text home every night and battled 
with the technobabble until I understood and owned it. I developed and 
nurtured a special friendship with the Doctor, who was a hologram and was 
the first of his kind to accept and embrace humanity—on my ship and on 
my watch. I threw myself into the intellectually challenging episodes that 
confronted issues such as the right to suicide, the loneliness of command 
and its attendant depression, art versus science, and always, of course, our 
steadfast devotion to the Prime Directive. I also phasered dozens of aliens, 
altered course numerous times, lost thousands of light-years, regained them 
through a vortex, and put my intrepid little starship through more paces 
than had ever been done before. I did most of my own stunts and stood on 
my feet for eighteen hours a day, averaging almost eighty-five hours a week, 
for the entire first season.
Then I received an invitation. First Lady Hillary Clinton inquired as to 
my interest and availability regarding a speaking engagement at the White 
House before a group of female scientists being honored for their extraor-
dinary achievements. These women had been culled from research labs, 
universities, hospitals, classrooms, and space stations. They were the crème 
de la crème of their species, and Mrs. Clinton thought it would be both fit-
ting and, I think, exciting for them if an actress who played a scientist and a 
captain on television addressed them from her vantage point of experience. 
This gave me pause. It would be one thing to address a group of actresses 
who played scientists on television, but to address the real thing seemed, 
frankly, suicidal. So of course I accepted. On the plane, I wrote and rewrote 
my remarks, finally settling on something that I figured was so benign it could 
neither offend nor impress—the kind of tribute one might find on QVC.
As I approached the podium, I was immediately assaulted by the absur-
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dity of the situation: how could a television actress even begin to impart 
anything resembling wisdom to these exceptional scientists? So I simply 
turned to the group and apologized. Whether they thought this was unchar-
acteristically modest or absolutely appropriate, I’ll never know, but as one 
they burst into applause. This response created an opening for a wonderful 
dialogue, and I began to talk, directly and honestly, about my experiences 
as the first female captain of a starship. They listened, rapt, as I went on 
about my duties, my disciplines, the difficulty of motherhood, exhaustion, 
the myriad rewards, and the beginning of a profound and enduring respect 
for science. I spoke of Captain Janeway’s ardent love of science and how it 
endowed her with a courage she might otherwise have lacked. I suggested 
that science fiction did not run so far afield from what they themselves 
studied and loved, that science required a leap of the imagination, and that 
physicists like Einstein and Feynman understood that. I thanked them for 
their mettle, their fine intelligence, their competitiveness, and their devo-
tion. Then I thanked Mrs. Clinton, who had taken me aside earlier and told 
me that she and Chelsea were big fans of Star Trek and watched Voyager 
religiously. This was enormously satisfying.
Later, mingling with the women scientists, I was surprised and over-
whelmed to hear over and over that my performance as a starship captain 
had been a determining factor in many of their decisions to leave the lab and 
go into the field. Some spoke of NASA, others of active research, and all of 
them referred to a “new beginning,” the “final frontier,” the “joy of pioneer-
ing.” In that room, on that occasion, there was a very clear sense of a brave 
new world, and none of these women were talking about microscopes. The 
talk was of black holes, string theory, life on Mars, space shuttles, and space 
travel. Some would walk on the moon, and all of them would dream of it.
So, when I’m asked what impact or influence Captain Janeway had on 
popular culture, I like to revisit that evening in Washington. I see faces, 
upturned and eager, and I see hope. But most important, I see a new kind 
of expectation, a very real anticipation of discovering the unknown. That is 
what this book is about. The authors of these chapters provide insight into 
the various ways popular culture can change perspectives, influence the way 
people think, and offer dissenting views of prevailing ideas. If Janeway urged 
change in the field of science and encouraged even a handful of women to 
take to the stars, then it seems to me that her influence was considerable. As 
my father used to say to me, “The sky’s the limit, kid.” I got to amend that 
to, “Space is the limit, ladies.” And I meant it.
xi
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IntroduCtIon
Tuning in to Democratic Dissent: 
Oppositional Messaging in Popular Culture
Joseph J. Foy
The Simpsons has never shied away from politics. In the seventh episode of 
its twentieth season, entitled “Mypods and Boomsticks,” Bart befriends a 
young Muslim boy named Bashir whose family has just moved to Spring-
field from Jordan. Bashir is polite, friendly, and easygoing, but Bart is afraid 
that his differences will make him a prime target for bullying. Sure enough, 
when the two run into Dolph, Kearney, and Jimbo, three of Springfield 
Elementary’s notoriously bad eggs, they immediately try to attack Bashir for 
being Muslim (and for “being the reason [Kearney] can’t take toothpaste on 
an airplane”). The politics of the playground extends to the barflies at Moe’s 
Tavern, as Lenny, Karl, and Moe convince Homer that Bart’s new friend is 
part of a terrorist family looking to destroy America. After seeing Jack Bauer 
torture a Muslim terror suspect on an episode of 24, Homer is convinced 
and lays a trap to try to uncover their plot. Through a series of paranoid 
misunderstandings, Homer thinks that Bashir’s father is going to attempt 
to blow up the Springfield Mall. He races to the rescue but ends up thwart-
ing a planned demolition of the old mall and destroys a newly constructed 
bridge to the Duff Brewery in the process.1
“Mypods and Boomsticks” was quickly praised by the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) for its willingness to take on anti-Islamic 
attitudes and paranoia in the United States and for depicting the respect 
for difference that is necessary in a multicultural society.2 The episode will 
undoubtedly join the ranks of other classic political ones taking on the 
debates related to homophobia (“Homer’s Phobia” and “There’s Something 
about Marrying”), medical marijuana (“Weekend at Burnsies”), gun owner-
ship (“The Cartridge Family”), religion (“Lisa the Skeptic” and “The Monkey 
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Suit”), animal rights and agricultural production (“Lisa the Vegetarian” and 
“Apocalypse Cow”), and campaigns and elections (“Sideshow Bob Roberts,” 
“Mr. Spritz Goes to Washington,” “Trash of the Titans,” “See Homer Run,” and 
“E Pluribus Wiggum”). Even The Simpsons Movie, which grossed over $527 
million in worldwide box-office receipts, took on controversial issues such 
as environmental degradation and abuse of power by the U.S. government 
in the name of security. These are but a few examples of how The Simpsons 
has challenged mainstream cultural and political assumptions, offering a 
dissenting perspective that seeks to influence the democratic dialogue.
This is perhaps what is most interesting about The Simpsons. As a work 
of popular culture, one might assume that it reflects mainstream attitudes 
and beliefs so that it will be readily embraced by a wide audience seeking to 
reaffirm broadly shared and collectively held worldviews. Popular culture is, 
after all, that which appeals to and is well liked by a mass audience. However, 
many of the episodes—such as those on homosexuality, animal rights, the 
war on terror, and religion—actually confront what is culturally accepted 
and popularly believed in an interesting interplay of popular culture chal-
lenging popular convention.
In the 2003 book entitled Leaving Springfield: The Simpsons and the 
Possibility of Oppositional Culture, edited by John Alberti, the theoretical 
underpinnings of popular culture as a means of fostering social opposition 
to mainstream views in a manner that is widely accepted and embraced 
are clearly established.3 The use of self-critical satire and humorously bit-
ing commentary on a range of issues and views has enabled The Simpsons 
to remain popular despite the numerous challenges to dominant views 
and culture explored by the contributors to Leaving Springfield. A theme 
present throughout the collection is that The Simpsons is such a popularly 
accepted series, despite containing political messages that might threaten 
to turn some audiences away, because its sociocultural messages of dissent 
are woven into the fabric of the show in a manner that does not overtly 
confront popular sensibilities. Instead, the writers and creators of the show 
internalize the messages of opposition without making their audience feel 
personally attacked.
Voices of Dissent, Voices of Democracy
The Simpsons is not the only popular culture artifact to take on the role 
of challenging widely held, commonly shared beliefs and values. Other 
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animated television shows such as Futurama, Family Guy, and South Park 
humorously defy sociopolitical norms and conventions, while a dramatic, 
dark comedy like Desperate Housewives attempts to peel back the illusion-
ary veneer in modern America suburbia to offer dissenting perspectives on 
gender, sexuality, power, and identity. Such perspectives are also reflected 
on the silver screen. Sean Penn’s 2009 Academy Award–winning portrayal 
of California’s first openly gay elected official, Harvey Milk, blends histori-
cal footage within a modern take on homophobia and social and political 
discrimination of the homosexual community.4 Other movies, such as the 
2008 box-office blockbuster The Dark Knight, offer a defense of unpopular 
political tactics used by the Bush administration (wiretapping, extraordi-
nary rendition, and torture) in the name of combating terrorism. Likewise, 
albums such as Green Day’s seventh studio album, American Idiot, which 
reached number one on the American charts and has sold more than 10 
million copies in domestic and international markets, openly confront 
American culture and politics with songs such as “American Idiot,” “Holi-
day,” and “Wake Me Up When September Ends.” U2’s 2009 release, No Line 
on the Horizon, offers tracks that personalize the horrors of war; “White 
as Snow” comments on the war in Afghanistan from the perspective of a 
dying soldier, and “Cedars of Lebanon” explores conflict from the perspec-
tive of a war correspondent. The aforementioned are just a few examples of 
how popular culture challenges prevailing political and moral orders. Such 
expression can be found in a variety of mass media, and whether through 
television, film, music, or the printed word, these works provide a voice to 
oppositional views that affect the democratic dialogue.
A liberal society, one that favors progress and individualism, can suc-
ceed only to the extent it allows individuals to identify and pursue a variety 
of goals. This is possible only in a context wherein respect for dissent and 
difference is maintained. Absent such respect, tyranny will replace pluralism, 
and individuals will no longer have ways to seek their own personal ends 
and the collective good through democratic deliberation. Liberal democ-
racy must therefore respect disagreement as much as it pursues consensus. 
Such tolerance is advanced through the fostering of a culture that not only 
tolerates dissent but also provides avenues for dissenting views to be freely 
expressed within mainstream dialogue. When opposition is expressed on 
a large scale, it is healthy for democracy because it confronts widespread 
political attitudes and symbols and transforms marginalized views into 
voices of currency and relevance.
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There are likely those who would join the ranks of social commenta-
tors and academics Kalle Lasn, Robert Putnam, and Naomi Klein or activ-
ist Peter Tatchell in arguing that popular culture and entertainment pacify 
and insulate the American public from the real obligations and challenges 
of democratic citizenship.5 Pop culture, to them, is a commercialized opiate 
that, in the spirit of Neil Postman, amuses the public to death.6 However, 
the purpose of this book is to counter such perspectives and reveal how 
popular culture can be used to deconstruct or undermine dominant politi-
cal and social standards. Far from being merely a tool of entertainment or 
pacification, popular culture is sometimes used by people when they dis-
agree with mainstream attitudes and are looking for a way to express their 
dissent. In these instances, pop culture becomes a medium for the expres-
sion of countervailing ideas in order to advance change and alter the public 
conversation. When we look at where expressions of dissent are occurring 
in our society, such as the examples included in this volume, we gain insight 
into how our society deals with dissenting views, what these views are, and 
how they are expressed.
Overt Advocacy and Covert Politics in Popular Culture
There are two ways in which popular culture can engage in the expression 
of social, cultural, and political dissent. The first is through overt messaging 
in which popular culture is used to advance direct, clear political advocacy. 
Such messages are openly political without attempting to mask or hide them 
within a broader entertainment framework. Examples of overt political 
engagement through popular culture abound. The direct influence of celeb-
rity and popular culture on political discourse is evident in documentary 
films such as Darfur Now, a call to action to end the humanitarian crisis 
in the Darfur region of Sudan. This documentary prominently features 
Don Cheadle, who also helped produce the movie, and other celebrity 
activists, such as George Clooney, who coproduced and narrated another 
documentary on the crisis, Sand and Sorrow. Similarly, Leonardo DiCaprio 
used his star status to call attention to the ecological crisis resulting from 
global warming by producing and narrating The th Hour, which followed 
on the heels of Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth, exploring 
similar issues. Likewise, famed director Spike Lee confronts the problems 
of poverty, racism, poor governmental planning and response, and social 
perceptions that led to the numerous and widespread problems following 
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Hurricane Katrina in the HBO documentary When the Levees Broke: A 
Requiem in Four Acts, which features celebrity activists Sean Penn, Kanye 
West, Harry Belafonte, and Wynton Marsalis alongside public officials and 
prominent scholars.
In addition to overt political messaging in documentary films, popular 
corporate brands have begun to promote direct political engagement by mar-
keting products with a clear political message. For example, Product (RED) 
has created a network of corporate participation involving businesses such as 
the Gap, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Converse to raise awareness about HIV/
AIDS. More important, by tapping into the strategy of a “buycott,” which 
allows consumers to purchase products in a socially conscious fashion to 
further a particular agenda, (RED) has generated more than $120 million 
for the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, which has impacted an estimated 2.5 
million lives in Africa.7
Political organizations such as MoveOn.org have also embraced the 
power of popular culture to engage and influence voters by moving away 
from traditional Beltway political formats of advertising and disseminating 
information. MoveOn has produced advertisements directed by A-list Hol-
lywood celebrities, comedians, popular music artists, and hip-hop producers. 
MoveOn has also attempted to work its way into the consciousness of poten-
tially disengaged citizens by placing ads in Entertainment Weekly, People, 
and Rolling Stone.8 Following a similar strategy, Barack Obama famously 
took out advertising space in the popular video games Burnout Paradise, a 
racing game for X-Box 360 that features an Obama billboard with the Web 
site voteforchange.com prominently displayed, and Madden NFL 2009. He 
also used both a text-messaging campaign and the social networking sites 
Facebook and MySpace to reach out to primarily young voters.9
It is important to note that the interplay between politics and popu-
lar culture has direct social and political effects. A 2008 study released by 
Christopher A. Cooper and Mandi Bates Bailey found that entertainment 
news shows have a significant positive effect on civic knowledge among the 
politically disinterested.10 Their research is supported by a 2004 Annenberg 
national election survey that found that voters who watched entertainment 
news knew more about the policy preferences and positions of presidential 
candidates than did nonviewers.11 Likewise, a study by researchers at the 
Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State Uni-
versity indicated that the efforts of celebrities such as Beyonce Knowles, 
Christina Aguilera, and Sean “Diddy” Combs were influential in promot-
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ing youth voter turnout, which increased by 12 percent between 2000 and 
2008.12 The researchers concluded that celebrity appeals connect young 
voters to the political process and help them understand that their actions 
can make a difference, transforming politics into something that is popular 
and exciting. Such studies show the important influence of popular culture 
artifacts, such as Eminem’s Mosh, a rap song and video to promote youth 
engagement in the 2004 election, or U2 front-man Bono’s numerous calls 
for public awareness and action on a range of issues, including debt relief 
for the world’s poorest nations, AIDS, and the environment. These overt 
messages in popular culture are clear and direct and are having an observ-
able impact.
No less important is the second way that popular culture can engage 
in transforming social and cultural convention, though it is less direct and 
less obvious. Through the use of covert messaging, which masks political 
ideas in the guise of entertainment, this strategy engages the political in a 
far subtler way. Such efforts can introduce oppositional ideas and values 
The members of U2: Larry Mullen Jr., Adam Clayton, Bono, and the Edge (from 
left to right). The band is known for its protest anthems, political messages, and a 
brand of activism that extends beyond the music. (Jerry Ohlinger’s Movie Mate-
rial Store)
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without openly or directly confronting audiences, which might cause them 
to turn away or reject the message outright. These subtle challenges can get 
individuals to think about their own views, beliefs, values, and priorities. 
Through covert messaging, we find popular culture attempting to engage 
the mass public indirectly in social and political discourse.
The influence of popular culture on the politics of mainstream society is 
well documented. In Politics and Popular Culture, John Street describes how 
popular culture helps organize the values and preferences of society, which 
also shapes personal and public identities. Street claims that “contemporary 
politics is itself conducted through the language and the formats of popular 
culture,” and he cites the work of Iain Chambers from a decade earlier when 
he notes that popular culture offers a “democratic prospect for appropriating 
and transforming everyday life.” Street is careful not to overstate the case. 
He does not claim that we are forced to imitate the messages or portrayals 
within popular culture, nor does popular culture serve entirely as a social 
mirror. Instead, popular culture can be viewed as something woven inex-
tricably into the fabric of democratic society and the lives of its consumers 
in a manner that allows us to “live through and with it.”13
Popular culture’s ability to challenge social norms and conventions 
in a manner that covertly influences mainstream perception is evident in 
portrayals of race. To examine the question “Is America ready for a black 
president?” National Public Radio ran a segment on All Things Considered 
on January 31, 2008, exploring how Dennis Haysbert’s portrayal of President 
David Palmer in the first through fifth seasons of 24 and Morgan Freeman’s 
role as President Tom Beck in the movie Deep Impact may have helped pave 
the way for acceptance of the notion of an African American president. Nei-
ther the television show nor the movie directly advocated that voters change 
their minds about race, but as Todd Boyd, a critical studies professor at the 
University of Southern California’s School of Cinematic Arts, noted in the 
segment, such portrayals “may have subconsciously made some things in 
society seem less troubling.”14 Had the television series Commander-in-Chief, 
starring Geena Davis as America’s first female president, been able to resolve 
some of its time-slot problems and translate its initial number-one rating 
on Tuesday nights into a regular viewing audience, a similar conversation 
might have been held about gender.
Like the examples of overt communication, covert political messaging 
in popular culture is all around us. The focus of this book is on the latter, as 
the contributing authors show how popular culture works to influence the 
8 Joseph J. Foy
cultural conversation without directly advocating for change. While some 
of the chapters show the theoretical connection between popular culture 
and social opposition, others demonstrate both the affect (the emotional 
experience invoked by popular culture artifacts to impress a particular per-
spective on an audience) and the effect (the direct change elicited by popu-
lar culture on political beliefs and actions) of dissenting views expressed in 
popular culture.
Pop Culture and Reactionary Opposition
Many of the chapters in this volume deal with progressive social, cultural, and 
policy issues rather than reactionary messages within popular culture. That 
does not mean that reactionary messages do not exist in popular forms of 
entertainment. One need only turn on the radio to hear conservative voices 
on entertainment talk shows or turn the dial to country music stations fea-
turing the conservative lyrics of popular artists such as Toby Keith.15 There 
are, in fact, numerous examples of popular culture expressing reactionary 
opposition to prevailing social and political trends.
A common theme in this regard is the expression of dissent against the 
growth of the state. In The Power of Myth, Joseph Campbell points to the 
character of Darth Vader in the Star Wars saga as representing the growth 
and transformation of the technocratic and overly bureaucratized state. 
According to Campbell:
Darth Vader has not developed his own humanity. He’s a robot. He’s a 
bureaucrat, living not in terms of himself but in terms of an imposed 
system. This is the threat to our lives that we all face today. Is the 
system going to flatten you out and deny you your humanity, or are 
you going to be able to make use of the system to the attainment of 
human purposes? How do you relate to the system so that you are not 
compulsively serving it? It doesn’t help to try to change it to accord 
with your system of thought. The momentum of history behind it is 
too great for anything really significant to evolve from that kind of 
action. The thing to do is learn to live in your period of history as a 
human being. That’s something else, and it can be done.16
Darth Vader represents a strong conservative fear of the growth of the dehu-
manized bureaucratic state and the desire to maintain one’s individualism 
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and rights in the face of evolving state power.17 That the rebellion in Star 
Wars seeks to liberate humanity from the all-encompassing, oppressive 
state reveals a reactionary, conservative message in the film. This mes-
sage is mimicked in the sci-fi western series Firefly and its feature film 
Serenity, as the ruggedly underdeveloped pioneer planets of the outer rim 
struggle to maintain their identity and freedom from the growing central 
Alliance.18
Also wrapped up in Campbell’s assessment of Vader is the assumption 
that an increasingly technologically driven society would deprive human-
ity of its true self. The fear of technology as challenging those traditional 
aspects of humanity has worked its way into numerous artifacts of popular 
culture. This is most evident in the popularity of the Terminator films and 
the popular Fox spin-off series The Sarah Connor Chronicles, which follow 
humankind’s struggle to save itself from the growing threat of machines 
that will one day wipe out our existence. Likewise, the CBS suspense-thriller 
Eleventh Hour works under the premise that humankind has overcome the 
forces of nature only to be threatened by the very science and technologies 
that facilitated civilization’s ascension. Such reactionary voices also find 
their way into less obvious portrayals in film and television. One example 
is the conclusion of the action film Rambo: First Blood Part II, when John 
J. Rambo (Sylvester Stallone)—himself a symbol for the primal nature of 
man—opens fire on the computers and equipment in Marshal Murdock’s 
(Charles Napier) command center before threatening to kill the heartless 
and unfeeling bureaucrat for his lack of concern for the American soldier 
who sacrificed so much for the state.19
A reactionary response to the forces of globalization is also present in 
many artifacts of contemporary popular culture. The 1990 Academy Award–
winning Best Picture Dances with Wolves is perhaps the quintessential 
frontier narrative that highlights the “globalization theme” of an expanding 
civilization’s threat to traditional life and society. We are first introduced to 
Lieutenant John Dunbar (Kevin Costner) as he fights on the front lines of 
the American Civil War. After his suicide attempt turns into a heroic ride 
that captures the attention of his superiors, Dunbar requests a transfer to the 
western frontier because he would like to see it before it disappears entirely. 
The story follows his solitary arrival and his communion with the land and 
its creatures. His animal familiars, Cisco the horse and Two Socks the wolf, 
represent the natural connection Dunbar has with the frontier, and his slow 
friendship with the Sioux tribe near the fort represents his immersion in the 
John Connor (Christian Bale) from the Terminator series symbolizes conserva-
tive reaction to the rapid proliferation of technology that has begun to transform 
society. (MovieGoods)
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traditional culture of the American West. But the civilization Dunbar left is 
close behind him. Soon more soldiers arrive, and they begin to threaten the 
traditional life of the Sioux. Moreover, the arrival of the soldiers is a har-
binger of the expansion of the industrialized East into the western frontier. 
Eventually civilization will touch all parts of North America; no longer will 
there be a place to escape its encroachment. Dances with Wolves ends with 
Dunbar and his wife, Stands with a Fist (Mary McDonnell), parting ways 
with the Sioux tribe, as members of the U.S. Calvary hunt them down. The 
end of the film gives the impression of a world that is getting smaller, one 
where the external is always present and with us. This conclusion illustrates 
the final disappearance of the American frontier, a symbol of the traditional 
sovereignty and cultural autonomy of an American past that is confronting 
the omnipresent forces of globalization.20
As evidenced in the aforementioned examples, not every form of dis-
sent in popular culture is aimed at progressive social change. Protests from 
the political Right are usually aimed at reducing the size of government, 
supporting the values of a traditional moral culture, promoting a certain 
view of the national American identity, or advancing a realist or isolation-
ist foreign policy. Given these various expressions of reactionary dissent, a 
reader might wonder why this book does not include an extensive discus-
sion of these voices of protest. There are two primary reasons. First, most 
of the texts analyzed in this book were produced during the period when 
conservative politics prevailed in the national political landscape and cul-
ture (2000–2006). George W. Bush and a Republican Congress unified 
government, allowing the pursuit of an aggressive military foreign policy, 
free-market economics, and a reduction in the size and credibility of the 
national government (whether through intentional acts of devolution and 
deregulation or the negligence of executive agencies, as was the case with 
the response to Hurricane Katrina). A majority of the electorate endorsed or 
tolerated these policies, and mainstream news reporting rarely questioned 
or undermined the foreign and domestic policy during this period. There-
fore, voices of dissent in popular culture were often aimed at this prevailing 
conservative politics. If an era of widespread liberal politics were to take over 
the national political culture in the mass-mediated age, we would expect to 
see many more popular culture texts reacting to this politics in the form of 
conservative dissent.
Second, protest and dissent tend to be progressive by their very nature. 
Progressive politics is about challenging political conventions and conserva-
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tive ideologies that stand in the way of reform. By definition, conservative 
is that which attempts to preserve what is in place, while progressive forces 
attempt to push society in a direction presumed to be better. Conservatives 
romanticize the past, while progressives romanticize the future. Dissent aimed 
at social change, no matter what the era, tends to aim at this future. Dissent 
does not intend to reinforce the social orders; it intends to change it. 
From Culture to the Classroom:  
The Pedagogy of Oppositional Pop
Just as there are many different ways that popular culture introduces oppo-
sitional voices into the social and political mainstream, there are many 
different approaches to the subject. The contributors to this book are a 
multidisciplinary team of scholars who bring expertise in the areas of politi-
cal science and public administration, sociology, criminal justice and law, 
history, film and media studies, communications, and English. Some of the 
chapters explain the theoretical ways in which popular culture can be seen 
as a vehicle for oppositional expression, while others demonstrate the his-
tory of the incorporation of popular culture elements into labor and social 
movements. Some of the chapters explore quantitative data that reveal the 
direct impact of political representation in popular culture on a viewing 
audience, while others perform more qualitative case studies of one or two 
popular culture artifacts. Still others examine some of the covert messages 
wrapped up in popular culture through a textual analysis of films and televi-
sion shows. Collectively, the chapters of this book demonstrate the diverse 
ways pop culture introduces opposition into the social and political main-
stream, and they tap into the various themes relevant to an introductory 
study of the interplay between popular media and politics, identity, culture, 
and society.
The contributors to this volume join a growing field of scholarly voices 
and pursuits as academics begin to explore more deeply the interplay 
between images and messages in popular culture and political and social 
change. A cursory search through course catalogs and syllabi of colleges and 
universities across the country reveals a proliferation of courses examining 
the sociology and politics of popular culture. For example, courses on the 
Sociology of Popular Culture are being taught at the University of Penn-
sylvania, the University of Vermont, and Bucknell University; American 
Popular Culture and Politics: 1940–Present is offered at the University of 
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Minnesota; and Popular Culture and American Politics is a course at the 
University of Tennessee–Knoxville. These and a host of other classes being 
taught on campuses throughout the United States reveal that the cultural 
interplay between the politics and sociology of popular culture is becoming 
a serious field of scholarly inquiry. We believe this volume will find a home 
in those classrooms, and we hope it helps students discover some of those 
covert messages of social, cultural, and political opposition that are present 
in contemporary popular media.
The goal of this volume is to explore the dynamics of the expression of 
dissent and oppositional voices in popular culture and in social and politi-
cal movements. To accomplish this, the book has been divided into three 
parts. Part 1 demonstrates how popular culture creates a “public space” 
wherein democratic debates and dialogue about important issues are 
waged. Timothy Dale uses social and political theory to explore the notions 
of a public sphere and demonstrates how popular culture facilitates the 
democratic discussion of and engagement in ideas of national importance 
within this public space. Jamie Warner provides a theoretical framework 
that extends this notion by demonstrating how entertainment news pro-
grams such as The Daily Show with Jon Stewart introduce oppositional 
perspectives through comedy and satire to “speak truth to power.” Beth 
Wielde Heidelberg and David Schultz provide a survey of popular political 
movies to demonstrate how social views of the state and shared societal 
values and priorities are framed and influenced by the consumption of 
popular culture. Finally, Paul Cantor examines how popular culture can 
be viewed in post-9/11 America through a reexamination of the relevant 
themes and messages in the longest-running science fiction show in tele-
vision history, The X-Files.
Part 2 turns to an examination of how dissent is expressed by means 
of the social messages conveyed through popular media. Here a variety of 
views on politics, society, culture, and identity are explored, beginning with 
a chapter by Sara Jordan and Phillip Gray, who examine oppositional mes-
sages against the regulatory state as expressed through the heroic antics of 
the title character in the series House. This is followed by Peter Caster, who 
uses Spike Lee’s film 25th Hour to explore themes of dissent related to the 
American prison system and issues of incarceration. Katherine Lehman 
moves the discussion to an evaluation of identity politics and sociopoliti-
cal messaging related to sexual orientation and issues of rights and equal-
ity as expressed through the actions of Rosie O’Donnell. Matthew Henry 
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then uses The Simpsons as the basis for a discussion about religious debates 
wrapped up in the larger topic of an American culture war. Finally, Joseph 
Foy concludes this part with an examination of the environmental messages 
contained in a genre of film known as “eco-horror” and a textual reading of 
M. Night Shyamalan’s The Happening as the basis for exploring American 
ecological politics and policies.
Part 3 examines how popular culture directly facilitates societal, cultural, 
and political transformation and change through a look at the dynamics of 
dissent and social movements. To begin this part, Jeffrey Johnson provides 
a historical context to the relationship between popular media and political 
movements by analyzing the use of popular culture by labor organizations 
and leftist movements at the turn of the twentieth century in America. 
This historical perspective is extended by Jerry Rodnitzky, who bridges the 
gap between history and the present through an examination of popular 
music as a vehicle for protest from Vietnam to the current wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Next, Tanji Gilliam uses hip-hop as the basis for an inquiry 
into representation, power, and identity formation within the black commu-
nity. Isabel Pinedo then examines how popular culture transforms not only 
the way people understand politics but also how they use popular media to 
mobilize and express opposition to institutions of power; she does this by 
looking into the notions of fandom associated with the CBS series Jericho. 
Carl Bergetz explores the transformational effect entertainment media have 
had on America’s mainstream news media. Finally, Diana Relke takes us back 
to the future with a look into how Gene Roddenberry’s Star Trek franchise 
(and Star Trek: The Next Generation in particular) influenced perspectives 
and dialogues on identity, gender, and power in the academy and households 
across America and around the world.
In the premiere episode of The Colbert Report, Stephen Colbert 
announces that the viewers of his show are “heroes” who know that “some-
thing must be done.” He then pounds his fist on his C-shaped desk to inform 
them that they are doing something right now—they “are watching TV.”21 
His proclamation might be met with smirks, guffaws, and skepticism, but 
the authors of the chapters of this book lend credence to this tongue-in-
cheek commentary. Although true activism requires mobilized engagement 
to inspire change, the empowerment of political dissent via mass media 
and popular culture reflected in these pages provides an argument that true 
public, democratic action is occurring through popular culture. We merely 
have to tune in to join the conversation.
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the revolutIon 
Is beIng televIsed
The Case for Popular Culture as Public Sphere
Timothy M. Dale
The Gil Scott Heron song “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised” begins 
with the lines “You will not be able to stay home, brother. / You will not be 
able to plug in, turn on and cop out.” As a call to political action, the song 
takes on the laziness and corporatism of popular culture as inimical to real 
political change. The song declares a litany of popular culture and media 
institutions as irrelevant to “the revolution” and suggests that the revolution 
will require real activism that is impossible within the confines of popular 
media, music, television, and film. Written before the twenty-four-hour 
news cycle, the proliferation of cable programming, product placement, 
and reality television, the lyrics of the Heron song are even more accusing 
of modern popular culture. Has modern popular culture removed us even 
further from the possibilities of political activity and prevented us from 
effecting change in society? With this question, we should consider Heron’s 
warning seriously: if I have “plugged in” and “turned on” my satellite dish, 
DVD collection, computer, and iPod, have I “copped out”?
The answer depends on how we understand political activity and the 
public sphere. A traditional understanding of the public sphere is that politi-
cal discourse is possible only in the realm of traditional political spaces. 
According to this view, the classic political spaces of picket lines, the halls of 
government, and conversations at cafés are where the action is. The trappings 
of popular culture are at best diversions and at worst insidious mechanisms 
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limiting our creativity and stifling our political imagination. But if political 
expression can exist in a multiplicity of forms, and exposing injustice and 
setting discursive agendas are forms of political activity, then perhaps the 
revolution can be televised after all.
The same year Heron recorded “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised” 
(1971), millions of American households were tuned in to All in the Family, 
the most popular show on television. The star of the show is Archie Bunker, 
a working-class (anti)hero who is also an ongoing satire of intolerance. In 
a notable episode that aired on February 9, 1971, titled “Judging Books by 
Covers,” Archie is convinced that his son-in-law, Michael, has a friend who 
is gay. Archie bases this assumption on the behavior, appearance, and man-
nerisms of this friend. It turns out that Michael’s friend is not gay, but Archie 
is even more shocked to learn that his ex–football player drinking buddy 
is. Situated within sharp, humorous dialogue and well-written characters 
Norman Lear’s All in the Family, the highest rated television show of the 1970s, 
confronted many politically charged issues and frequently encouraged awareness 
and perspective through its uniquely written characters and comedy style. (Jerry 
Ohlinger’s Movie Material Store)
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are serious messages about homophobia, intolerance, and social stigma. 
Produced years before the gay rights movement became widespread, and at 
a time when the open discussion of homosexuality was taboo, the episode 
was clearly intended as a political message by the show’s writers. In this case, 
a popular television show advanced a national dialogue on a controversial 
issue by exposing the narrowness and inaccuracy of homosexual stereotypes. 
After the episode aired, people had conversations about this issue in living 
rooms across the country, and millions were challenged to reconsider their 
thinking. The episode was remarkable enough that Richard Nixon had a 
recorded reaction to it in his infamous tapes.1
This is one of many examples of All in the Family utilizing its popular 
appeal to encourage a national dialogue about important social issues.2 Due 
in part to the controversy the program stirred up, everyone was watching—
more than 20 million households tuned in to All in the Family each year 
between 1971 and 1976, making it the number-one-rated show on television. 
Thus, during this period, the most popular show was also one of the bold-
est in terms of expressing dissenting views on issues of race, gender, class, 
and politics. The production of the show was a form of political action, and 
watching episodes could be politically formative. Can we say, then, that in 
the case of All in the Family, a revolution was televised?
The irony of arguing with Heron’s premise about the possibility of 
political activity through popular culture is that “The Revolution Will Not 
Be Televised” has itself become an artifact of popular culture. Originally 
recorded as a spoken word poem in 1970, it was rerecorded as a song on an 
album with musical accompaniment in 1971. The revolution, or at least this 
one song about it, was also in fact “televised.”3 The song has now become a 
cultural icon, appearing in the sound tracks to several films, including The 
Hurricane (1999). The song has also been covered by musicians across a 
range of musical styles, and it is iconically referenced in poetry, song lyrics, 
news stories, and television shows.4 Heron’s call to action is a political act, 
and popular culture becomes a mode for communicating, and debating, 
that call.
An Expanded View of the Public Sphere
Political expression does not always take the form of policy-oriented dia-
logue, formal political protest, or direct appeals to political representatives. 
Art and culture are rich with elements that connect individuals with ideas 
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and with communities of meaning. Often created with political intent, these 
elements can offer alternative avenues for compelling social commentary. 
Especially for those who express dissent with a message that may not have 
access at the ballot box, forms of artistic expression can give voice to the 
otherwise marginalized. Artistic voices do not always exist at the margins, 
however, and expressions of political dissent become even more salient in 
the public sphere when they are expressed in modes of popular culture.
This realization is possible, however, only if we conceive broadly of 
the “public sphere.” We engage in political discourse “in public.” If politi-
cal discourse can take many forms, the public sphere can be conceived of 
as a multiplicity of spaces. Additionally, different messages and forms of 
communication are intended for and received by different audiences. If we 
imagine a public sphere in which newspapers, talk radio, and the halls of 
government account for all public discourse, we will be missing something. 
When modeled as a concept limited to the place where explicit policy debate 
and deliberation take place, the public sphere does not necessarily include 
the forms of political expression and types of political messages that can 
be found throughout popular culture. If, however, we understand political 
discourse as that which is expressed in a broader public sphere, including 
a wide range of ever-expanding modes of discourse, then we can better 
understand the role of cultural expression as it relates to political institu-
tions and policies.
Such an expanded view of the public sphere is advocated and explored 
by several contemporary political theorists. They believe that a diversified 
conception of the public sphere is promising because it includes not only 
different forms of expression that should be called political but also different 
groups and messages that may not have widespread access to or acceptance 
through other means of political communication.5 Marginalized groups, for 
example, can create alternative publics to raise issues among themselves and 
develop their own discursive modes for expressing their perspective. Political 
dissent expressed among a group of people naturally creates its own public 
sphere, and the dissent is shaped through participation in the dialogue. 
Multiple publics then vie for attention, as arguments are made within and 
among them. The political debates that prevail, and the conclusions that are 
reached, are the consequence of the interplay among these publics.
Musicians can write political messages into lyrics, for example, that are 
heard by audiences and spread in digital form. A political message contained 
therein can have just as much impact as something written on an editorial 
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page, even though it is expressed within this limited “public.” For marginal-
ized groups, this method can be especially effective, allowing communities 
to be created around dissenting ideas and back channels for communica-
tion.6 Additionally, as publics interact, such a message can be spread even 
further, and if enough people are exposed to the message, we would say that 
the song has become an artifact of popular culture.
The expanded view of the public sphere also suggests that not every 
public sphere or collection of political expressions is intended to directly 
affect decision making. Although we engage in political deliberation about 
public policy in public, public spheres are also spaces where we form our 
opinions, and the interactions therein have a significant role in shaping our 
political identities. That identity, shaped by cultural influences, is the foun-
dation for political activity. Thus, any sharp distinction between “political” 
public spheres and “cultural” ones misunderstands the nature of political 
activity and the essential role that identity formation plays in originat-
ing political action in the first place. Given the importance of identity for 
politics, we should consider the political significance of both “strong” and 
“weak” publics—the former concerned with decision making and the latter 
with identity formation.7 As evidenced in the chapters of this book, popular 
culture is full of politics, and politics is full of popular culture.
Just as the public sphere is not homogeneous, popular culture is het-
erogeneous as well. As popular culture outlets proliferate, these multiple 
forms of media circulate a variety of discourses and make them available 
for analysis.8 The examples explored in the chapters that follow demonstrate 
that many political things are happening in popular culture, and they are 
happening among different audiences, through different messages, and with 
different political consequences. Thus, even as we refer to “popular culture” 
as a collection of artifacts and symbols consumed by large portions of the 
population, they also exist as distinct artifacts of political expression to be 
analyzed and understood.
Culture, Commercialism, and Co-option
Obviously, not all popular culture contains political content. Much of popu-
lar culture is produced to be a diversion, intended as an escape from the 
matters of everyday life and, more importantly, to sell products for adver-
tisers. Even when there is political content in elements of popular culture, 
not all of it is effective at bringing about social change, nor does it neces-
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sarily challenge prevailing political and moral orders. This is not evidence 
of the wholesale irrelevance of popular culture for expressions of dissent 
and political change, however. Dismissing popular culture as irrelevant 
for understanding the way dissenting views are expressed simply because 
much of it lacks political content, and because most of it is complicit with 
established political and economic orders, prevents us from appreciating 
those instances when popular culture can have a transformative effect on 
the broader culture and politics.
A visible example of the use of popular culture to promote a politi-
cal agenda is the work of Bono (U2’s front man) to promote awareness of 
global poverty and other international issues. Bono meets regularly with 
world leaders, appears at concerts dedicated to international justice issues, 
and promotes the special products of companies such as American Express, 
Gap, and Apple, which promise to donate a portion of the proceeds to his 
favored charities. Are Bono’s actions effective political activism? Should it 
be considered political activism to purchase products or attend concerts?
Such are the questions posed by Naomi Klein and others who chal-
lenge the notion that political action can be embodied in consumerism. 
In her book No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Klein suggests that 
corporate sponsorship of political activism is merely capitalism finding 
ways to profit from dissenting political views.9 Even worse, this co-opting 
of dissenting views renders them harmless to the prevailing order: people 
purchase products, feel that they are making a difference, and do nothing 
else to address social problems. Calling this tendency the “Bono-ization” 
of political action, Klein argues that “what’s been lost . . . is [the] ability to 
change [global] power structures. There are still the winners and losers, 
people who are locked in to the power structures and those locked out.”10 
This “stadium rock” model of protest is less powerful because everyone 
affected by it is a spectator rather than a participant.
Klein’s argument forces a choice between consumerism and citizen-
ship and claims that the prevalence of marketing in protest movements has 
allowed the former to take over the latter. But is the dichotomy between 
citizenship and consumerism accurate? As long as markets have existed, the 
power of the consumer as a political actor has been utilized to effect politi-
cal change, though primarily through consumer boycotts. Buying certain 
products because doing so sends a message, gives money to a cause, and 
allows us to participate in a particular community of ideas (referred to as 
“buycotting”) is also a political act. Merely because the Gap profits from 
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this exchange does not mean that this form of political action is irrelevant 
or has been inexorably co-opted by the market. Rather, we could say that 
the political movement has exploited the market by advancing a particular 
agenda.
Having a limited view of effective protest activity also neglects the sense 
in which participation occurs within both weak and strong publics (to use 
Fraser’s terminology described previously). Strong publics, involved in dem-
onstrations and deliberations, require participants rather than spectators. 
In weak publics, however, everyone is both a participant and a spectator. It 
is in these publics that one’s political identity is formed. This identity has 
to be formed, and the commitments of the protest movement engendered, 
before activism within strong publics takes place. Complaining that buy-
ing a T-shirt promoting awareness of AIDS or poverty does little to change 
global power structures seems misplaced.
A person who buys (RED) products at the Gap to fight global AIDS is 
helping to establish his or her identity as someone who cares about AIDS. 
This act of purchasing forms an identity and establishes membership in a 
group. The act of buying the shirt may not do much to combat AIDS—the 
$25 for a (RED) shirt might be better spent sending a check directly to an 
AIDS charity—but the ownership and wearing of the shirt is likely to have 
a greater effect beyond the act of the purchase itself. For example, the per-
son may be more likely to vote for candidates who support African AIDS 
programs, engage in conversations with friends about global AIDS, and 
join an activist group as a result of the importance of this issue to his or 
her political identity. Clearly, the act of buying a shirt is not always simply 
buying a shirt.
One potential problem with this kind of political protest is the false sense 
that people are “making a difference” simply by purchasing a product. This 
is an impossibly difficult standard to uphold, however—that is, in order to 
be considered worthwhile, political acts must have some measurable effect 
on the world of political decision making. If the difference I make is merely 
one of understanding myself and my political commitments with a little 
more certainty, this too counts as a political act.
Another reason to doubt the political efficacy of popular culture is that 
certain forms of protest are complicit with the very systems that perpetuate 
the social problem they are battling (consumerism fighting global poverty, 
for example). Every protest movement struggles with this dilemma, how-
ever: to what extent should it work outside the “system,” and to what extent 
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should it use the system to spread its message? Although it is helpful to be 
reminded that the system itself is flawed, this is not an independent reason 
to reject the use of consumer culture to spread ideas—even ideas against 
consumer culture itself. In No Logo, Klein describes the use of commercial 
messages to critique commerce as ironic, but rather than a liability, irony 
itself can be an instrument for expressing dissent. Dissent needs controversial 
and engaged activism, as Klein suggests, but it also requires an accessible 
communication of ideas that reach as many people as possible. The value of 
the “multiple publics” model is that it does not force us to choose between 
different forms of political activism as more or less legitimate.
Understanding a model of social change as effective only from the “out-
side” is limited because it ignores the necessity of cultural transformation 
in addition to the need to convince decision makers through social pres-
sure. Political expression is about shaping cultural identities and identify-
ing forms of oppression, as well as affecting political decisions.11 Dissent in 
popular culture may have a greater effect on the former than the latter, but 
this is no reason to ignore it as a force of social change. Over the last two 
decades, for example, the movement for gay rights has been as affected by 
Ellen DeGeneres, Rosie O’Donnell, and Dharma and Greg as it has been by 
demonstrations or other “engaged” forms of activism, and corporate spon-
sorship did not diminish these effects.
Exposition, Legitimation, and Agendas
The popular culture artifacts with arguably the greatest potential impact 
on society are television programs and films. Televisions have become the 
social and recreational centerpieces of most American homes, and movies 
are one of the top ways that people seek entertainment outside of television. 
Because of their widespread consumption, television shows and movies 
are significant constitutive elements of what we consider popular culture, 
and because they are viewed by so many, we would expect them to make 
significant contributions to national dialogues and cultural identities. As 
such, some of them have been important for communicating dissenting 
viewpoints to a wider public. (Many of the chapters in this book are dedi-
cated to examining such artifacts.)
In addition to the influence of cultural expressions on the formation 
of identity, the widely distributed productions of television and film often 
play an even greater role in shaping the dialogue that occurs in the public 
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sphere (and across public spheres). Regarding political issues, these ele-
ments of popular culture can have a threefold effect on how political issues 
are received and discussed: they can expose issues that might otherwise be 
overlooked, they can legitimize issues and viewpoints that might otherwise 
be considered marginal or inappropriate, and they can set agendas for politi-
cal discussion, forcing issues into a national dialogue that otherwise might 
not have taken place. 
The ability of television and film to reach a wide audience means that 
the writers, directors, and producers of these media have a powerful tool at 
their disposal to draw attention to problems or issues that are not yet at the 
forefront of the national consciousness. These depictions are not always of 
controversial issues—many shows present what amounts to “public service 
messages” intended to increase awareness of important topics. The moti-
vation to serve the community led to the widespread use of “very special 
episodes” by sitcoms in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In these episodes, a 
typically comedic show would become serious while the characters dealt 
with issues such as drunk driving, teen suicide, or drug use.12 Though usually 
uncontroversial, except for the advertised “shock value” intended to garner 
high ratings, these programs demonstrate that popular culture is understood 
by many as a tool for communicating socially relevant messages.
The power of television and film also makes them useful for communi-
cating more controversial messages that run counter to generally accepted 
viewpoints or challenge the widely accepted range of appropriate topics 
for television shows. As discussed in the introduction, All in the Family 
was an early example of dissenting views being expressed on television. 
Many episodes pushed controversial political and cultural viewpoints to 
the fore. Homosexuality, racism, and women’s liberation were all featured 
topics in episodes that successfully mixed humor with social commentary 
aimed at promoting tolerance. The character Mike (whom Archie nonaf-
fectionately referred to as “Meathead”) was a frequent mouthpiece for a 
range of politically charged, dissenting leftist viewpoints, most of which 
made Archie uncomfortable but all of which were vindicated by the end of 
the episode. Since All in the Family, many other television shows and films 
have attempted to bring awareness and focus to politically sensitive issues. 
The film Crash, for example, is widely recognized for confronting viewers 
with insidious racism. Hotel Rwanda educated hundreds of thousands of 
viewers about the horrors of the Rwandan genocide and brought attention 
to the continuing plight of millions of Africans. With so many people ready 
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to watch television and movies, these are ripe forms of communication for 
bringing unspoken and marginalized issues to the forefront.
When popular culture artifacts depict a controversial viewpoint, they 
sometimes legitimize that viewpoint as either worthwhile or accurate. These 
messages are designed to cause viewers to walk away not only with an aware-
ness of a problem or controversial opinion but also with a changed attitude 
toward a dissenting view or idea. In these cases, popular culture gives approval 
to these views or ideas, encouraging viewers to recognize the value of the dis-
senting political perspective and occasionally bringing these views to national 
attention through political debate. One of the most famous examples of this 
was the 1990s sitcom Murphy Brown, featuring a sarcastic, hard-hitting news 
reporter played by Candice Bergen. Although the show frequently referenced 
political events and issues, at the end of its fourth season it was thrust into the 
national political spotlight when Murphy (Bergen) gave birth to a child. The 
day after the episode aired, Vice President Dan Quayle singled out the show 
as an example of popular culture promoting bad family values by depicting 
Crash, written and directed by Paul Haggis, portrayed many different attitudes and 
perspectives on race and racism in the United States and won the Oscar for Best 
Picture of 2005. (MovieGoods)
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single motherhood as a “lifestyle choice.”13 In response, the following season 
of Murphy Brown began with a series of episodes that took direct aim at the 
vice president’s remarks. The show deliberately featured the struggles and joys 
of single motherhood, included explicit consideration of the social stigma 
on single-parent households, and examined a wide range of issues related to 
the definition of “family values.”
When Ellen DeGeneres’s character on the show Ellen declared that she 
was a lesbian, she became the first lead character in a popular television 
show to be openly gay. The “outing” of Ellen created a national stir, with 
supporters of gay rights defending the show and calling for increased public 
openness on issues of sexuality, and cultural critics decrying the show for its 
disrespect for traditional values.14 Dominating the headlines and gaining big 
ratings during this period, Ellen helped legitimize the “coming out” process 
and gave many the courage to do the same with family and friends. Since 
Ellen opened the door to the closet, several prominent figures in popular 
culture, both fictional and real, have proudly declared their sexuality.
It is important to note, even as we consider dissent in popular culture, 
that the legitimizing power of popular culture can work both ways. In many 
cases, it is not dissenting views but prevailing ones that are legitimated 
through television and film. In the television show 24, for example, the main 
character Jack Bauer fights against evil terrorists, allowing him the moral 
certitude to fight these immoral agents with any means necessary, including 
the use of torture.15 The show was so effective at communicating the kind of 
tactics required when fighting such a war that foreign policy conservatives 
embraced it as a depiction of the best way to fight the “war on terror.” From 
Rush Limbaugh to the Heritage Foundation, Jack Bauer was glorified as the 
ultimate hero who legitimized the prevailing arguments in the Bush admin-
istration about how to rightly and effectively combat terrorist aggressors.16 
This kind of legitimation can hardly be called dissent, since it authorizes both 
prevailing and institutionalized views, yet it proves that active legitimation 
occurs in popular culture from all sides of the political spectrum.17
Additionally, it is easy to identify ways that popular culture obscures 
dissenting voices in favor of a prevailing national culture. This is especially 
true in times of national crisis, when the value of unity is occasionally pro-
nounced and emphasized through a cooperative cultural defense. After 
September 11, 2001, for example, much of popular culture united to dem-
onstrate a collective national pride. This unity was embodied in the simul-
cast of America: A Tribute to Heroes, wherein musicians, actors, and other 
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celebrities joined to sing “America the Beautiful” and perform other acts 
of patriotism for the massive fund-raising effort. This display of a unified 
cultural voice did not last long, however; as political debate began to occur 
about the appropriate response to the attack, dissent found its way back 
into popular culture. For example, ironic humor on late-night talk shows 
and other comedy programming quickly became popular again. Although 
popular culture would maintain an enduring reverence for the tragic events 
of that day, many popular television shows addressed September 11 with 
humor—The Daily Show directing its insulting humor toward the absurdity 
of the evil perpetrators of the crime, and South Park depicting a love affair 
between Osama bin Laden and a camel.18
In addition to bringing visibility to marginalized issues and legitimizing 
dissenting as well as prevailing views, at its most “political” (in the “strong” 
sense), popular culture also attempts to set political agendas. When Holly-
wood produces a film that is politically motivated, it is often with the hope 
that a national conversation about the film will inspire citizens and law-
makers to instigate political change. The most successful examples of this 
are popularly distributed documentaries intended both to be entertaining 
and to effect some kind of social or political change. These include Mor-
gan Spurlock’s Super Size Me (2004); Al Gore’s film about climate change, 
An Inconvenient Truth (2006); and several films made by documentarian 
Michael Moore.19 In the case of Super Size Me, Spurlock’s marathon eating 
of fast food pressured McDonald’s and other fast-food restaurants to add 
healthier choices to their menus, and several states and cities passed public 
health laws regarding unhealthy fats and foods that restaurants cannot serve. 
Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth also succeeded in advancing the debate about 
climate change beyond the question of whether global warming is real. Sci-
entists had reached a consensus years before the film, but it took the wide 
distribution of Gore’s cinematic presentation of facts and figures to finally 
turn the national debate toward solutions.
Popular Dissent in the Public Sphere
When popular films and television shows expose, legitimate, and set agendas 
for the consideration of dissent, it demonstrates the influence popular cul-
ture can have on our political discourse. This discourse is broadened when 
multiple and diverse political views are communicated through popular 
forms of culture. Because our public sphere is best viewed as a collection of 
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multiple spheres and forms of expression, we will understand it better when 
we understand the multiple and dominant sources of information and cul-
tural meaning. Voices of dissent seek listeners, and popular culture is full of 
voices. We are listening to these voices, and they are affecting us. Sometimes 
they subtly encourage us to adopt different views,20 and sometimes we are 
hit in the face by that with which we disagree vehemently.
Students of politics, social movements, and popular culture are served 
by analyzing the relationships between marginalized voices and mainstream 
cultural expressions. An appreciation of the political relevance of popu-
lar culture, and a broadened view of the public sphere that includes these 
cultural expressions, allows new insight into the way our identities, ideas, 
and politics are shaped by the messages that surround us. Even for political 
activists and practitioners, an awareness of the productive forces at work in 
popular culture allows greater understanding of how dissent is expressed, 
spreads, and draws people toward social movements.
Gil Scott Heron declared that the “revolution will not be televised,” but 
in a world where everything is televised, it is inevitable that the revolution 
will be as well. These forms of expression deserve analysis because popular 
culture is full of political voices, many of them dissenting from prevailing 
views. It benefits us as scholars, students, and participants in this public 
sphere to understand these messages and their impact on society. We need 
to recognize that political expression in popular culture can contain a range 
of productive, counterproductive, and neutral relationships with voices of 
dissent. Through an understanding of the richness and diversity of popular 
culture as an important element of the public sphere, we better understand 
the political significance of popular culture and the multiple modes of 
expression and artifacts of dissenting voices we find there.
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the dAIly show  And the 
PolItICs oF truth
Jamie Warner
“One anchor, five correspondents, zero credibility.” So begins the descrip-
tion of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart on the Comedy Central Web site. It 
wraps up as follows: “Don’t miss The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, a nightly 
half-hour series unburdened by objectivity, journalistic integrity or even 
accuracy.” In contrast, many media and political heavyweights, such as Ted 
Koppel, Tim Russert, and Al Gore, argue exactly the opposite: The Daily 
Show is more credible, more objective, more accurate, and more truthful 
than the politicians it satirizes.
This chapter explores the complicated relationship between truth-telling 
and the satirical critique of The Daily Show. I argue that Jon Stewart embod-
ies a contemporary form of what Michel Foucault calls parrhesia, Greek for 
“truth-telling.” This unique form of parrhesia could only have emerged in 
our current political atmosphere: a colonization of the political space by the 
contemporary spectacle of politics itself, created by campaign consultants, 
political advertising, and political branding
The Daily Show highlights and satirizes this type of spectacle. This is 
the “truth” that Stewart and his cast are telling both explicitly and implicitly 
through parody, epitomizing the show’s role as a new type of democratic 
watchdog. Stewart offers no political alternatives of his own; his contributions 
are purely diagnostic. He is our guide through the morass of political hype 
generated by the politicians themselves, calling attention to the spectacle 
of the permanent campaign by highlighting the artifice of contemporary 
political discourse. By showcasing this spectacle as artifice and manipula-
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tion, Stewart and The Daily Show emerge as truth-tellers, despite their pro-
testations to the contrary.
Parrhesia: Telling the Truth
Truth is a complicated concept. From the biblical “The truth will set you free” 
(John 8:32) to Jack Nicholson’s character in A Few Good Men shouting “You 
can’t handle the truth,” what constitutes the truth, who can give voice to it, 
and how one can do so have been fraught with layers of often contradictory 
implications. Even seemingly simple factual truths like “the sky is blue” can 
become problematic when one examines them more carefully. When dealing 
with something infinitely more complex—such as politics—what counts as 
the truth quickly becomes a matter of debate.1
Comedy Central’s The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, the self-proclaimed “most 
important television show ever,” uses comedy and parody to unmask the political 
spectacle of modern American government and society. (MovieGoods)
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Thus, to better understand how a fake news program on Comedy Central 
can engage in truth-telling, it is first necessary to look more closely at the 
concept of parrhesia, a very specific kind of truth-telling that occurred in 
ancient Greek and Roman cultures. In the fall of 1983, philosopher Michel 
Foucault gave six lectures at the University of California–Berkeley in which 
he discussed the concept of parrhesia. He began by briefly examining par-
rhesia as a model of good citizenship in a democracy, then noted the changes 
in parrhesia that can occur in a monarchy and finally the philosophical 
relationship the parrhesiastes must have with himself as a truth-teller, which 
was Foucault’s main concern. In this chapter, however, I am most interested 
in that which interested Foucault the least: political parrhesia, or telling the 
truth in a democracy.2
First, according to Foucault, for truth-telling to be considered parrhe-
sia, the telling must be risky and the truth must be a critique of someone 
more powerful. The risk to the speaker can run the gamut from risking a 
friendship to risking one’s popularity to risking one’s life, but there must 
be some danger present for it to be considered parrhesia. Second, the par-
rhesiastes must be frank; it has to be obvious to his audience that what he 
says is his opinion, and to avoid any confusion, he must use direct, exact, 
unmistakable language. In the Greek context, Foucault argues, parrhesia 
stands in contrast to mere rhetoric—where the speaker’s aim is to convince 
the audience of his argument regardless of whether he actually believes what 
he says is true. Finally, the speaker who uses parrhesia regards his truth- 
telling as a duty. He is not telling the truth because he is being forced to 
do so or because of personal gain. He is free to stay silent, but instead he 
tells the truth because he believes it is his responsibility and obligation as a 
person and as a citizen.3
Thus, according to Foucault, political parrhesia was very important to 
the Greek conception of democracy. Not only was parrhesia a constitutional 
right of Greek citizens, it exemplified the ethical qualities of a good citizen. 
A good citizen was considered someone who tells the truth, even if doing 
so puts his political office, his friendships, his reputation, or even his life 
in jeopardy.4
That’s it. Foucault gives no empirical definition of the truth besides the 
three criteria laid out above. He does not speak to whether the parrhesiastic 
utterances must be empirically verifiable or philosophically universalizable. 
His only criteria are that the parrhesiastes must take a risk by criticizing 
someone or something more powerful, he must believe what he says and 
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say it plainly, and he must do it for the betterment of his country, not for 
himself.5 In the spirit of that definition, I argue that, paradoxically, a fake 
news show on Comedy Central, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, functions 
as a contemporary political parrhesiastes.6 To better understand how a fake 
news program staffed with comedians can fulfill this unlikely role, we must 
next examine the current political context in the United States, one in which 
telling the truth has morphed into selling the truth.
The Permanent Campaign: Selling the Truth
When Foucault lectured on parrhesia, he talked very specifically about how 
it worked within the Greek context where it originated. Thus, to examine 
contemporary versions of political parrhesia, we must first look at the con-
temporary political context.
Political communication has always had a strategic element, but con-
temporary mass political communication is now saturated with exactly 
the “rhetoric” against which Foucault defines parrhesia. Sidney Blumen-
thal popularized this move into total strategic rhetoric as the “permanent 
campaign”: image-based, winner-take-all, tactical rhetorical calculations 
traditionally reserved for political campaigns. These techniques, designed 
to “sell” a specific politician during the campaign, are now routinely used 
constantly, even after the politician wins office. And this, according to Blu-
menthal, “remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an 
elected official’s popularity.”7 According to this mentality, governing is no 
longer about legislating and implementing policies helpful to the American 
people; government is about accruing and keeping power by selling the 
American people a political product. As George W. Bush said, “See, in my 
line of work you got to keep repeating things over and over and over again 
for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda.”8
It is not controversial to argue that contemporary politics is built on the 
backs of an army of well-paid, nonelected staff working as general consul-
tants, media consultants, campaign managers, pollsters, public affairs execu-
tives, fund-raisers, and the like. In fact, many have become media celebrities 
in their own right, with recognizable names: Mark Penn, James Carville, 
Mary Matalin, Dick Morris, Paul Begala, and Karl Rove. Over the past forty 
years, these political consultants—often with backgrounds in advertising, 
marketing, public relations, direct mail, and polling—have become integral 
to the permanent campaign. With the help of their expertise, all commu-
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nications, all policies, all legislation must be “spun” in a way that highlights 
the strengths of one politician or political party while, hopefully, drowning 
out or denigrating one’s opponents.
In his book Words that Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People 
Hear, Republican pollster and strategist Frank Luntz exemplifies the most 
blatant and overt use of the language of the permanent campaign. (Actu-
ally, he thinks we should adopt it not only for governing but also for our 
lives. In fact, he recommends this book to people who would like to get out 
of speeding tickets, as does Chris Matthews, discussed later.) The theme 
of Luntz’s book is that all politics is rhetoric: what one says, even what one 
believes, is not that important. The important thing is what one’s audience 
hears. Thus, one must say things in a very particular (focus group–tested, 
sound bite–conscious, and overtly manipulated) way to effectively convey 
one’s message. Luntz is probably most famous for his behind-the-scenes 
work in selling Newt Gingrich’s 1994 Contract with America, but he has 
a long history of manipulating language in the service of the Republican 
Party. The following is an excerpt from a leaked 2005 memo to Republican 
congressional spouses entitled “The 21 Political Words and Phrases You 
Should Never Say Again . . . Plus a Few More”:
Never Say: Inheritance Tax, Estate Tax. Instead Say: Death Tax. 
While two-thirds of Americans (68 percent) think the “inheritance 
tax” or the “estate tax” is unfair, fully 78 percent view the “death tax” 
as unfair. And while a narrow majority would repeal the “inheritance” 
or “estate tax,” an overwhelming majority would repeal the “death 
tax.” If you want to kill it, always refer to it as the “death tax.”9
Notice that Luntz makes no mention of the fact that this really isn’t a “death 
tax” at all. Ninety-eight percent of Americans will never pay this tax. Only 
those who own property with a fair market value exceeding $1 million at 
the time of their death (or the wealthiest 2 percent of all Americans) are 
affected. Thinking in permanent campaign terms, however, means that the 
truth of the statement is not as important as the use of a phrase—in this 
case, “death tax”—that evokes a knee-jerk, negative gut feeling.10
The foundational problem with the permanent campaign mentality is 
that it works against the ideals of democracy, where informed citizens and 
their representatives debate and compromise to find the best practical solu-
tion. Marketing techniques are designed to “win” the consumer-citizen over 
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using emotionally manipulative rhetorical techniques, such as labeling a tax 
on estates over $1 million a “death tax.” The permanent campaign mentality 
does not encourage compromise, discussion, and working together toward 
the best solution to a problem: Should we tax property when people die? 
Why or why not? If not, how will we deal with the shortfall in the treasury? If 
so, how much tax is appropriate? By manipulating language, the permanent 
campaign effectively bypasses all these questions. Under these competitive 
conditions, the dialogue, discussion, and compromise necessary for good 
governance are actually detrimental, in the sense that they muddy the mes-
sage the consultants have worked so hard to sell to the public. In fact, the 
best-case scenario for politicians and their consultants is one in which there 
is no thinking, no critical examination, and no questioning on the part of 
the citizen—just a positive emotional reflex. The politician or party has thus 
become a trusted “brand” that inspires an unreflective loyalty in the mind of 
the consumer-citizen. Just as the ultimate goal of Geico, Gerber, or Google 
is for consumers to automatically, consistently, and unthinkingly use their 
brand, the ultimate goal of the permanent campaign is to create a permanent 
citizen base that can be counted on to always support the political brand.
In what follows I argue that The Daily Show functions as a parrhesiastes 
in our mass media–saturated, consultant-driven political environment, a 
truth-teller in an environment where no truth goes unspun. Specifically, I 
argue that Jon Stewart and The Daily Show writers and cast meet all three 
of Foucault’s criteria for political parrhesia, but in a unique and contempo-
rary way: First, they consistently criticize and ridicule people in positions of 
power to show how the permanent campaign mentality hurts our democ-
racy. Second, Stewart is frank and tells people what he personally believes 
to be true (as well as funny). Finally, he does this, in large part, because he 
feels it is his duty as a citizen and as a human being, thereby functioning as 
a modern day parrhesiastes.
The Daily Show: Parodying the Truth
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart is a popular thirty-minute “newscast” that 
airs Monday through Thursday at 11:00 p.m. EST on the cable network Com-
edy Central, with an estimated 1.5 million viewers per night.11 Although the 
show has been on the air since 1996, the addition of Jon Stewart as anchor 
in 1999 resulted in a run of entertainment awards, including ten Emmy 
Awards.12 The Daily Show has also made journalistic waves, winning two 
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prestigious Peabody Awards for its “Indecision 2000” and “Indecision 2004” 
election coverage.13 In addition, Stewart won individual awards from the 
Television Critics Association for comedy in 2003 and 2005, and in 2004 The 
Daily Show won the Television Critics Award for Outstanding Achievement 
in News and Information, beating out 60 Minutes (CBS), Frontline (PBS), 
Meet the Press (NBC), and Nightline (ABC).14 Newsday even listed Stewart 
as the most influential media player in the 2004 election, outclassing the 
likes of Ted Koppel, Sean Hannity, and Tim Russert.15
But unlike its competition for these prestigious awards, The Daily Show 
is a funny and often sharply critical satire of a normal news broadcast. It is 
fake news. It is a parody of cable news, and its host and correspondents are 
all professional comedians. In fact, in his videotaped acceptance of the 2004 
Television Critics Association Award, Stewart recommended that one of the 
other legitimate nominees—60 Minutes, perhaps—should investigate how a 
fake news program won the award for Outstanding Achievement in News 
and Information.16 However, it is this odd combination of serious criticism of 
the politically powerful and news parody designed for laughs that gives The 
Daily Show its unique place as a new type of democratic watchdog. During 
an interview, Bill Moyers said to Stewart, “I do not know whether you are 
practicing an old form of parody and satire or a new form of journalism.” 
Stewart responded, “I think, honestly, we’re practicing a new form of despera-
tion, where we just are so inundated with mixed messages from the media 
and from politicians that we’re just trying to sort it out for ourselves.”17
For parody to be effective, one must closely mimic the target, and The 
Daily Show does that. In fact, if you watched The Daily Show with the sound 
muted, you might not realize that it is a fake news program. Jon Stewart sits 
at an anchor desk, where he reads the news and interviews correspondents 
and guests. The set is designed in the ubiquitous red, white, and blue, with 
a map of the world behind him. There is also a video box that appears over 
Stewart’s right shoulder with video clips that complement his commentary. 
However, turn up the volume, and you would soon be alerted to the fact 
that this is not an ordinary news program. For example:
Stewart: When you combine the new mandate that criticizing 
the commander in chief is off limits in wartime with last year’s 
official disbanding of the Democratic Party, we’re left at the 
all-time low in the good old-fashioned debate category. Now I 
know you’re thinking: But Jon, every time I want to have a calm, 
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honest discussion about these kinds of issues, I’m shouted down 
and harassed by the Dixie Chicks and their ilk. Well, tonight it 
all changes. . . . So first, joining us tonight is George W. Bush, 
the 43rd president of the United States. . . . Taking the other side, 
from the year 2000, Texas governor and presidential candidate, 
George W. Bush.
[Split screen of Governor Bush on the left and President Bush on the 
right, with a “Bush vs. Bush” logo between them]
Stewart: Mr. President, you won the coin toss. The first question will 
go to you. Why is the United States of America using its power to 
change governments in foreign countries?
President Bush: We must stand up for our security and for the 
permanent rights and the hopes of mankind.
Stewart: Well, certainly that represents a bold new doctrine in foreign 
policy, Mr. President. Governor Bush, do you agree with that?
Governor Bush: Yeah, I’m not so sure that the role of the United 
States is to go around the world and say, “This is the way it’s gotta 
be.”
Stewart: Well, that’s interesting. That’s a difference of opinion, and 
certainly that’s what this country is about, differences of opinion. 
Mr. President, let me just get specific: Why are we in Iraq?
President Bush: We will be changing the regime of Iraq for the 
good of the Iraqi people.
Stewart: Governor, then I’d like to hear your response on that.
Governor Bush: If we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us. I think 
one way for us to end up being viewed as the ugly American is to 
go around the world saying, “We do it this way, so should you.”18
This is obviously not your grandmother’s newscast.
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Risky Business
According to Foucault, in the context of ancient Greece, parrhesia entailed 
a certain amount of risk because the truth being told was a criticism of 
someone in power. The danger need not rise to the level of risking one’s 
life, although it could if the truth-teller criticized a powerful tyrant. There 
had to be, however, some risk in the confrontation: to one’s friendships, 
one’s reputation, or one’s livelihood. Within the contemporary context, The 
Daily Show meets this criterion by consistently criticizing the permanent 
campaign mentality of those in power, as well as the mainstream media that 
often unproblematically disseminate their messages. Here, Stewart clearly 
expresses his opinion of the watchdog role of the media while interview-
ing “senior media analyst” Stephen Colbert about the coverage of the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003:
Stewart: What should the media’s role be in covering the war?
Colbert: Very simply, the media’s role should be the accurate and 
objective description of the hellacious ass-whomping we’re 
handing the Iraqis.
Stewart: Hellacious ass-whomping? Now to me, that sounds pretty 
subjective.
Colbert: Are you saying it’s not an ass-whomping, Jon? I suppose 
you could call it an “ass-kicking” or an “ass-handing-to.” Unless, 
of course, you love Hitler.
Stewart [stammering]: I don’t love Hitler.
Colbert: Spoken like a true Hitler-lover—
Stewart: I’m perplexed. Is your position that there’s no place for 
negative words or even thoughts in the media?
Colbert: Not at all, Jon. Doubts can happen to everyone, including 
me, but as a responsible journalist, I’ve taken my doubts, fears, 
moral compass, conscience, and all-pervading skepticism about 
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the very nature of this war and simply placed them in this empty 
Altoids box [produces a box]. That’s where they’ll stay, safe and 
sound, until Iraq is liberated.19
Although Stewart’s main target for criticism is frequently the hapless 
mainstream media, he also highlights how the Bush administration has 
become a master of using the media’s weaknesses to its advantage to get 
the administration’s version of events to the public. The following example 
illustrates how The Daily Show splices together a sequence of videos to 
highlight one of the most pervasive tactics of the permanent campaign—the 
widespread repetition of talking points—and to show how this can be detri-
mental to democratic conversation. In this excerpt from 2004, Stewart offers 
an editorial on the origins of what he calls “conventional wisdom”:
Stewart: Let’s take the example of the addition of John Edwards to 
the Democratic ticket: I don’t know how to feel about that. I don’t 
know what it means. Here’s how I will:
[Cut to video clip of CNN reporter, standing in front of the White 
House]
CNN reporter: This is 28 pages from the Republican National 
Committee. It says, “Who is Edwards?” It starts off by saying “a 
disingenuous, unaccomplished liberal.” We also saw from the 
Bush-Cheney camp that they had released talking points to their 
supporters.
Stewart: Talking points: that’s how we learn things. But how will 
I absorb a talking point like “Edwards and Kerry are out of the 
mainstream” unless I get it jackhammered into my skull? That’s 
where television lends a hand [laughter].
[Cut to a series of video clips]
Fox News: He stands way out of the mainstream.
CNN, Terry Holt, Bush campaign spokesman: . . . way out of the 
mainstream.
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CNN, Nicole Devenish, Bush-Cheney ’04 communications 
director: . . . that stands so far out of the mainstream.
CNN, Lynn Cheney: . . . that he is out of the mainstream.
CNN, Terry Holt at Democratic National Convention: . . . out 
of the mainstream.
CNN, Frank Donatelli, GOP strategist: . . . well out of the 
mainstream.
Stewart [a glazed expression on his face; laughter]: I’m . . . I’m 
getting the feeling . . . I think . . . I think they’re out of the 
mainstream.20
The manipulative nature of the Bush administration’s rhetoric is also 
showcased in the next example, where Stewart is interviewing “senior mili-
tary analyst” Stephen Colbert in June 2005.21 This time, Stewart is calling 
attention to the rhetoric of two high-ranking administration officials who 
seem to be making contradictory points:
Stewart: When the vice president says that the insurgency is in its 
last throes and Donald Rumsfeld says that that could mean twelve 
years, isn’t that contradictory?
Colbert: Well, Jon, as a member of the cynical, knee-jerk reaction 
media, liberal, Ivy League, Taxachusetts elite, I can see how 
you would find a discrepancy between the words “last throes” 
and “twelve-year insurgency.” But your mistake is looking at 
what’s happening in Iraq on a human scale. The administration 
is looking at it from a geological perspective. After all, it took a 
billion years for the earth to cool.22
If we the American people are supposed to choose our leaders based on their 
decisions, how can we do so if we don’t know the truth? If we would like to 
rationally discuss the pros and cons of the Iraq war, how can we talk about it 
and judge it accurately if we don’t know the truth? Is the insurgency almost 
over, or should we prepare ourselves for a much longer, more expensive, 
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and potentially more violent conflict? Which statement is the sales pitch, 
and which statement is the truth?
Since Vice President Cheney frequently made the most starkly (and, 
as we would later learn, wildly) optimistic pronouncements about the Iraq 
war—pronouncements repeated over and over in the media to attest to the 
wisdom of invading Iraq—he was the subject of many Daily Show segments 
raising questions about the truth of his statements. The following aired in 
March 2007, questioning the vice president’s continuing “clout”:
Stewart: As it happens, the media is atwitter when it comes to 
Cheney. . . . Surely, the Libby conviction must have reduced the 
vice president’s clout. His chief of staff was convicted of lying! Is 
there any other instance involving Cheney that should have had a 
clout-loosening effect? . . .
[Cut to a series of video clips of Cheney]
Cheney [August 29, 2002]: Simply stated, there is no doubt that 
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.
Cheney [March 16, 2003]: My belief is that we will, in fact, be greeted 
as liberators.
Cheney [May 2, 2005]: I think that they’re in the last throes, if you 
will, of the insurgency.
Stewart: So I think we’re beginning to see the pattern. Cheney 
causes some high-level embarrassment or makes a completely 
erroneous statement about American policy. His clout is 
questioned and yet his clout goes on. All of this does beg the 
question: What the fuck? Why does this man still have any clout? 
At all? . . . Cheney has been wrong about everything: his ideas, 
his execution. I’ve been fired from jobs for being late. This man 
is very, very ungood. The only thing I would trust Cheney for 
advice on is [pause] if I had a dead hooker in my hotel room.23
Calling the vice president “ungood” and claiming that he has been wrong 
about everything is obviously a criticism of the powerful Bush administration 
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and its manipulation of language. How can we talk intelligently about Iraq 
if the people in power are more interested in selling the policy, in spinning 
the reasons for the invasion, and in minimizing the difficulty, duration, and 
expense of the war than in having a serious nationwide discussion about 
it? If you believe Scott McClelland, White House press secretary from 2003 
to 2006, a serious nationwide conversation was not the goal. In his 2008 
memoir, he talks candidly about getting caught up in the sales pitch of the 
permanent campaign:
When you mount a campaign, you aim at deploying your strongest 
arguments. It’s a bit like the strategy a courtroom lawyer uses. . . . 
He focuses purely on his most compelling arguments, even if this 
means presenting a one-sided picture of the case. That’s his job. The 
search for the ultimate truth is in other hands—those of the judge 
and the jury.
And that is the spirit in which the Bush Administration ap-
proached the campaign for war. The goal was to win the debate, 
to get Congress and the public to support the decision to confront 
Saddam. In the pursuit of that goal, embracing a high level of candor 
and honesty about the potential war—its larger objectives, its likely 
costs, and its possible risks—came distant second.24
Since the mainstream media had all but abandoned their watchdog role 
after 9/11 and in the lead-up to the Iraq war, The Daily Show highlighted the 
weaknesses in the administration’s arguments and underscored contradic-
tions between the language used and the actual events on the ground.25
You Be Frank and I’ll Be Earnest
The second criterion for parrhesia is frankness. According to Foucault, the 
parrhesiastes is as direct as possible with his audience and stays away from 
the artificial nature of rhetoric that would allow him to win an argument that 
he himself does not believe. In the contemporary political context, where 
the rhetoric of the permanent campaign is the norm and where almost all 
information is spun in some way, how can one effectively tell the truth?
This criterion could pose a problem for The Daily Show’s parrhesiastes 
status, as its discourse is not necessarily frank or earnest. The show is not 
a real newscast, and much of the discourse within it is satirical—meaning 
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that the cast members do not always say what they really mean. Satire is an 
indirect, ambivalent, ambiguous mode of communicating meaning, making 
it problematic for a contemporary parrhesiastes. However, this indirectness 
is actually advantageous in a complicated and artificial rhetorical regime 
because it can embed “a threatening idea in a non-threatening form” that 
is unlikely to be taken out of context and respun by those who disagree.26 
In fact, the ambiguity of satire, combined with its often playful yet critical 
attitude, makes it less likely to be addressed, or even noticed, by those who 
are the object of the criticism. In addition, the ambiguous, double-layered 
construction of satire means that it always has the ability to retreat back to 
the literal, if need be. As Stewart himself remarked: “Here’s the way I look 
at it. President Bush has uranium-tipped bunker busters and I have puns. I 
think he’ll be OK.”27 Instead of overt criticism of powerful people, satirical 
pieces can circulate as ridiculous suggestions—as jokes—though hopefully, 
some will know better.28
This last point is worth emphasizing. According to George Test, satire 
requires a public—or a counterpublic, in this instance—that understands 
the second nonliteral layer of meaning. The double-layered nature of satire 
asks its audience to be “sophisticated about the context in which the satire 
transpires, sensitive to the means at work, and sympathetic in sharing the 
aggression and judgment.”29 This creates what Wayne Booth calls a “tight 
bond,” a knowing wink and a nod between the author and the audience 
that gets the joke.30 The top, literal layer of discourse is meant for the ears 
of those in power, while the underlayer of meaning can be used to question 
that same power. Thus, when Colbert says that the media are going to put 
all their doubts and fears about the Iraq war into an empty Altoids box, or 
when he calls Stewart a member of the “cynical, knee-jerk reaction media, 
liberal, Ivy League, Taxachusetts elite,” the audience knows not to take this 
literally. Indeed, it is the disjuncture between the literal meaning and the 
meaning behind it that spurs the audience to laugh. Stewart’s discussion 
with “senior White House correspondent” Dan Bakkedahl in February 2007 
further illustrates how this can function:
Stewart: With more on the White House reaction, we’re joined by 
senior White House correspondent Dan Bakkedahl. Dan, thank 
you for joining us. Dan, this administration has been very slow 
to accept the reality of climate change despite the overwhelming 
evidence.
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Bakkedahl: No Jon, because of the overwhelming evidence 
[laughter].
Stewart [looking puzzled]: What does that mean?
Bakkedahl: Well, we all saw what happened the last time this 
administration was told that the evidence for something 
was a “slam dunk,” a gathering threat demanding immediate 
action. Oh, no, no, no [smiling and shaking his head]. We’re 
not falling for that again. No, we go down that road and the 
next thing you know we’re locked in an intractable war against 
fossil fuels.
Stewart: But aren’t we supposed to be cutting back on fossil fuels?
Bakkedahl: Oh no. Conserving right now would send the wrong 
message to the earth, Jon. That just emboldens our planet.
Stewart [still looking confused]: Yes. That would embolden our 
planet, the source of all that is life-giving.
Bakkedahl: You’re a cut and walker, you know that, Jon? We’ve 
got to show the earth that we mean business: more emissions, 
more greenhouse gases, more of those plastic six-pack things 
for dolphin killing. The earth has got to know that we’ve got the 
stomach for this fight.
Stewart: So because the war in Iraq hasn’t worked out, Bush is not 
going to heed the global warming study?
Bakkedahl: Exactly, Jon. As the president once said, “Fool me once, 
shame on . . . you? Fool me . . . Fool me twice, uh, can’t be fooled 
again?” I don’t know. I’m probably misquoting him, Jon. I’m sure 
he said it far more eloquently.31
Bakkedahl obviously does not mean to be taken literally, but the audience 
has no trouble understanding the segment’s true meaning.
Jon Stewart plays an interesting role in these double-layered skits. To 
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offset his correspondents, who are speaking in a completely exaggerated and 
satirical manner, Stewart often plays the straight man. Thus, the second way 
The Daily Show demonstrates the frankness of a parrhesiastes is for Stewart 
himself to be unusually direct. This is the role he often plays as interviewer: 
the voice of common sense in a crazy, artificial world. His October 2, 2007, 
interview with Chris Matthews, the host of MSNBC’s Hardball and author 
of the book Life’s a Campaign, exemplifies this blunt and open quality, much 
to the exasperation of Matthews, who laughingly calls this absolutely the 
worst interview he’s ever had:
Stewart: Now if I read this correctly, and I believe that I read this 
book [Life’s a Campaign] correctly, what you are saying is, people 
can use what politicians do in political campaigns to help their 
lives. . . . This strikes me as fundamentally wrong. It strikes me as 
a self-hurt book, if you will [audience laughter]. Aren’t campaigns 
fundamentally contrivances?
Matthews: Yeah, campaigns can be, but the way politicians get to 
the top is the real thing. They know what they’re doing. You don’t 
have to believe a word they say, but watch how far they got, how 
did Clinton get there, how did Hillary get there, how did all these 
guys get there. Reagan. They have methods to get there and you 
can learn from those methods.
Stewart: So you’re suggesting—even if no one believes a word you 
say, you can be successful.
Matthews: Yes. . . . [Life] is a campaign. Everything about getting 
jobs is about convincing someone to hire you, right? It’s about 
getting promotions; it’s about selling products. It’s always a 
campaign. It’s a campaign to get the girl of your dreams. It’s a 
campaign to do everything you want to do in life.
Stewart: But there has to be some core of soul in there. Otherwise—
Matthews: I’m not denying that [Stewart laughs]. I’m saying that 
you can learn. You are, you are a hard sell, but let me tell you: 
Watch the Clintons, watch how successful they are, and watch 
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what they do. They do listen to people. Hillary Clinton went on a 
listening tour of upstate New York and won a Senate seat.
Stewart: No, labeling something a “listening tour” doesn’t mean 
you’re listening. That’s what I’m saying. . . . President Bush had 
a sign that said “Mission Accomplished”; that doesn’t make it 
accomplished . . . [audience laughter]. What campaigns are are 
photo opportunities that are staged and there’s nothing in this 
book about, uh, be good, be competent—
Matthews: That’s called the Bible. It’s been written.
Stewart: Oh my God [laughing]. . . . This book has been written too, 
it’s called The Prince.32
In this example, and unlike many interviews of authors on the perfunc-
tory book promotion circuit, Stewart blatantly disagrees with the political 
premise behind Matthews’s book—that life itself is a permanent campaign. 
At one point Stewart even remarks that he is not trashing Matthews’s book, 
he is trashing his philosophy of life, which gets a big laugh from the studio 
audience. Matthews’s (also laughingly) incredulous reaction shows that he 
isn’t ready for such a candid discussion.
Another example of Stewart’s forthrightness comes from the scandal 
over the July 2008 New Yorker cover in which Barack Obama is portrayed 
as a Muslim extremist giving a fist bump to his wife, who is dressed as a 
militant black radical complete with Afro, machine gun, and bandolier. 
The New Yorker’s editor, David Remnick, said that the cover was satire 
and was intended to target “distortions, misconceptions, and prejudices” 
about Barack Obama. This was not how either the McCain or the Obama 
campaign interpreted the cover. Both they and the vast majority of the 
mainstream media condemned it as stupid, offensive, or worse.33 Stewart’s 
take was a little different: “Obama’s camp initially agreed that the cartoon 
was ‘tasteless and offensive.’ [Stewart looks perplexed and shakes his head.] 
Really? You know what your response should have been? It’s very easy. 
Here, let me put the statement out for you: ‘Barack Obama is in no way 
upset about the cartoon that depicts him as a Muslim extremist, because 
you know who gets upset about cartoons? Muslim extremists. Of which 
Barack Obama is not.’ It’s just a fucking cartoon.”34 Again, Stewart is very 
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direct, clearly conveying his opinion about the situation and doing so in 
an unmistakable form.
The Daily Show as Good Citizen
The final criterion Foucault lays out for parrhesia is that the truth be told out 
of a sense of duty, and Jon Stewart clearly feels that it is his duty to point out 
the artificiality of political spin. Certainly one could argue that The Daily 
Show is simply a vehicle to make money and thus Stewart is being provoca-
tive because it is lucrative rather than because he feels obligated to do so. The 
show’s enormous popularity with the coveted eighteen- to thirty-four-year-
old demographic is attractive to advertisers and has made The Daily Show 
a very profitable show and Stewart a very wealthy man. However, both the 
content of Stewart’s jokes (like the ones quoted above) and his own words 
in interviews bespeak an interesting sincerity. For example, Stewart both 
downplays his importance and demonstrates his motivation in an interview 
with Bill Moyers: “I think of myself as a comedian who has the pleasure of 
writing jokes about things that I actually care about. And that’s really it. . . . 
I have great respect for people who are in the front lines and the trenches of 
trying to enact social change. I am far lazier than that. I am a tiny, neurotic 
man, standing in the back of the room throwing tomatoes at the chalk board. 
And that’s really it.” And Stewart has consistently taken issue with those who 
accuse The Daily Show of fostering cynicism: “People criticize our show for 
breeding cynicism, but there’s nothing at all disingenuous about what we’re 
doing. If anything is cynical, it’s suggesting that your policy has never been 
‘stay the course’ when we have thousands of hours of tape showing you using 
‘stay the course’ as a talking point.”35
Of course, the most blatant example of Stewart’s sense of civic respon-
sibility is his now infamous appearance on CNN’s Crossfire on October 15, 
2004. In this instance, Stewart was again astonishingly direct (and, according 
to Crossfire cohost Tucker Carlson, not funny) in his criticism of Crossfire: 
“You’re hurting America,” Stewart told Carlson and his cohost Paul Begala. 
“You’re doing theater, when you should be doing debate. . . . What you do 
is not honest. What you do is partisan hackery.” Certainly, this appearance 
can’t be explained by a financial motive; being a guest who is so obviously 
critical of both the show and the hosts is not correlated with increased 
profits, especially for Crossfire, which was canceled several months after 
that episode. Interestingly, Stewart, a comedian, increased his credibility 
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when he wasn’t funny at all. He felt it was his responsibility to be blunt and 
honest, and he acted on it.36
Like the Greeks, American citizens have a constitutional right to free speech. 
And also like the Greeks, we have embedded in our definition of a good 
citizen the notion that we need people who will dare to criticize the power-
ful if they think it is necessary for good government. The Greeks called this 
type of truth-telling parrhesia. Although Foucault confines this concept to 
the specific Greek context, I believe that we still need those with enough 
courage to tell the truth. In fact, I would argue that they are especially 
necessary in a context where practically every political communication is 
vetted, focus group tested, and compacted into a sound bite before being 
endlessly repeated.
I have argued that a fake news program on Comedy Central acts as a 
modern-day parrhesiastes, speaking the truth about some very powerful 
people. Within our current milieu, it seems perfectly logical, as well as a little 
sad, that someone who is admittedly a “fake” seems more “real” than both 
the politicians and the media that disseminate their messages. Rather than 
being discouraged by such a situation, however, I find the very existence of 
The Daily Show a cause for hope. It suggests that no matter what the context, 
no matter the speed of the technology, the sophistication of the marketing 
techniques, or the intensity of the spin, someone will step up and have the 
courage to tell what he sees as the truth.
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mr. smIth goes to the movIes
Images of Dissent in American Cinema
Beth Wielde Heidelberg and David Schultz
Terrorists have hijacked a plane. They force everyone to the back, isolating 
passengers and taking control of the flight. On the ground, government 
officials are in frenzy, trying to figure out how to resolve the situation. Just 
when all seems lost, a hero rushes in to save the day. Who is this dashing 
figure ready at the rescue? The president of the United States. In the post-
9/11 world, the terrorist scenario seems all too real, and the president as 
action hero in Wolfgang Peterson’s Air Force One shows a new type of dis-
sent—where the government is presented as we wish it could be rather than 
as one we don’t trust in reality.
Pop culture expresses potent political messages. Though often dismissed 
as the fluff of celebrity gossip, crass commercialism, or mass consumption, 
pop culture images serve as a potentially important source of socialization 
and knowledge about the political world. It may also be a locus of express-
ing and channeling dissent.
Individuals are politically socialized and express disagreement about 
their government in at least three ways. First, they obtain firsthand political 
knowledge through direct experiences such as voting, attending meetings, or 
participating in rallies or demonstrations.1 Second, individual knowledge 
about politics is second-ordered and mediated by the news establishment, 
obtained by reading newspapers or watching television news.2 Finally, 
political knowledge can be third-ordered, mediated by popular culture 
venues such as television entertainment shows or movies.3 Given data 
suggesting low rates of civic engagement for many activities and signifi-
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cant decreases in public consumption of mainstream news, pop culture’s 
influence on political knowledge is significant.4 Thus, pop culture’s role as 
a way of expressing dissent and disagreement may be more critical than 
many think.
There is no question that movies are often political vehicles.5 Leni 
Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will is by many accounts one of the most pow-
erful political movies ever made. But many other films also express politi-
cal messages, dissent, or criticism of authority. Casablanca’s Rick and the 
opposition to the German occupation of France come to mind. But films 
such as All the President’s Men, Three Days of the Condor, and even Michael 
Moore’s Sicko and Fahrenheit 9/ all express critical views of authority and 
government and serve as potential rallying points for political opposition. 
Yet even “lighter” fare such as Dave, where a look-alike imposter takes over 
the White House, or Legally Blonde 2: Red, White, and Blonde, where vapid 
Elle Woods exposes corruption and works the political process to get an 
animal protection bill through Congress, contains critical views of govern-
ment—the processes and people that encompass the political and public 
service realms. 
Oliver Stone’s W, a movie about President George W. Bush, was destined 
to be a political film, especially given its planned October 2008 release, barely 
a month before the presidential election. Like Stone’s earlier films such as 
JFK and Nixon, W’s impact on political consciousness might be profound. 
Evidence exists, for example, that viewers of JFK were strongly influenced 
by Stone’s account of the assassination of John F. Kennedy.6 They might be 
similarly affected by his depiction of Bush and his presidency. But films do 
not always have to feature or focus on elected officials or politicians. Critical 
or negative depictions of government administrators or bureaucrats doing 
their jobs can also express dissent, legitimize disapproval, or simply social-
ize citizens.
This chapter examines American movies as a tool of political dissent. 
It does so by analyzing depictions of public officials in American movies 
from the 1940s to the present. We first determine the frequency of critical 
depictions of government and public officials in films; then we examine how 
movies express dissent, based on discussion of contemporary political events. 
The data show that movies with government-related subjects are actually 
more common than thought, and these films often reflect contemporary 
political themes, issues, and facts. Our conclusion is that movies provide an 
important third-level source of political criticism and knowledge. We also 
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suggest that this cinematic-based political knowledge has implications for 
citizens’ attitudes about and support for the government.
Pop Culture as Political Expression
Pop culture is ordinarily depicted as politically insignificant. In fact it is often 
dismissed as fluff, just part of the realm of entertainment. However, at least 
two arguments can be made as to why pop culture, and especially motion 
pictures, should be reappraised for its political value.
First, pop culture venues, which include television and movies, are 
vehicles of political socialization. If political socialization is, as Roberta Sie-
gel defines it, “the learning process by which political norms and behaviors 
acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation 
to generation,” then there are many sources from which individuals acquire 
this information.7 These sources include the family, the community, and 
peers. Direct political engagement, such as participating in campaigns, 
contacting public officials, or seeking out government services, also serves 
as a tool for learning about politics. But in addition to this first-level knowl-
edge, individuals acquire knowledge about government and politics through 
the news media.8 Traditionally, this has meant gathering information from 
newspapers and television news—a type of second-order knowledge. Then 
there is a third-order level of socialization that occurs through pop culture 
venues such as television and movies.9 It would be fair to say that depictions 
of government officials in entertainment venues have a significant impact 
on how people think of and view these characters. For example, Timo-
thy Lenz demonstrated that crime, the police, and law and order themes 
change over time, either reflecting the public view or helping to mold it 
with regard to these issues.10 Recently, some have contended that there is 
a “CSI” effect, arguing that these shows influence how jurors think about 
evidence and trial deliberations.11 Thus, with so many individuals consum-
ing pop culture, its influence on politics and political knowledge should not 
be underestimated.
Pop culture as a form of art is potentially political. On one level, pop 
culture in the United States, especially Hollywood and its films, is often at 
the center of so-called culture wars.12 But Walter Benjamin argues that art 
in the “age of mechanical reproduction” takes on a political dimension.13 
More important, one can draw on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
and argue that pop culture lies at the center of a struggle among contend-
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ing groups, with movies serving as one setting where the war for the hearts 
and minds of the public is being fought.14 Thus, movies such as Triumph of 
the Will, Sicko, JFK, An Inconvenient Truth, and perhaps W are part of an 
ideological battle among various groups to communicate their messages to 
the public. These messages may be intended to encourage people to take 
political action or vote in a specific way, or they may simply be efforts to 
prime an issue or set an agenda.15
Overall, if pop culture is in fact a source of political knowledge and 
socialization for many, and if one views it as part of a hegemonic battle for 
political influence or dominance, it is also possible to contend that it is a 
source of expressing dissent. This may be especially true when it comes to 
films. As Ernest Giglio points out, movies have long been seen as embody-
ing political messages and as being intertwined with images and themes 
both supportive and critical of the government.16 Yet studies such as Giglio’s 
have looked mainly at the intersection of movies and politics; they have 
not examined how often the government and its officials (nonelected) are 
depicted in film and what types of images are offered. Additionally, these 
studies generally do not look at films as a source of dissent or as part of the 
hegemonic battle for political influence. It is to this topic we now turn.
Government as a Theme in Film
An evaluation of research into the depiction of government and public 
service in film reveals a critical void—specifically, whether there is valid 
statistical evidence that government-related themes are prevalent in popular 
culture media. There is no shortage of authors who have examined politics 
and other aspects of government in popular culture film, but most of them 
used anecdotal evidence and other nonrandom sampling methods as the 
basis of evaluation.17 To determine whether film provides the third-order 
feature of voicing dissent, it is important to determine how important gov-
ernment in film actually is to popular culture. We used latent content analysis 
rather than the traditional anecdotal method to develop such evidence.
To determine the popularity of government in film, we derived a data 
population from the top twenty films from 1945 to 2005 based on gross 
domestic box-office receipts (with the exception of ten missing data items 
from 1950 and 1951, where the records indicate only the top ten). First, a data 
source (boxofficemojo.com) was selected to provide the raw data. Internet 
databases have been used in peer-reviewed journals in prior studies about 
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film and culture and provide a consistent method of raw data collection.18 
To narrow down the 1,210 films from this raw data, the plot description 
of each title was investigated and cross-referenced on two film databases 
(imdbpro.com and allmovie.com). Plot descriptions were checked for specific 
keywords that indicated governmental themes in the story line. Forty-five 
percent of the films in the sample were identified as having governmental 
themes, including foreign and fantasy governments. This was broken down 
further, as shown in Figure 1, to identify the percentage of films with spe-
cifically U.S. government–related themes.
Figure 2 shows the specific breakdown of the most frequently depicted 
governmental themes in the top twenty films, with political themes account-
ing for 9 percent. Action-based governmental activity, particularly military 
and public safety divisions such as police and fire, have been particularly 
popular at the box office.
Over time, the various sectors of government have been represented at 
different rates. Figure 3 shows, by decade, the U.S. government sectors being 
shown most frequently to domestic audiences.
Government as a film theme is clearly commonplace in the ever-changing 
Figure 1. U.S. Government versus Other Government Depictions in the Twenty 
Top-Grossing Domestic Films, 1945–2005.
Figure 2. Breakdown of Government-Related Themes in the 
Twenty Top-Grossing Domestic Films, 1945–2005.
Figure 3. Breakdown of Government-Related Themes by Decade, 1940s–2000s.
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political climate, with almost half of all films in the sample having some sort 
of governmental theme, and a high percentage of them having U.S. govern-
ment–specific themes each decade. Measuring the prolific nature of these 
government-themed films against public sentiment toward government lays 
the foundation to determine whether film is a tool of dissent or whether it 
provides a picture of government as we want it to be.
Dissent on Screen
There are at least two ways films can be viewed as tools of dissent. The first 
simply documents the percentage of films overall with negative depictions 
of government officials or with specific instances of characters described 
critically. The second way is to examine film’s interrelationship with public 
opinion about government over time.
To determine whether there is a parallel between public opinion and 
how film depicts government and the people who operate it, we examined 
data from the National Election Survey (NES) to see whether depictions 
tend to increase during times when people’s attitudes toward government 
are favorable. Figure 4 shows the trend in decade averages for NES responses 
from the 1960s to the 2000s (NES data were not compiled until 1958, so 
the 1940s and 1950s are not included; for the 2000s, 2004 was the most 
recent year surveyed). Then it compares those responses to the number of 
total governmental depictions in film and specific U.S. government depic-
tions. Figure 4 shows that in times of declining government trust (i.e., when 
more people trust the government only “some of the time” as opposed to 
“most of the time”), the frequency of government depictions in film actu-
ally increases.
In examining the films from 1945 to 2005, individual government offi-
cials were initially depicted positively in 27 percent of the films and nega-
tively in 36 percent. By the end of the movie (as a result of character growth 
or change), positive depictions grew to 64 percent and negative depictions 
shrank to 23 percent. Neutral depictions dropped from 37 percent to 13 
percent.
This survey of films indicates that government-related themes increase 
as trust levels decline. Conversely, government themes decrease as trust 
increases. These trends suggest several interesting hypotheses. For one, 
when faith in government declines, one way to channel criticism toward it is 
through films. Disapproval of the government can be expressed in cinematic 
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depictions. Moreover, these depictions can legitimize other forms of dissent 
or criticism or otherwise validate disagreement in society.
Second, the fact that movies demonstrate mixed negative, positive, and 
even neutral views of government officials points to their political plastic-
ity. Mixed depictions of government officials show how Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony is applicable to movies. Contrasting images of government in 
film speak to an ideological battle for the public’s hearts and minds. These 
mixed images reveal the potential to use films to socialize positive feelings 
and support for a regime or to provide a basis for legitimizing or channel-
ing dissent and criticism.
Finally, it is important to understand what message audiences are leav-
ing the theater with when they watch these films. For instance, our 2007 
study  enumerated seven distinct types of depictions of government and the 
people who operate behind its grand Corinthian columns. Many of these 
depictions are negative, but some are positive, demonstrating that movies 
may be one tool to fight our culture wars and express disapproval of the 
current regime.19
Figure 4. Comparison of National Election Survey Results on Trust in Government 
and Prevalence of Government-Related Themes in Films, 1960s–2000s.
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Government Depictions
Latent content analysis of government-themed films from 1945 to 2005 
reveals six different character types—some positive, some negative, and some 
neutral.20 These different images of public officials are important expres-
sions of how films can educate the public about government, with negative 
character portrayals expressing dissent and disagreement.
Ivan Reitman created the quintessential “Bad Government” depiction 
in the 1984 film Ghostbusters and its 1989 sequel. In the original film, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) agent Walter Peck oozes with animosity 
toward the ghost-capturing clan, flexing his governmental muscle whenever 
he can and managing to both jail the Ghostbusters and shut down their 
containment system (unwittingly heralding the destruction of New York 
City by the Stay-Puft Marshmallow Man).
Reitman’s films illustrate exactly how the film industry paints a vivid 
Ghostbusters, tapping into the zeitgeist of the 1980s, pits its protagonists against both 
specters and bureaucratic overregulation. (Jerry Ohlinger’s Movie Material Store)
68 Beth Wielde Heidelberg and David Schultz
portrait of the government worker, the politician, and the governmental 
process—for better or worse. We viewed the twenty films in our sample to 
determine whether there are trends in this type of characterization.21 Six 
distinctive characteristics emerged from these screenings, and Ghostbusters’ 
Walter Peck represents one of the two negative types, the “Monstercrat.” 
Ghostbusters shows the Monstercrat as the embodiment of “big govern-
ment” flexing its proverbial muscle to demonstrate its strength. Sometimes 
this preening is for self-interest or career advancement, but sometimes it is 
just out of spite or as a strong-arm tactic to say, “Watch out, we’re stronger.” 
But while Monstercrats may use or abuse the power of their office, they 
stay within the realm of the law, unlike their even less desirable relatives, 
the “BlackHatocrats.”
BlackHatocrats not only use their office for self-interest, monetary gain, 
career advancement, or self-preservation; they also break the law to achieve 
their devious goals. In Enemy of the State (1998), “regular Joe” Robert Dean 
(portrayed by Will Smith) gets entangled in a cover-up when the National 
Security Agency (NSA) tries to hide its involvement in the murder of a con-
gressman who advocates a bill blocking the expansion of law enforcement’s 
surveillance powers (seeing it as encroaching on individual privacy). Dean 
unwittingly comes into possession of a videotape of the murder, and the 
NSA uses all its means—legal (observation, pursuit) and illegal (breaking 
and entering, attempted murder)—to retrieve it. These BlackHatocrats are 
self-serving and conspiratorial and have little regard for ethics or the pub-
lic welfare. As long as they achieve their end goal, it doesn’t matter what 
technique is used or who is hurt in the process. This is a typical BlackHa-
tocrat function—to depict government as a system that can get away with 
murder—but in the film world, the “big, bad government” often gets what 
it deserves.
In the movies, corrupt governments and public officials often receive 
their just punishment. And with real-life government scandals and cam-
paign mudslinging, that third-order knowledge may be seen as a relief to 
some and a fantasy to others, depending on their first- and second-order 
political opinions. Directors Ivan Reitman (Ghostbusters) and Tony Scott 
(Enemy of the State) leave no evil deed unpunished. EPA agent Peck is given 
a spectacular comeuppance: he is forcefully ejected from the mayor’s office, 
doused by the goo of the melted Stay-Puft Marshmallow Man, and vapor-
ized by the Ghostbusters after a Godzilla-like rampage. The NSA agents are 
outwitted by Dean, despite their technological resources. They are gunned 
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down by a mafioso whom Dean has been working with in a mistaken- 
identity shoot-out. Those who survive the shoot-out are jailed, and the plot 
is exposed to the FBI. Such comeuppances usually involve less marshmallow 
and more jail time, removal from office, or public humiliation. In contrast, 
one of the reasons Chinatown’s end is so unsettling is that the BlackHato-
crats do not get reprimanded for their actions—the corruption shown in 
the film is left unresolved.
The “Obsessocrat” represents a neutral depiction; it is negative in that 
the character has no discernible life outside of public office, but positive 
in terms of a strong dedication to public service—to the point where the 
Robert Dean (Will Smith) is an “enemy” of the expansion of state power as hypersur-
veillance encroaches on the privacy and civil liberties of a vast majority of Americans 
in the 1998 political action thriller Enemy of the State. (MovieGoods)
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character rejects self-interest or personal gain. However, this dedication has 
a downside: an almost robotic, obsessive focus on public service. In Apollo 
3, flight director Gene Kranz (based on a real person and portrayed by 
Ed Harris) begins the mission with one focus: to achieve the third manned 
moon landing. He begins the mission with staunch professionalism; the only 
indication of an outside life is when he receives a vest sent by his wife—with 
the mission patch sewn onto it. Even after the spacecraft accident, Kranz is 
not shown in panic mode; he exhibits only a fierce determination to abort 
the original mission in favor of a new one—to get the astronauts home safely. 
He is all business until this new mission is accomplished.
Whereas Kranz personifies the Obsessocrat’s determination to accom-
plish a job, the “Romanticrat” often starts off with this type of fierce govern-
ment loyalty, but some outside influence—usually a handsome rogue or a 
stunning ingénue—chips away at that single-minded focus on governmental 
duty. The Romanticrat is typically a bureaucratic drone who emerges from 
the constraints of his or her position to become a romantic figure. In Music 
Man, Marian Paroo does just this. The stoic librarian has a rousing musi-
cal number locked inside her; all she needs is a smooth-talking “civilian” 
to release her from her ways. The Romanticrat shows that there is a person 
behind that government-issued desk.
In The Wedding Crashers, the secretary of the interior (depicted by 
Christopher Walken) is at first excited by the prospect of his daughter mar-
rying a man of wealth and status and the opportunity to merge two pow-
erful families. But when he sees that she loves someone with little power 
or status, he realizes that love is more important than the merging of two 
“power families.” The Romanticrat, then, puts feelings ahead of duty or 
power in a way the Monstercrat, the BlackHatocrat, and, to some extent, 
the Obsessocrat do not. 
Yet the Romanticrat faces no physical threat to his or her person or to the 
overall public safety. The Romanticrat lives in a safe, secure world ruled by 
love, whereas the life of the “Herocrat” is a dangerous, action-packed thrill 
ride. The Herocrat puts life and limb on the line to expose the truth, obtain 
justice, or save others in distress—all out of a sense of duty. In Air Force One, 
the president embodies the Herocrat. When the plane is hijacked by terror-
ists, staff members choose to stay on board with the targeted president and 
his Secret Service agents, much to their mortal peril. The president is shown 
as an action hero, dodging bullets and fistfighting his way out of danger 
rather than escaping through the hatch designed for his protection.
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In Jon Turtletaub’s National Treasure, Dr. Abigail Chase, the consummate 
director of the National Archives, reluctantly aids protagonist Ben Gates in 
uncovering the founding fathers’ hidden treasure, risking life, limb, and the 
Declaration of Independence in the pursuit of truth. In the end, Chase is not 
only a Herocrat, having been flung out of vans and maneuvering a rotting 
staircase, but also an “Ethicrat.” When they find the treasure, she refuses to 
take more than a token 1 percent of the reward, despite the government’s 
offer of 10 percent.
Ethicrats are very similar to Herocrats, but rather than becoming 
involved in life-threatening situations, they use ethics and a general sense of 
what’s right to guide their decisions and serve the greater good. For instance, 
in The Day after Tomorrow (2004), NASA hurricane paleoclimatologist Jack 
Hall stands up to the stubborn vice president (to warn him about the impend-
ing second ice age and to debate the relative importance of economics and 
ecological responsibility). His refusal to budge from his position despite 
disagreeing with his superior in the power structure demonstrates that he 
values ethics over just going along and doing what he is “supposed” to do.
In Armageddon (1998), an asteroid is threatening to wipe out Earth, 
and the only way to save it is to have oil drillers and amateur astronauts dig 
800 feet into the asteroid and plant a nuclear bomb to blow it apart. Ethicrat 
and NASA civilian executive director Dan Truman disregards presidential 
and military orders to detonate the nuclear bomb prematurely, correctly 
insisting that his way will work.
Although the NES data indicate a declining trust in government until an 
upswing in the early 2000s, the depictions of government cover a spectrum 
of negative (Monstercrat, BlackHatocrat), neutral (Obsessocrat), and posi-
tive (Romanticrat, Herocrat, Ethicrat) images. However, there is a strong 
trend toward positive depictions at the end of films. Positive depictions 
tend to be strong even in eras when trust in government is low, such as 
in the 1990s. Figure 5 shows which depictions tend to be dominant at the 
end of films—that is, the impression left with audiences as they exit the 
theater. This illustrates that even when trust in government declined in 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s, government depictions were still strongly 
positive at the end of films (although in the 1980s, the decline in govern-
mental trust paralleled the Monstercrat and BlackHatocrat depictions). 
This implies that film, if it is truly a voice of dissent, provides a picture 
of benign government, where the bad folks get what’s coming to them and 
the good folks prosper.
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History and the movie W will speak to how the American public ultimately 
remembers George W. Bush. Cinematic portrayals of government officials 
offer another way of understanding the relationship between pop culture 
and politics.
Our examination of the top-grossing American films from 1945 to 2005 
demonstrates that the government and its officials are frequent themes. 
Although this study did not examine American cinema’s specific depiction 
of elected officials, pop culture portrayals of government officials and pro-
cesses can provide critical insights into politics.
This study reveals an overall mixed—positive, negative, and neutral—
depiction of government officials, as well as a number of specific character 
types that view public officials in various lights. These often ambivalent or 
perhaps contradictory depictions mean that movies may be a third-order 
source of knowledge that individuals use to learn about government, stand-
ing behind both direct participation and news accounts. But more important, 
films that offer critical as well as supportive images of the government and 
Figure 5. Depictions of Seven Character Types in the Twenty Top-Grossing Domestic 
Films by Decade, 1940s–2000s.
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its officials demonstrate their Gramscian nature. They are tools of political 
socialization capable of expressing or channeling dissent or support for a 
regime. Thus, they serve as one point in the battle for position in culture 
wars and in political struggles directed at the government.
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the truth Is stIll out there
The X-Files and 9/11
Paul A. Cantor
What does this science fiction have to do with anything?
—Special Agent Kallenbrunner, “The Truth,” The X-Files
From the beginning it was very difficult to separate the significance of the 
events of 9/11 from the significance of the media representation of them. 
The impact of what happened that day was bound up with the fact that it 
largely took place on live television, with the whole world watching. The ter-
rorists who planned the attack no doubt were counting on media coverage 
to magnify its impact and thus to achieve their sinister purposes. With the 
media rushing to cover such a shocking event, their commentary quickly 
turned into meta-commentary, as they began to discuss not just the event 
itself but also how they were covering it. Within days, if not hours, of the 
event, media commentators began speculating about how 9/11 would affect 
American popular culture. At times, the talking heads on television seemed 
concerned as much about the cultural impact of 9/11 as about its political, 
economic, and military implications.
Under the stress of a profoundly traumatic event, the media experts 
were understandably tempted to make apocalyptic pronouncements. Soon 
a consensus seemed to emerge: after 9/, American popular culture would 
never be the same again.1 Cynicism about America was out; patriotism would 
return to movies and television. The mood of the moment was crystallized 
in a Time magazine article by Roger Rosenblatt with the title “The Age of 
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Irony Comes to an End” (September 16, 2001). In words that resonated 
throughout the mediasphere, Rosenblatt powerfully argued that “one good 
thing could come from this horror”—Americans would wake up from three 
decades of insisting that “nothing was to be believed in or taken seriously.” In 
opposition to a postmodernist attitude that “nothing was real,” the events of 
9/11 would serve as a reality check for Americans: “The planes that plowed 
into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were real. The flames, smoke, 
sirens—real.” From this perception, Rosenblatt went on to predict a return 
to patriotism: “The greatness of the country: real.”2 Rosenblatt’s eloquent 
rhetoric struck a responsive chord in America, especially among those who 
had long felt that movies and television were letting down their country, 
failing to offer images embodying its traditional values and instead debunk-
ing its icons of national greatness. The heroic responses to the 9/11 crisis by 
firefighters, police, military personnel, and ordinary citizens were genuinely 
inspirational and, many commentators argued, would serve as new and 
invigorating models for American popular culture. Many predicted that 
the traditional all-American hero would soon be returning to movie and 
television screens.3
The events of 9/11 certainly had an immediate impact on television. 
In the first few days following, broadcasting schedules had to be hastily 
reshuffled. For example, the Fox Network canceled a showing of the movie 
Independence Day advertised for September 15. The movie’s trademark shot 
of the White House exploding was exactly what Americans did not want 
to see so soon after witnessing all-too-similar disasters in the real world.4 
Late-night talk-show hosts such as David Letterman and Jay Leno were open 
about their reluctance to go ahead with their normal comedy routines at a 
time when the nation was more inclined to grieve than to laugh.5 To focus 
on a trivial reflection of a very serious situation: the wacky family sitcom 
Malcolm in the Middle had to retool itself. Since its beginning the show had 
featured a subplot involving the oldest son in the family (Francis) being 
exiled to a military academy. The show mercilessly satirized this institution 
as fascist, with the particularly repellent Commandant Edwin Spangler as a 
grotesque caricature of an authoritarian personality. When the sitcom began 
its third season on November 11, 2001, it took only a week for the show to 
find a way for Francis to flee the military school and head up to Alaska to 
work at a resort. I may have been the only person to make anything of this 
development at the time—the country had more important things on its 
mind—and I have never seen any explanation from the producers of the 
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series. Yet I cannot help thinking that Commandant Spangler was a casualty 
of 9/11. In its own small way, Malcolm in the Middle confirmed what com-
mentators like Rosenblatt had argued. After 9/11, one of the most cynical 
shows on television now drew the line at making fun of the military in any 
form.
A more significant and complex case study of the impact of 9/11 on 
American popular culture is provided by the Fox Network’s flagship series, 
The X-Files. In its eight-season run leading up to the fall of 2001, The X-Files 
exemplified what media critics had in mind when they complained about a 
negative attitude toward government in American popular culture. One of 
the mottoes of the show was “Trust No One,” and that meant especially trust 
no one in government. The show featured two FBI agents, Fox Mulder and 
Dana Scully, who were presented as heroic, but only because of their inde-
pendence from the government, their constant willingness to disobey the 
orders of their superiors and go it alone in their pursuit of truth and justice. 
Over the years, The X-Files portrayed the FBI and other government agen-
cies such as FEMA as alternately incompetent or sinister. In the seemingly 
contradictory terms of the show, government agencies were either incapable 
of handling the simplest problems or involved in complex conspiracies and 
cover-ups. In the central plot arc of the series, the FBI and other govern-
ment agencies were shown to be manipulated by a shadowy syndicate mas-
terminding a projected alien takeover of the planet, which involved, among 
other nefarious schemes, the federal government spying and experimenting 
on American citizens against their will and without their knowledge. The 
X-Files raised doubts about the conduct of the U.S. government throughout 
the cold war, often presenting its actions as morally equivalent to those of 
its evil enemies. In a number of episodes, the show took a cynical attitude 
toward the first Gulf War, even going so far as to suggest that Saddam Hus-
sein was a puppet of the United States—indeed, its creation.
Thus, if any show was going to run into problems with a changed 
American public in the wake of 9/11, it was going to be The X-Files, and 
Fox chose to delay the beginning of its ninth season by several weeks. In the 
event, its ratings plummeted in the 2001–2002 season, with the show aver-
aging 8.5 million viewers, down from 13.2 million the previous season and 
from a peak average of 18.3 million in 1996.6 By January 2002, the creator- 
producer of The X-Files, Chris Carter, could see the handwriting on the wall 
and made the decision to pull the plug on the series. When its last episode 
aired in May 2002, many commentators chose to view The X-Files as another 
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casualty of 9/11. In a thoughtful—and appreciative—article on the show, 
Andrew Stuttaford argued that 9/11 had relegated The X-Files to the dust-
bin of history: “the X-Files is a product of a time that has passed. It is a relic 
of the Clinton years as dated as a dot-com share certificate, a stained blue 
dress or Kato Kaelin’s reminiscences.” Echoing Rosenblatt and other media 
pundits, Stuttaford accused the series of not taking life seriously, pointing 
to its “cynicism, irony, and a notable sense of detachment.” “This is a show 
where, for all the drama, no one seems genuinely involved—even with each 
other. . . . This is Po-Mo Sci-Fi. . . . It is Seinfeld with flying saucers, another 
show, ultimately, about nothing. Nothing serious, anyway.” Invoking 9/11 
as having transformed the world, Stuttaford dismissed the series as having 
become irrelevant in the twenty-first century: “The X-Files was a show for 
self-indulgent, more complacent times, an entertainment for before.”7
Sorting out causality in the realm of culture is notoriously difficult, and 
an argument like Stuttaford’s risks falling into the fallacy of post hoc, ergo 
In uncanny ways, The X-Files anticipated the events of 9/11 and their troubling 
aftermath. In the series finale “The Truth,” Fox Mulder (David Duchovny) is rep-
resented by Walter Skinner (Mitch Pileggi) in a closed military tribunal completely 
controlled by the state and Mulder’s enemies. (MovieGoods)
The Truth Is Still Out There 79
propter hoc. Merely because the popularity of The X-Files began to decline 
after 9/11 does not prove that a change in the American public’s attitude 
toward government was responsible for the show’s demise. To his credit, 
Stuttaford admits that other factors may well have been at work. Nine sea-
sons is a long time for any television series to survive. The X-Files is, in fact, 
the longest running science fiction show in TV history (by comparison, 
the original Star Trek lasted only three seasons). Well before 9/11, media 
critics began wondering whether 2001–2002 would—and should—be the 
last for The X-Files.8 Many argued that the show had suffered a significant 
decline in quality ever since its fifth season, or at least since its seventh. For 
a show that often depended on the shock value of its episodes, The X-Files 
was running out of novel plot twists. Moreover, casting problems threatened 
to doom the show once its stars, David Duchovny and Gillian Anderson, 
began to lose interest in continuing in their roles. Duchovny’s absence from 
all but the final episode of the ninth season was probably enough by itself 
to sink the series. The attempt in the eighth season to introduce two new 
FBI agents to pick up the slack from Mulder and Scully never really caught 
on with X-Files fans. In short, the show had probably run its course by the 
2001–2002 season, and attempts to attribute its demise to a post-9/11 change 
in mood in the American public probably overemphasize the importance 
of cultural factors.
More to the point, if Stuttaford’s thesis were correct, The X-Files should 
have long since slipped off the pop culture map. Instead, a significant seg-
ment of the public continues to be very interested in the show. The X-Files 
has been highly successful in syndication and is still rebroadcast regularly on 
such channels as SciFi. DVDs of the show have also sold very well in various 
packaged and repackaged forms. Despite Stuttaford’s confident prediction, 
The X-Files has not gone the way of Kato Kaelin, ending up as a mere foot-
note in pop culture history. On the contrary, The X-Files has emerged as a 
permanent feature of the American pop culture landscape. New television 
shows and movies continue to draw on its legacy and refer to it in implicit 
and explicit ways.9 One might even argue that, far from being made outdated 
by 9/11, The X-Files actually pioneered a model of what post-9/11 popular 
culture would be like. Some critics were saying this even in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11. An October 23, 2001, New York Times article on how 
horror movies might have to change after 9/11 quotes Robert J. Thompson, 
a professor of media and popular culture at Syracuse University: “The hor-
ror movie is going to move away from the age of Godzilla, which personi-
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fied this enormous threat of atomic power to destroy things. . . . Instead, it’s 
going to be much more on the ‘X-Files’ model, where the villain is elusive 
and perhaps conspiratorial.”10
Perhaps The X-Files did not generally receive the credit it deserved for 
modeling the post-9/11 world because media pundits did not want to face 
up to a disturbing truth—the show had actually predicted a new age of 
international terrorism with uncanny accuracy. The X-Files was one of the 
darkest and most unnerving shows in the history of television, especially 
in the way it dwelled on the nightmare aspects of globalization. Its horror 
stories often focused on how the increasing dissolution of national borders 
was unleashing new and terrifying forces in the contemporary world, forces 
that threatened to undermine and destroy the American way of life. X-Files 
plots often dealt with the migrant as monster and the monster as migrant. In 
episode after episode, various forms of alien creatures, whether extraterres-
trial or not, penetrated U.S. borders and had to be hunted down by Mulder 
and Scully. The show rested on the premise that in the age of globalization, 
the nature of the threat to the United States had undergone a fundamental 
transformation. Gone were the cold war days when America had faced a 
single, clear-cut enemy in the form of the communist bloc and the central 
fear was nuclear annihilation. The X-Files accurately reflected the fact that 
by the 1990s, the enemies of the United States were no longer coming neatly 
packaged in the form of hostile nation-states like the Soviet Union.
Again and again The X-Files suggested that in a globalized world, threats 
would take more shadowy, diffuse, and mysterious forms, difficult to pin 
down and hence difficult to deal with. Many episodes centered on the threat 
of terrorism, both international and domestic, and the line between the two 
was sometimes difficult to draw. The X-Files was especially interested in 
bioterrorism, and several episodes portrayed the threat of plague and other 
forms of disease being spread around the globe by sinister but unidentifi-
able forces. As I summed up the basic situation in The X-Files in a book 
published in September 2001:
The X-Files portrays a kind of free-floating geopolitical anxiety that 
follows upon the collapse of the clear-cut ideological divisions of 
the Cold War. . . . [It] presents a post–Cold War world that, far from 
being polarized in terms of nation-states anymore, is interconnected 
in all sorts of clandestine and sinister ways that cut across national 
borders. . . . The central image of threat during the Cold War was a 
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nuclear explosion—destruction that starts at a clear central point 
and spreads outward. The central image of threat in The X-Files is 
infection—a plague that may begin at any point on the globe and 
spread to any other—thanks to international air travel and all the 
other globalizing forces at work today.11
Does this sound like a television show that is irrelevant in the post-9/11 
world?
In fact, when the events of 9/11 were quickly followed by the anthrax 
scare, and scenes of personnel in hazmat suits decontaminating whole build-
ings suddenly filled the airwaves, the real world seemed to have been plunged 
into an X-Files episode. I remember thinking at the time not how outdated 
the series was but how prophetic it had turned out to be. Life seemed to be 
imitating art in the form of The X-Files. But the most prophetic moment the 
show produced came not in the series itself but in its spin-off The Lone Gun-
men. The eponymous heroes of this series were three paranoid conspiracy 
theorists who ran a tabloid that sought to expose various forms of govern-
ment cover-ups and evil deeds. Introduced in the first season of The X-Files 
as aides to Mulder in his FBI investigations, the characters were treated 
semicomically and became very popular with fans of the show. Eventually 
the X-Files team decided to give the Lone Gunmen their own series, pro-
duced by the same people who had made the parent show successful (Chris 
Carter, Frank Spotnitz, John Shiban, and Vince Gilligan).
The new series debuted on March 4, 2001, with a pilot episode pun-
ningly entitled “Pilot” because it deals with piloting an airplane. Incredible 
as it sounds, the episode portrays an attempt to pilot a commercial airliner 
into the World Trade Center in order to create an international incident. Of 
course, the episode does not get all the details right—it involves a Boeing 
727 rather than a 757 or 767, and the fictional flight is heading for Boston’s 
Logan Airport, not departing from it. Still, the resemblance of the fictional 
story to the actual events of 9/11 was chilling for anyone who, like me, 
remembered the Lone Gunmen episode on that fateful day in September. 
It seems to me very odd to claim that 9/11 demonstrated the irrelevance of 
The X-Files to the twenty-first century when the creators of the show had 
anticipated the details of the disaster better than anyone else in the twentieth 
century, including U.S. intelligence agencies.
To be sure, in the TV episode, the plane headed for the World Trade 
Center is being piloted not by Islamic terrorists but by remote control, and 
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at the last moment the Lone Gunmen succeed in freeing the regular pilots 
to fly the 727 on their own. The plane merely grazes one of the Twin Tow-
ers, and disaster is averted. As for the explanation of the “terrorism,” true 
to the conspiratorial worldview of The X-Files, in the Lone Gunmen episode 
the plot has actually been hatched by a faction within the U.S. government. 
As the father of one of the Lone Gunmen explains it: “The Cold War’s over, 
John, but with no clear enemy to stockpile against, the arms market’s flat. 
But bring down a fully loaded 727 into the middle of New York City and 
you’ll find a dozen tin-pot dictators all over the world just clamoring to take 
responsibility and begging to be smart-bombed.”12 In their commentary in 
The Lone Gunmen DVD set, the producers of the show all talk about how 
difficult it was for them just to view the episode after 9/11. Frank Spotnitz 
says: “I actually couldn’t bring myself to even look at the episode again until 
I sat down to prepare for this interview today.” They regret having presented 
a plot so close to 9/11 as planned by the U.S. government itself. Comment-
ing on the episode’s explanation of the plot, one of the producers says: “The 
irony is there are people out there who believe this to be true”—referring 
to all the conspiracy theories about the 9/11 attacks having been executed 
by the U.S. government, not by Islamic terrorists.
The deeper irony is that the existence of this Lone Gunmen episode has 
itself fueled conspiracy theories about 9/11. Refusing to accept the idea 
that the anticipation of 9/11 in this television show could have been a mere 
coincidence, conspiracy theorists have offered the episode as proof that 
some people in the United States must have known about the World Trade 
Center plot ahead of time.13 Some theorists have seized on the fact that, like 
The X-Files, The Lone Gunmen was broadcast on the Fox Network, which is 
owned by the wealthy and powerful media mogul Rupert Murdoch. These 
conspiracy theorists insist that Murdoch must have been actively involved 
in producing this episode, perhaps trying to warn the public about what 
turned out to be the 9/11 terrorist attacks, perhaps trying to create disin-
formation about them in advance. There could be no better example of art 
and life blurring together than the way in which the pilot episode of The 
Lone Gunmen has become woven into conspiracy theories about 9/11. In 
this case, television has become part of the reality it is supposed to be merely 
representing.
But if we are to believe the Lone Gunmen producers—and I think that 
we should—they were as shocked as anybody by what happened on 9/11. 
In the DVD commentary, Spotnitz says of the morning of 9/11: “My first 
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thought was the Lone Gunmen. . . . ‘I hope this has nothing to do with what 
we did on television six months ago. . . . I hope we weren’t somehow guilty 
of inspiring this.’” Given the amount of time required to prepare for the 9/11 
attacks, Spotnitz and his colleagues were safe in assuming that they were 
innocent of having contributed in any way to what happened. Nevertheless, 
they were troubled by their strange “prediction” of the World Trade Center 
disaster. A number of government authorities, in defense of their failure to 
anticipate 9/11 and their lack of any contingency plans for dealing with this 
kind of attack, have said that such a terrorist act was unimaginable. And yet 
in working on the Lone Gunmen pilot, the X-Files team in fact imagined it.14 
As Spotnitz says about his own assumptions at the time: “If we thought about 
something like this happening, then the government certainly has thought 
about something like this happening. When it actually happened in real life, 
six months after this was broadcast, I just was shocked that there was nothing 
in place . . . to prevent something like this from happening.” Unfortunately, 
the events of 9/11 confirmed not only The X-Files’ vision of the rise of global 
terrorism but also its vision of the U.S. government’s inability to deal with 
this development. The kind of bureaucratic infighting and snafus The X-Files 
frequently portrayed in the FBI and other government agencies turned out 
to be all too real. As subsequent investigations revealed, various government 
agencies had reason to believe that a terrorist attack was imminent in Sep-
tember 2001, but their failure to share their information and other errors 
prevented them from doing anything to forestall the disaster.
Perhaps, then, those who chose to dismiss The X-Files in the wake of 
9/11 were shooting the messenger. Far from being wrong about the world 
we now live in, The X-Files had portrayed it all too accurately. Disturbed 
by what they saw in that mirror, critics decided to blame the representa-
tion for what it revealed about the underlying reality it was representing. 
As the series approached its final episode, many commentators seized the 
opportunity to proclaim its irrelevance in the post-9/11 era, but they never 
bothered to analyze the episode itself.15 They thereby missed a chance to 
see whether The X-Files might have anything important to say about the 
post-9/11 world.
I myself found that watching “The Truth” air on May 19, 2002, I was so 
caught up in the excitement of seeing the last-ever episode of The X-Files 
that I was unable to view it critically. Seeing it again on DVD now, I would 
have to say that “The Truth” is not an example of The X-Files at its dramatic 
and intellectual best. Chris Carter and his crew were trying to accomplish 
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too many things at once in this episode, and as drama it suffers from being 
overburdened with retrospective exposition, nostalgia, and the sheer emo-
tional weight of being the last show. Oddly enough, in light of the criticism 
of the show at the time, the strongest aspect of the final episode is its con-
temporary relevance. Unwilling to go down without a fight, Carter came out 
swinging in “The Truth.” At a time when movies and television were heeding 
the media pundits and trying to avoid any content that might be considered 
antigovernment, the final episode of The X-Files remained true to its motto 
of “Trust No One.” “The Truth” has turned out to be almost as prophetic as 
the “Pilot” episode of The Lone Gunmen. Just as the Bush administration’s 
war on terror was ramping up, The X-Files chose to deliver a timely warn-
ing against its tendency to disregard civil liberties and to deprive people of 
their fundamental legal rights.
In “The Truth,” Mulder breaks into a secret government facility and 
is put on trial for supposedly killing a soldier in the attempt. The episode 
is largely devoted to showing how brutally Mulder is treated in detention 
and how unjustly he is treated during the trial. Early in the episode, he is 
kept incommunicado in a military prison and is shown wearing the orange 
outfit that had already become familiar to the American public in images 
coming out of the U.S. government’s detention facility for terrorist suspects 
in Guantanamo Bay. The parallels with the situation in Guantanamo were 
obvious at the time and have become only stronger as more information has 
emerged about how the government has treated its prisoners at the Cuban 
base. Mulder is being held in secret, with no access to legal counsel and no 
way to communicate with his friends and allies. In the opening sequence, he 
is brainwashed by vicious military guards, who, in Orwellian fashion, keep 
asking him: “What are you thinking?”16 He is deprived of sleep, beaten, and 
tormented in an effort to break his spirit and get him to confess his guilt. At 
a time when most Americans were not inclined to think too closely about 
what their government was doing in Guantanamo, The X-Files was confront-
ing them with images of what can happen when there is no public scrutiny 
of the treatment of prisoners.
Mulder’s friends at the FBI, including Scully and Assistant Director 
Walter Skinner, finally find out that he is, in Skinner’s words, “being held . . 
. indefinitely” and are able to come to his aid. But they seem virtually help-
less in the face of a coalition between the military and the FBI to ensure 
that Mulder is convicted. FBI Deputy Director Alvin Kersh has always had 
it in for Mulder, and if that were not enough, he is told by General Mark 
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Suveg that he will have to preside over Mulder’s trial. Suveg makes Kersh’s 
task clear: “I want a verdict—a guilty verdict.” Then, in typical X-Files fash-
ion, he ominously adds, “There are forces inside the government now that 
a man would be foolish to disobey.” This seems to be Carter’s comment on 
a political turn for the worse in post-9/11 America.
As for Mulder’s trial, it is a classic case of a kangaroo court. In the 
director’s commentary on the episode in the DVD set, Kim Manners says 
that Carter’s model for the trial was the Australian movie Breaker Morant, 
a powerful story of military subordinates taking the fall for the misdeeds 
of their imperialist superiors. In “The Truth,” every aspect of the trial is 
stacked against Mulder. Skinner tries hard to defend him, but any appeal 
he makes to traditional legal safeguards is rejected by the court. Finally 
in exasperation, he says to Kersh, “This isn’t a secret tribunal; as you so 
kindly informed me, it’s a court of law.” But Kersh immediately counters 
that it is “a military court of law,” and it turns out to be a secret tribunal of 
the worst kind. No written record is being kept at all of the proceedings. 
The government is never able to produce the body of the soldier Mulder 
is charged with killing (which would in fact be impossible, since Mulder’s 
“victim” is one of the show’s invincible “supersoldiers” and hence can-
not be killed). Even when Scully comes up with incontrovertible forensic 
evidence that the corpse the government claims is Mulder’s “victim” is a 
fake, Kersh refuses to accept her expert testimony. He finally delivers the 
court’s verdict: “Acting fairly and impartially, this panel finds the defendant 
guilty.” But fairness and impartiality are exactly what the episode shows 
are absent when the government is able to try people in secret, outside the 
normal justice system.
Condemned to death by lethal injection, Mulder is rescued by his FBI 
allies (in one of several unprepared for plot developments in the episode, 
Kersh inexplicably comes to Mulder’s aid and helps in his escape). Instead 
of fleeing to safety through Canada, Mulder heads with Scully to one of the 
series’ favorite locations—the deserts of New Mexico (site of the infamous 
1947 UFO incident at Roswell and hence where the story begins for The X-
Files). Here the episode’s plot gets murky, especially for anyone unfamiliar 
with X-Files mythology. In a remote desert cave, Mulder finds none other 
than the chief villain of the series, the sinister Cigarette Smoking Man. We 
had every reason to believe that he had been killed off in an earlier episode, 
but somehow he survived and somehow he has made it to this mountain 
retreat, where he is cared for by an old Indian woman.
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None of this action is well explained, and at this point the plot appears 
to be driven by considerations not of narrative logic but of thematic sym-
bolism. The most striking fact about the scene is that the hitherto urbane 
Cigarette Smoking Man, at home in the corridors of power in Washington, 
D.C., has retreated to a mountain cave. In President Bush’s October 7, 2001, 
address on the first U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, he famously said: 
“Initially the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched 
hiding places.”17 Because of its initial implausibility, I offer this interpretation 
with some hesitation, but in the cave scenes of “The Truth,” the Cigarette 
Smoking Man appears in some weird way to be standing in for Osama bin 
Laden.18 He has traded in his standard-issue government bureaucrat’s busi-
ness suit and adopted the pose of an Indian shaman. He is referred to as a 
“wise man” and looks the part of some Eastern sage with his newly flowing 
long hair. At the climax of the episode, two military helicopters blast him 
into flaming oblivion by firing missiles into his retreat. Exactly this kind of 
scene was very much on the American public’s mind at the time this episode 
aired. The U.S. government was promising to deliver a similar blow to bin 
Laden in his mountain hideaway in Afghanistan.
I am not sure exactly what point The X-Files was trying to make by link-
ing the Cigarette Smoking Man with Osama bin Laden, but a connection that 
seems logically weak is extremely strong visually in the episode (and televi-
sion is a visual medium). Just look at the cave scenes with the sound turned 
off and ask yourself whether what you are seeing was more appropriate to 
Afghanistan than to New Mexico at the time the show was broadcast. The 
best I can do to articulate the connection is this: American Indians, especially 
the long-vanished Anasazi peoples referred to in this episode, always figured 
prominently in X-Files mythology. The show criticized what it regarded as a 
contemporary American empire by linking it with the conquest and extermi-
nation of Indian tribes in the creation of the American nation-state. If “The 
Truth” was pairing Afghanistan with New Mexico, the suggestion was that 
the United States was doing to a Third World people in Asia in 2002 what it 
had done to Indians in America throughout the nineteenth century—namely, 
using its technological superiority to wipe them out.
As for the destruction of the Cigarette Smoking Man, it seems to be an 
illustration of the principle of blowback, which was on many people’s minds 
in connection with 9/11. The United States had originally armed and trained 
the mujahideen in Afghanistan; terrorists were now using those weapons 
and skills against the United States. Similarly, throughout The X-Files, the 
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Cigarette Smoking Man had participated in one government operation after 
another directed against indigenous peoples around the world, operations 
that sometimes bordered on genocide. In the final episode, the government 
weapons he helped unleash against the world come back to destroy him with 
a kind of rough justice.
As so often happens in The X-Files, opposites come to be equated. Gov-
ernments turn out to be the mirror images of the evil opponents they rail 
against; sometimes governments generate the very enemies they fight. In 
“The Truth,” the Cigarette Smoking Man has retreated to his cave because 
unusual mineral deposits in the area will protect him against the aliens 
and the government’s supersoldiers. He explains to Mulder: “Indian wise 
men realized this over 2,000 years ago. They hid here and watched their 
own culture die. The original shadow government.” These words take us 
back to the beginning of the episode, when Skinner explains that the 
secret facility Mulder broke into, the Mount Weather Complex, is “where 
they say our so-called shadow government is installed.” Two shadow gov-
ernments—the episode is bookended by images of leaders hiding out in 
mountain caves, protecting themselves while appearing to be indifferent 
to the fate of their own people. Ever willing to play two sides against each 
other, the amphibious Cigarette Smoking Man moves between these two 
worlds, the government at the center of power and the remote Indian 
tribes on the periphery. In response to 9/11, there was much speculation 
about where American leaders would go to keep safe during a national 
emergency. The X-Files could not resist calling our attention to the irony 
of the fact that our nation’s leaders might be hiding in mountain caves 
even as they were directing air strikes against terrorist leaders hiding in 
mountain caves in Afghanistan.
The finale of The X-Files is characteristic of the series as a whole in the 
way it blurs the line between the persecutor and the persecuted, showing 
that the victim is the mirror image of his killer. The protean Cigarette Smok-
ing Man, who had already played many contradictory roles in the series, 
represents at once both the government and the forces it wants to suppress. 
In seeking to annihilate him, the government is trying to eliminate the 
destructive forces it originally set loose itself. In a world of terrorist blow-
back, the cave scenes of “The Truth” makes a kind of rough sense. After all, 
in bombing Afghanistan, the United States was trying to wipe out terrorist 
forces it had originally armed and trained back in the 1980s in an effort to 
push the Soviet Union out of the country.
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If we had any lingering doubts about the contemporary relevance of 
the final episode of The X-Files when it first aired, they have been dispelled 
by the evidence of a deleted scene in the DVD version. We now know that 
“The Truth” was originally intended to conclude with a scene of President 
Bush in the White House overlooking the Washington Monument (with a 
remarkable look-alike cast in the role of the president). Handed a note that 
evidently tells him that Mulder has escaped, Bush says, “What do you want 
me to do? I was told this was being handled. The truth is out there now.” 
The camera then pans to the other figure in the room, and it turns out to 
be one of the members of Mulder’s kangaroo court. Indeed, he is the most 
sinister of the judges, the one identified by the psychic Gibson Praise as an 
alien and the clandestine orchestrator of Mulder’s railroading in court (in 
the quaint terminology of The X-Files, he is known as the Toothpick Man). 
It is this dark figure who was originally going to conclude the episode and 
hence The X-Files as a whole with these ominous words, which refer to two 
of the show’s mottoes: “The truth has always been out there, Mr. President. 
The people just don’t want to believe.”
Even by the normally harsh standards of The X-Files, this scene is 
extraordinarily cynical about the U.S. government. It is the only time in the 
long history of the series that a U.S. president is shown actively engaged at 
the heart of the great conspiracy the program purported to chronicle. With 
the words “What do you want me to do?” the Bush figure suggests that the 
president is merely the puppet of shadowy forces of which the American 
public is willfully ignorant. One of the commentators on the deleted scene 
says, “I’m so happy we cut this scene,” and perhaps this decision is evidence 
that even The X-Files felt a need to exercise some self-restraint in the wake 
of 9/11. Yet further comments on deleting the scene suggest that the real 
reason for doing so was aesthetic, not political—they wanted to end the 
episode and the series with the highly emotional exchange between Mulder 
and Scully that actually brought the original broadcast to a close. But for 
whatever reason it was deleted, the mere existence of the Bush scene gives 
some insight into the political attitudes of The X-Files and emphasizes how 
much it was engaged with the realities of the post-9/11 world. Precisely when 
media pundits were calling for movies and television to get on board with 
the program and become cheerleaders for Team America, The X-Files had 
the courage to remain true to its long-term mission of providing a voice of 
dissent in popular culture.
In sum, even though the plot and the symbolism of the final episode 
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of The X-Files are often murky and perhaps inconsistent, it is still clear that 
the series was engaging with some of the fundamental issues that had been 
raised by 9/11 and its aftermath. The attitude the show took toward those 
issues may not have pleased media pundits at the time, and they had every 
right to criticize the show’s position, but it was unfair to say that The X-Files 
had simply been made irrelevant by 9/11. In some ways, we can now say that 
it had become more relevant than ever. Up to and including “The Truth,” 
the show continued to have something to say about global terrorism and 
the U.S. government’s efforts to combat it. The course the war on terror has 
taken since The X-Files went off the air has unfortunately confirmed what the 
series was trying to say about the danger to civil liberties posed by govern-
ment policies, as well as about the government’s ineffectiveness at eradicat-
ing terrorism at its roots. In particular, in its portrait of a globalizing world, 
the show cautioned that the nation-state is no longer the appropriate unit 
of analysis in geopolitical conflict. Some would argue that one of the basic 
errors in the U.S. government’s post-9/11 antiterrorist policy has been to 
look for nation-states to punish, while ignoring ways in which the threats 
against America have been fundamentally altered, thereby requiring new 
modes of response that take into account the amorphous and global nature 
of the new forces arrayed against the United States.
As for the prediction of a total transformation of American popular cul-
ture after 9/11, very little of what the pundits prophesied in the fall of 2001 
has come to pass.19 As we have seen, in the immediate weeks and months 
after 9/11, there were many signs of movie and television producers alter-
ing their plans in an effort to avoid upsetting and displeasing a traumatized 
American public. But as for the long-term effects of 9/11 and its aftermath, 
one could argue that movies and television are more cynical than ever about 
government. The landscape of popular culture is constantly changing. As 
I am writing this chapter in the summer of 2008, the biggest blockbuster 
of the season is the new Batman movie The Dark Knight, a film that in its 
scenes of urban destruction on a mass scale clearly evokes 9/11. Insofar as 
it is an allegory of a post-9/11 world, it suggests that the good guys have 
become virtually indistinguishable from the bad guys. Batman must operate 
outside the law and resort to the tactics of the villains in Gotham City in 
order to combat them successfully. In particular, the Caped Crusader must 
rely on morally and legally dubious practices, such as kidnapping foreign 
citizens on foreign soil and eavesdropping on a massive scale on the citi-
zens of Gotham City in the name of protecting them. The Joker is a chilling 
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portrait of a terrorist—a man who is not interested in money or any of the 
other usual goals of criminals but is destructive because “some people just 
want to watch the world burn.” The Joker is actually shown triumphing in 
the film, because he manages to turn the most upright man in Gotham City, 
District Attorney Harvey Dent, into Two-Face, a crazed vigilante who seeks 
vengeance at any price. After Dent dies, the only way justice can prevail in 
the world of the film is for the authorities to cover up his crimes to preserve 
the myth of him as a decent and just civic official. The Dark Knight may end 
up endorsing the need to violate civil liberties in order to combat terrorism, 
but its portrait of government officials comes very close to what The X-Files 
tried to show.20
Two other popular superhero movies from the summer of 2008—Iron 
Man and The Incredible Hulk—portray the federal government in general 
and the military-industrial complex in particular in a sinister light. In both 
cases, the government literally produces monsters and unleashes them to 
wreak havoc on its own cities on a scale that dwarfs the devastation of 9/11. 
Iron Man explicitly connects the operations of the U.S. military-industrial 
complex with terrorist threats coming out of Afghanistan from a group 
called Ten Rings. Both movies provide powerful metaphors of geopolitical 
blowback. One review of another blockbuster hit from the summer of 2008, 
Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Skull, begins: “Steven Spielberg’s fourth 
Indiana Jones adventure is the best very special episode of The X-Files ever!”21 
(Notice how The X-Files continues to be a reference point with regard to 
popular culture.) It is not just that Spielberg’s movie heavily borrows its plot 
elements from The X-Files, with references to the 1947 Roswell incident, alien 
autopsies, and extraterrestrial forces colonizing the earth in earlier periods 
of history. The film is cinematically nostalgic, with a loving re-creation of 
the 1950s as it was visualized in film, including a teenage hangout perfect 
in all the details. It takes us back to the “simpler” days of the cold war and 
even features that most 1950s of movie treats—a nuclear explosion. But the 
film does not take a 1950s attitude toward the 1950s. The main villains are 
from the Soviet Union, but it portrays its FBI agents as their moral equiva-
lents; just as in The X-Files, the McCarthyism of the FBI is presented as the 
mirror image of the Stalinism of the KGB.22
To turn briefly to television, the popular Fox series 24 is frequently 
offered as the alternative to The X-Files and an example of a patriotic response 
to 9/11.23 The show celebrates the actions of a government Counter Terror-
ist Unit and makes a hero out of Jack Bauer for risking everything, includ-
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ing his own family, to foil terrorist plots against America. But in fact, 24 
is much closer to The X-Files than it may at first appear. Bauer is actually 
much like Mulder and Scully—he succeeds not because of but in spite of the 
government agencies he works for and with. And 24 goes just as far as The 
X-Files ever did in showing how bureaucratic incompetence and infighting 
hamstring the government’s efforts to deal with terrorism. Hence Bauer 
is, if possible, even more insubordinate than Mulder and Scully and even 
more of a lone wolf and a loose cannon. As for the show’s portrait of the 
federal government, it offered a very attractive model of a president in the 
figure of David Palmer, but let us not forget that it went on to show Palmer 
assassinated on the orders of his successor, Charles Logan. In Logan, 24 cre-
ated perhaps the most loathsome portrait of a U.S. president ever offered in 
popular culture—a figure who is obviously meant to conjure up memories 
of Richard Nixon but who, in the end, makes “Tricky Dick” look like Mr. 
Nice Guy by comparison. Logan turned out to be literally a traitor to the 
United States, colluding with the Russians and countenancing a terrorist 
strike against American citizens in a conspiracy that would have shocked 
even Fox Mulder. Looking carefully at 24, one would conclude that the 
spirit of The X-Files is very much alive in American popular culture in the 
post-9/11 era.24
At a party celebrating the conclusion of the broadcast run of The X-Files, 
Sandy Grushaw paid tribute to its creator: “Chris Carter didn’t just create a 
show for our time, but for all time.”25 A Fox executive is not exactly the most 
objective judge of one of his own network’s series, and Grushaw’s evoca-
tion of Ben Jonson’s famous encomium to Shakespeare may be a trifle over 
the top. As with all cultural products, only time will tell how enduring the 
achievements of The X-Files will turn out to be in the history of television. 
But I think that it is already safe to say that the rumors of its death in 2002 
were exaggerated. The continuing relevance of The X-Files is a tribute to the 
vitality of popular culture and its ability to perform a gadfly role in American 
society. The pilot episode of The Lone Gunmen is a powerful reminder that 
popular culture may sometimes glimpse truths about our world that have 
eluded those in power who are supposed to be on the lookout for just such 
truths. The critics of The X-Files in 2001–2002 may have mistaken political 
dissent for cynicism about politics. In political terms, popular culture is at 
its best when it provides not a chorus unanimously singing the praises of 
America and its values but lone voices raising the kinds of question that 
must be asked if democracy is to continue to function.
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The decline dates back to the fatal decision last season to continue without Duchovny’s 
full-time services . . . , a move that coincided with the unsatisfying announcement of 
Scully’s miracle pregnancy: two ‘jump the shark’ moments for the price of one” (10). On 
Duchovny’s absence causing the show’s decline, see also Johnson, “Secret Agents,” 5.
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that came to be associated with 9/11. “Tango de los Pistoleros” contains this remark-
able line about a Department of Defense composite material that confers invisibility: 
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I Want to Believe is a deeply dark, unnerving, and depressing film, with almost none 
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Skinner coming to the rescue. I Want to Believe may have been an excellent movie—a 
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X-Files movie. Therefore, it would be unfair to judge the relevance of the original TV 
series to our world on the basis of how this theatrical film performed at the box office. 
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terious multinational corporation, the show is such an obvious rip-off of The X-Files 
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Roberto Orci, admitted, “The X-Files was an inspiration” (TV Guide, July 14, 2008, 33–34), 
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unPACkIng the house
Images of Heroism against the Regulatory State
Sara R. Jordan and Phillip W. Gray
Gregory House, M.D., is not the type of doctor most people would want 
to meet. He is rude, condescending, and curmudgeonly—not the type of 
man anyone would want for a colleague, either. His general view of human-
ity is straightforward—“everyone lies”—and his favorite term for others is 
“moron.” Yet this unattractive central character of the popular television 
show House, M.D. attracts millions of viewers. Whether viewers tune in to 
House weekly, record it via DVR, or purchase the series on DVD, the show 
appears to have a dedicated viewer population.1 In this chapter we attempt 
to ascertain what accounts for the series’ dedicated viewership.
Communications and media researchers advance a number of hypoth-
eses on the psychological appeal of television dramas. Here we advance 
another, based on the political-psychological effects of this particular 
drama and its genre. Without delving into an empirical assessment of its 
appeal, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, we argue that the appeal 
of House originates from a desire for professionals to escape the confines 
of the regulatory state. What millions of health care professionals and 
representatives of various other professions cannot do, House does. The 
attitude that so many people hide behind their e-mail and professional 
personae is the public image he cultivates. House has intuitive psychologi-
cal appeal to an audience whose psyches are entangled in red tape. We do 
not argue that the creators of the character designed House as a purposeful 
emblem of rebellion against the regulatory state—the character’s exoteric 
appeal is his unique antisocial genius charm. We argue that the esoteric 
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meaning of the series is an insider’s rebellion against modern regulation 
and professionalism.
Diagnosing Viewer Motivation
If House (Hugh Laurie) is an abrasive character whose professional and pri-
vate personae are emblems of a purposeful violation of law and convention, 
what draws viewers to the screen episode after episode? Communications 
scholars such as Graber and McQuail suggest that viewers have multiple 
motivations for their choice of television programs.2 Based on a survey of 
the relevant research, Dhavan Shah provides the following summary: “Many 
theorists suggest a four-part typology of media use and gratifications: an 
information function, a personal identity function, an integration and social 
interaction function, and an entertainment and diversion function.” Shah 
Dr. Gregory House (Hugh Laurie) personifies one man’s struggle against the over-
regulated state and professionalized health care system. (Jerry Ohlinger’s Movie 
Material Store)
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further develops these categories, describing the use of television media “to 
achieve social empathy and a sense of belonging, find a basis for conversation 
and social interaction, carry out social roles, or connect with family, friends 
and society.”3 Although the literature on viewer motivation and gratifica-
tion is too rich to delve into here, the hypothesis we espouse to explain the 
House phenomenon is that viewers get a sense of rebellious catharsis in the 
behavior of the main character. That is, viewers tune in to displace their own 
dissatisfaction with their regulated professional or personal lives onto the 
screen and the character House.
In this chapter we describe the contours of catharsis gained through 
House viewership. By catharsis, we mean a psychological release from pain 
or frustration. The origin of the pain and frustration that viewers feel is 
multifaceted, but we hypothesize that it is rooted in frustration with their 
totally administered existence. The totally administered existence is the 
modal condition of modern humankind; subsumed by the blob of the exten-
sive household administration that is a social policy–focused state, men 
and women know little of the comparative freedom of a polis or a Roman 
republic.4 The normative claims for or against the administered state are 
largely left to the side here, but the basal assumption is that the psychologi-
cal effects of the totally administered existence posited by Arendt, Hummel, 
Marcuse, Oakeshott, Strauss, and others are nominally true. Although the 
argument in this chapter is descriptive, we hope that this empirical claim 
might be substantiated by further research.
A Rebel without a Heart 
The story line of the archetypal medical drama is the compassionate caregiver 
working in the cold, cruel “system.” Shows such as ER, M*A*S*H, and Grey’s 
Anatomy replicate variations on this archetype, to clear viewer applause. 
The story line of House, M.D. is a contradiction—an unalloyed uncompas-
sionate character, surrounded by emblems of compassion, works purpose-
fully against the standard. As suggested above, the character is contrarian 
to the point of rebelliousness. Yet the question arises: can such a character 
represent conscientious dissent? Importantly, can this representation have 
cathartic effects for those who cannot do so? There are various facets of the 
character that make House unique. He is part übermensch, part Oakeshottian 
“responsible man,” part Rousseauian “noble savage,” and part reincarnation 
of La Mettrie, the cynical French physician-philosopher. While House acts 
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out with Nietzschean disregard for the sensibilities of those around him, his 
intention is not a “transvaluation of values.”5 Although he has a Zarathustrian 
influence on those around him, he himself is not interested in disciples. His 
obsessive drive to solve puzzles derives from his well-developed notion of 
truth as an outside, objective force. For House, the right answer is always 
out there, even if it is not known or, further, cannot be known. What can-
not be known is often the result of intentional obfuscation—“everyone 
lies” because they cannot accept this difficult obligation to the truth. As the 
converse to those around him, House’s pride centers on his recognition of 
this responsibility.
In his sense of responsibility to the truth, House resembles Oakeshott’s 
“responsible man.”6 Rather than expecting others to take on these burdens, 
as “mass man” does, House accepts the responsibility that comes with 
acknowledging the obligatory nature of the “right answer.” House embod-
ies this sense of responsibility in himself, while holding a contempt of mass 
man similar to Ortega y Gasset.7 When presenting a radical and usually dan-
gerous method of treatment for a patient, House offers the option without 
diplomacy, without lies: “Either we do this, or she dies.” The scorn heaped 
on the mass man is not reserved for the layperson; it extends to colleagues 
as well. Anyone who tries to hide from the brutal nature of this truth gains 
House’s disdain as a coward and will be circumvented.
In his isolation from others and his intuitive drive for truth, House 
shares similarities with Rousseau’s “noble savage.”8 In rejecting the social 
order’s norms and institutions, without desiring to overturn them to further 
his own will-to-power, House liberates himself from false constraints and 
hypocrisies of administered society. Like La Mettrie, he reserves for physi-
cians the privilege of diagnosing social order and disorder. Only physicians, 
he says, echoing the philosophe Frenchman, can know human nature well 
enough to diagnose individuals and societies.
And, echoing each of the philosophers whose personae and theories 
he embodies, House’s expertise is not limited to the realm of medicine. 
Throughout the series, we see indications that he is skilled in sundry other 
fields, including statistics, music appreciation and performance, analytic 
philosophy, history, comparative anthropology and cultures, languages, and 
(before his thigh infarction) various sports.9 One result of this breadth of 
knowledge is House’s willingness to address, and usually offend, the philo-
sophical, religious, legal, and moral proclivities of those around him. More 
to the point, House is comfortable not only ignoring the administered state 
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but also launching a cogent attack at its foundations. Putting to the side his 
manipulative use of conventions and norms when trying to get what he 
wants, House expresses his disgust at the administered state through direct 
or oblique attacks, euphemism, and irreverence.
Few, if any, individuals completely conform to expectations. Noncon-
formity seems to be a basic human trait shared by all. What differentiates 
the nonconformist from the dissenter is the degree to which one rejects 
norms and one’s motivation for doing so. For the purposes of this chapter, 
nonconformity means loosely applied contrarianism or rejection of norms 
as part of an adolescent growing process. Nonconformity, pace theorists of 
the household as political space, is a household matter. Dissent is public; it 
is meant to be political and representative of the agonistic nature of politics, 
whereas nonconformity is less than this.
Dissent, as theorists of politics recognize, comes in various forms. As 
a modal form of political expression, dissent is, as Camus describes it, “the 
affirmation of a borderline beyond which one cannot go”; it is a “movement 
of rebellion . . . founded simultaneously on the categorical rejection of an 
intrusion that is considered intolerable and on the confused conviction of 
an absolute right which, in the rebel’s mind, is more precisely the impres-
sion that he ‘has the right to . . . ’. Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling 
that, somewhere and somehow, one is right.”10 In more Foucauldian terms, 
rebellion is a reassertion of confidence and camaraderie with the criminal, 
a rejection of the “invincibility of power.”11 As such, dissent need not be an 
ideologically motivated form of expression, though an ideology can be its 
frontispiece. Dissent is an individual’s conscientious move against expecta-
tions and against the direction in which she or he is pushed. Dissent is going 
against the tide under one’s own sails, guided by one’s own interpretation 
that the present or prevailing tide flows in an unfortunate direction that 
one cannot follow.
Based on this definition of dissent, how does the character House dis-
sent? What distinguishes House’s form of dissent is its anti-ideological 
nature. House is not an altruist pursuing a “public interest” or a common 
good. Indeed, House seems to be dissenting against the expectations of 
a physician as a professional whose purpose is to protect a modal public 
interest in “health” (however defined). His rebellion is against the belief that 
following the rules and conforming to expectations are somehow protec-
tive of life as such and a life well lived. Like the tragic heroes of so many 
novels now eclipsed by the plastic characters of reality television, House’s 
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dominant desire is truth—specifically, to determine the answer to puzzles 
of human nature, medical or otherwise. His dissent is against the unreal 
nature of existence according to expectations. As a result, he disregards or 
belittles any obstacles that come between him and his answers. One episode 
that embodies this dissenting attitude well is “Half-Wit” (season 3, episode 
15), starring Dave Matthews. In this episode, House swims against the tide 
to recommend that a musical savant undergo radical surgery to remove 
half his brain in order to recoup the basic minimal functions necessary to 
live independently. Contrary to the expectation that special gifts trump 
ordinary abilities, and contrary to the expectation that disabled individuals’ 
guardians are always their best advocates (an issue that appears in a number 
of episodes), House recommends the ordinary life of buttoning one’s shirt 
independently over the exceptional life lived only with constant manage-
ment. The esoteric theme of the episode seems to be that a life of ordinary 
independence is what is actually extraordinary.
Obstacles to the ordinary and extraordinary, whether ordinary mis-
ery, ordinary independence, or extraordinary medical treatments, crop up 
regularly in the drama. These obstacles often include people, but looking 
beyond the characters as such, those that represent obstacles are embodi-
ments of rules and norms. One character that exemplifies this is Lisa Cuddy 
(Lisa Edelstein), the endocrinologist turned dean of medicine that House 
seeks to circumvent or subvert regularly. In House’s quest for truth, all that 
matter are solving the puzzle and determining the right answer, whether in 
compliance or not with rules, laws, expectations, or norms. In that quest, a 
regulation-implementing boss is certainly an obstacle. For instance, in the 
episodes “Euphoria” parts one and two, House makes multiple appeals to 
Cuddy to contravene a quarantine and instructions for handling an unknown 
agent imposed by the Centers for Disease Control. In this episode and others, 
what thwarts House’s quest for truth is the firm hand of regulation.
Against the Administered Life
To paraphrase the arguments of Arendt and, later, Pitkin, the contemporary 
state is the totally administered blob. A morass of administrative offices 
supervising the conduct of household tasks, the state is less a sovereign 
creature and more a social, regulatory creature. By social, we mean an 
amorphous, all-encompassing entity that describes the location for the lives 
of human beings whose right to self-determination has been stripped by 
Unpacking the House 105
the steady accumulation of mass culture, mass politics, and the mass man’s 
power (also noted, in different language, by Oakeshott). Living in the mire 
of the social, contemporary man is trapped in a gilded cage—secure in his 
sustenance, but insecure in his being.
The life of the professional in present-day America is the life of the 
socialized human. Reflecting on the arguments posited by Caiden in “What 
Really Is Public Maladministration?” we can recognize this existence for 
its pathology.12 Overly specialized, highly routinized, dependent on the 
direction of others, and stripped of the autonomy of free, rational choices, 
the bureaucratized person is an automaton, a cog in a machine. And at last 
count, the number of cogs was in the millions. Further, particularly through 
the mechanisms of “contracting out” or the formation of “public-private 
partnerships,” the number of bureaucratized people has expanded greatly. 
As noted in a study from 2006, the total number of employees in the fed-
eral bureaucracy alone (including employees in the military, postal service, 
contractors, and others) stood at 14.6 million.13
For each man and woman working in or for public bureaucracies, 
there are untold numbers of regulations applicable to them, and they are 
creating even more regulations to control others. Apropos of the present 
context, the medical profession is the most heavily regulated. According to 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were nearly 6.9 million health care 
practitioners and technicians employed in the United States in 2007, and 
another 3.6 million people employed in health care support occupations.14 
Given that this accounts for approximately 3.5 percent of the total Ameri-
can population, the sheer size of the medical-industrial complex is clear. 
Compound this by the number of individuals employed in the Department 
of Health and Human Services and the number of regulations pertinent (at 
the federal level alone) to medical care, devices, technology, and pharma-
ceuticals, and the magnitude of the totally administered existence becomes 
abundantly and frighteningly clear. There is, it seems, no escape from the 
attack of the blob.
As described in the introduction to this chapter, our primary hypothesis 
is that House’s performances act as a catharsis for all professionals who feel 
suffocated by the administered life and its regulated structures, constrain-
ing any creativity they may wish to impart to their day-to-day activities. 
Although we do not systematically prove the decidedly empirical claim 
that all professions are heavily regulated, most readers would vigorously 
nod in the affirmative if asked whether their profession is heavily regulated. 
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By contemptuously ignoring the hierarchies, the norms, and the mundane 
obligations cum bureaucratic procedures that inhibit him, House acts as an 
inspiration to the misanthropic desires inculcated in overly regulated pro-
fessionals. House serves as a therapeutic release by giving professionals in 
all fields the vicarious experience of revolt against procedural systems that 
appear insurmountable.
By combining the traits of independence, genius, and sarcasm, House 
provides a psychological release for viewers. The audience gains this release 
from two themes in the program. The first theme is the personality of the 
character himself. Locked in the position of the administered mass man, 
viewers can vicariously experience the emancipation of the autonomous, 
flippant genius. Few people will ever have the intelligence, learning, or 
audacity to act remotely similar to House, as they are habituated and trained 
to behave in ways more conducive to the administered state. But in the 
character of House, the audience can briefly experience the liberation not 
dissimilar to the freedom Camus describes in his absurdist existentialism. 
The second theme is the success of the character. The catharsis experienced 
by the audience derives not only from House’s personality but also from his 
victories against the crushing bureaucracy he loathes. It is in his accomplish-
ments—forcing the representatives of his profession’s regulatory norms to 
acknowledge not only his autonomy but also the validity and accuracy of 
his methods—that the audience gains vindication.
It is against this startling backdrop that the medical drama comes into 
focus. As suggested by Burke so many years ago, we marvel at the sublime 
magnificence of difficulty. In a stroke of both terror and reverence, we per-
ceive the voice of the dissenting medical professional as representing the 
possibility of sublime salvation from our own eventual consumption, or the 
pathway out of the gut of the Leviathan.
How Far Dissent?
House’s rebellion against regulatory norms is best compared to his main 
antagonist in the third season: Detective Michael Tritter (David Morse). 
After House humiliates the detective in a clinic examination room, Tritter 
dedicates himself to investigating House. In the process, he catches House 
driving a motorcycle without a license, carrying a large amount of painkill-
ers (having forged a prescription for Vicodin using his friend Wilson’s pad), 
and taking a bottle of OxyContin prescribed to a dead man. Although Trit-
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ter collects a damning amount of evidence, and House’s antisocial behavior 
aggravates the case against him, House avoids a trial in the end. In large 
measure, House evades indictment through the assistance, or at least the 
complacency, of his colleagues. The character Wilson (Robert Sean Leonard), 
who epitomizes the altruistic drive of the professional, regularly defends and 
lies for House, up to the point of nearly losing his medical practice. Indeed, 
House’s salvation comes through the regulatory minded Cuddy, who com-
mits perjury to protect her egomaniacal genius doctor. House’s dissent pushes 
his colleagues to rebel in his defense, but his solitary and miserable example 
prevents them from internalizing his form of resistance.
Throughout the story arc, House shows little or no remorse for what he 
has done and is in fact self-righteous in the declaration of his innocence. His 
staff, colleagues, and boss all tell him that he needs help with his Vicodin 
addiction, yet they spend most of their time attempting to hide from the 
police House’s unethical (and potentially illegal) actions, ranging from omit-
ting information when being questioned by Tritter to committing perjury 
in court. For House, the arrest and potential indictment are unjust, in that 
he has done nothing wrong (he needs the exceptional amount of Vicodin 
he takes for pain), and he sees the entire investigation as merely the result 
of a “bully” being angry with him. The transvaluation that House inspires 
is notable in this story arc—while he wants to focus on his medical puzzles, 
the other main characters spend their time (for the most part) rationalizing 
and lying about House’s drug abuse. When Wilson, facing economic and 
professional ruin as a result of writing prescriptions for House, works with 
Tritter to get a better deal from the district attorney, House, Cuddy, and 
especially Dr. Cameron (Jennifer Morrison), one of House’s medical fel-
lows, accuse Wilson of being a traitor and self-interested. In other words, 
House’s utter contempt for regulation, law, and friendship makes his abuse 
of all of them acceptable, but as soon as Wilson attempts to help himself, he 
becomes the unethical one—a transvaluation of marked proportions. But 
Tritter’s persecution of House presents a conundrum: how far can dissent 
be pressed in the administered state?
Tritter and House share various characteristics. Both are antisocial; 
neither man seems to have much of a life outside of his profession. Both 
have addictions: House to Vicodin, Tritter (if House’s diagnosis is correct) to 
cigarettes. Both believe that “everybody lies” and are unwaveringly dedicated 
to finding the truth. But there is one major difference between them: while 
House ignores and rebels against the regulatory norms of his field, Tritter 
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does not. By remaining within the confines of the regulatory state, abiding by 
the legal and procedural rules of police work, the detective cannot catch his 
quarry. House shows himself to be the more dedicated and superior profes-
sional, and perhaps the more responsible individual, because he will stop at 
nothing to find his answers. But this comparison also shows the danger of 
this type of dissent: If House can blithely ignore the rules, why not Tritter? 
If the truth is truly what matters, should we not cheer on Tritter as well?
House is a misanthropic hero for the conformist professionals who seek 
release from the administered life. Through his genius, his self-made 
autonomy, and his sarcasm, House provides a cathartic release for all those 
trapped in the regulated life of mass man. Viewers flock to this program to 
find the type of liberation that can only be imagined but not performed. 
But by placing the administered state in question, House, M.D. may provide 
opportunities to rehabituate audiences away from the presumption of the 
normalcy of current regulatory norms.
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“I leArned PrIson Is A  
bAd PlACe to be”
25th Hour and Reimagining Incarceration
Peter Caster
Midway through Spike Lee’s 25th Hour (2002), the story of a man’s final 
day before beginning a lengthy prison sentence for drug trafficking, main 
character Monty Brogan (Edward Norton) offers an extended monologue 
to a bathroom mirror. It is a profanity-laced litany of abuse heaped on every 
racial, ethnic, and identity group in New York before Brogan concludes that 
his real anger is directed at himself: “You had it all and you threw it away.” 
The film tracks the dialogue with extradiagetic images of the “Bensonhurst 
Italians,” “Korean grocers,” and “uptown brothers” Brogan derides. One 
line in the rant directed at African Americans—“Slavery ended 137 years 
ago. Move the fuck on!”—echoes Norton’s role as a white supremacist in 
Tony Kaye’s American History X (1998), where he asks rhetorically, “Slavery 
ended like a hundred and thirty years ago, how long does it take to get your 
act together?” In that film, Norton’s character makes an effort at atonement 
the day after being released from prison for a racially motivated murder. 
Thus the two films bookend an imagined prison sentence, and 25th Hour 
responds to Norton’s previous film in particular and to prison films in gen-
eral by staging a complex representation of criminality nuanced in terms 
of race and history.
As sociologist Sean O’Sullivan recognizes, American History X itself 
seems to respond to an earlier prison film—The Shawshank Redemption 
(1994), an escapist male melodrama by Frank Darabont. The 1998 film’s 
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“gritty realism” and cinema verité contrast with its predecessor so much that 
it “could be seen as a mirror image of, or an answer-film to,” the prior work. 
O’Sullivan suggests that the “contrasts between the two are so striking that it 
is almost as if the makers of American History X had set out to make a film 
that was not The Shawshank Redemption.”1 The consistently dark and occa-
sionally documentary style of American History X certainly differs from the 
soft-focus sentimentalism of The Shawshank Redemption, but both describe 
prison as a violent setting of sexual predation, vicious inmates, and cruel 
corrections officers, a hellish place that paradoxically proves transforma-
tive, man-making, and redemptive for the charismatic central characters. 
Such prison films can be seen to endorse the very system of punishment 
they seem to critique. Many representations of incarceration—both fiction 
and nonfiction—rely on lurid portrayals in which crime and punishment 
are divorced from historical specificity and dynamic relationships of per-
sonal agency and cultural circumstances. Lee’s film offers a more complex 
Departing from the often sensationalized Hollywood portrayals of life in prison, 
Spike Lee’s 25th Hour provides a realistic perspective on the complexities of crime 
and punishment in the United States. (MovieGoods)
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understanding of the causes and effects of incarceration. As this chapter 
demonstrates, the massive expansion of the criminal justice system in the 
past three decades has been accompanied by an increased public fascination 
with actual and imagined prisons. Lee’s film departs from more common 
sensationalist portrayals, focusing instead on equating imprisonment with 
personal, social, and historical loss. Most important, the film depicts crime, 
punishment, and race with a historical specificity to counter broadly held but 
inaccurate assumptions of criminality, wherein criminals are usually black 
and uniformly guilty of violent offenses, deserving the harsh incarceration 
that will somehow redeem them.
Prisons Actual and Imagined
Law-and-order–themed films and television programs textured as realis-
tic regularly portray criminals who murder or rob innocents before being 
apprehended and sent to prison, but more detailed and accurate portray-
als of crime and punishment are vital at a time in U.S. history when an 
unprecedented number of persons live behind bars, many sentenced for 
nonviolent offenses. The social institution of incarceration creates one the 
most marginalized groups in the United States, as prisoners are nearly invis-
ible and voiceless in the public sphere. Although prisons and jails hold 2.3 
million people at an annual cost to taxpayers of more than $60 billion, and 
nearly one-third of black men will be incarcerated during their lives, broad 
critiques of this criminal justice system and its racial inequities rarely get 
public attention.2 After all, prisons are largely concealed from public sight 
by both design and economic necessity. Given that property values in urban 
areas with the densest crime preclude the construction of large, unprofitable 
structures there, prisons are relegated to distant rural areas. In addition to 
the 2.3 million people in correctional facilities, almost 5 million are involved 
in another phase of the criminal justice system, whether parole, probation, 
or alternative sentencing. 
The numbers have not always been so high; the incarcerated popula-
tion doubled in the 1980s and again in the 1990s, largely due to extended 
sentences, increased criminalization of drug-related offenses, decreased 
alternative sentencing, and trends in population demographics, such as 
a slight increase in the total number of young men—those most likely to 
commit crimes. Furthermore, the prison population has expanded even as 
violent and property crime rates have decreased, and to suggest that the 
114 Peter Caster
former caused the latter underreads the complexity of the interlocking local, 
state, and federal criminal justice systems, as well as historical trends, racial 
inequities, and economic factors.
Although more than 1 percent of the U.S. adult population is in prison or 
jail, the 99 percent who are not have scarce access to that environment, and 
that lack of access likely contributes to the popular fascination with seeing 
inside. Serial television drama and would-be blockbusters do not lend them-
selves to complexity, substituting sensationalism for ambiguity and sophis-
tication. Certainly prisons have long provided a dramatic setting, and such 
stories punctuate film history: I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang (1932), 
The Birdman of Alcatraz (1962), Cool Hand Luke (1967), and Escape from 
Alcatraz (1979). An innocent man unjustly imprisoned thematically links 
many of these films and makes for compelling narrative.3 Since the fourfold 
increase in the incarcerated population began, we have seen an increasing 
number of these stories in films such as The Shawshank Redemption, Murder 
in the First (1995), American History X, The Hurricane (1999), and The Green 
Mile (1999). However, the ideological pressure to reinforce the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice system to appeal to the broadest audience mandates 
that in many of these stories, prison provides a place of redemption as well 
as punishment. Television programming plays a role as well, and ABC’s 2006 
In Justice followed Fox’s phenomenally successful 2005 series Prison Break, 
both of which featured story lines based on innocent characters escaping 
from prison through appeal or breakout, continuing a common trend in 
prison films going back to Hollywood’s golden age.
These fictional accounts are accompanied by documentaries from 
which audiences might expect greater truth value. The rising population of 
California’s prisons serves as the focus of Ted Koppel’s Discovery Channel 
prison documentary Breaking Point (2007), where he interviews some of 
the 173,000 inmates at California State Prison Solano. However, in pur-
suit of niche market shares, documentaries take their cues from fictional 
programming, even as prisons become a setting for dramatic situations or 
generic conventions. Koppel’s slice-of-life video journalism joins the cable 
network’s other shows, including Dinosaurs: Return to Life? Future Weapons, 
and Animal Face-off: Hippo vs. Bull Shark. Along with its regular exposi-
tions of bizarre foods and exotic destinations, the Travel Channel features 
Mysterious Journeys, one episode of which is “Prison of Horrors—Eastern 
State Penitentiary,” which balances the history of the 1829 prison built on 
Benjamin Rush’s eighteenth-century model with contemporary lore of its 
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reported haunting by ghosts. MSNBC features Lockup, which shares its name 
with a Sylvester Stallone innocent-man-in-prison film from 1989, while the 
National Geographic Channel has Prison Nation and Tru TV (with its tagline 
“Not reality. Actuality”) brings audiences Inside American Jail. 
Prison dramas, documentary or otherwise, saturate the media landscape 
and become naturalized, concurrent with the expansion of actual incarcera-
tion. They become one more place to tell familiar stories. According to the 
Internet Movie Database, as of the end of 2008, the keyword prison resulted 
in a list of more than 1,500 films. Prison narratives have become a ubiquitous 
part of the national culture, and for a nation that defines itself by freedom, 
the loss of liberty is the dark side of the American dream.
Evoking Loss
For Monty Brogan, the main character of 25th Hour, the dream has become 
a nightmare. Heroin sales funded his Horatio Alger rise from working-class 
youth to moderately wealthy businessman; arrested, convicted, and sen-
tenced, he heads for prison in twenty-four hours. Over the course of the 
day, he bids good-bye to his father, the boyhood friends from whom he has 
grown distant, the girlfriend he suspects of turning him in to the police, and 
his Ukrainian mobster connections. He also comes to terms with his past 
regret—not guilt for selling drugs, but the greed that kept him in the game 
long enough to get caught—and his fear of the future—prison rape and a life 
without point or promise. Lee’s direction in this, his fifteenth feature, stays 
very close to its source, the debut novel and screenplay of David Benioff. 
The novel’s extended character study translates well in Benioff and Lee’s 
adaptation, although more of the drama surrounds Monty, and plot proves 
to be less important than the ensemble performance of complex characters 
and the richness of the New York setting (familiar in Lee’s oeuvre). Aside 
from a few expressionist flourishes that are among Lee’s directorial trade-
marks, the film adheres to conventions of realism, its story visually evoking 
the traumatic absence of the World Trade Center, a visual metonymy for 
Monty’s lost future and a direct testament to the film’s immediate realness, 
its historical present, and thus an indirect testament to its truth value.
The two central questions of the film’s plot—did the girlfriend sell him 
out? (no) and will Monty go to prison? (yes)—provide the stage for the 
film’s three-act structure, each of which culminates in increasingly intense 
conflict. From morning through evening, a series of separate interactions 
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introduce the characters and demonstrate their relationships with Monty. 
The first act concludes with the central character’s extended monologue 
mentioned earlier. That scene is signature Lee, closely resembling a similar 
sequence in Do the Right Thing (1989), as most reviewers recognized; even 
Benioff admits that the film may have served as unconscious inspiration.4 
That night, Monty meets his girlfriend Naturelle (Rosario Dawson) and 
childhood friends Jacob (Philip Seymour Hoffman) and Frank (Barry Pep-
per), first at a bar and then at a dance club, where they are joined by Jacob’s 
student Mary (Anna Paquin). The group rapidly devolves into pairs and 
intense, ultimately divisive conversations, especially as Monty discovers 
that not Naturelle but his partner Kostya (Tony Siragusa) betrayed him. 
The short final act sees Monty, Jacob, and Frank walking to a park in the 
early morning, a return to the riverside setting of the film’s opening. There, 
Monty goads Frank into brutally beating him, hoping that disfiguring his 
boyish good looks will help him escape rape in the first few weeks of life in 
prison. In the dénouement, Monty’s father (Brian Cox) drives him to Otis-
ville Correctional Facility in upstate New York. A five-minute voice-over 
by Cox narrates an oversaturated montage of what would happen if Monty 
jumped bail and escaped west to make a new life. One New York Times film 
reviewer called this conclusion as “bittersweet and sincere an evocation of 
the American dream as I have seen on film.”5
Loss permeates the film—from the title credit montage, a tableau of 
light and dark at Ground Zero, to the final dream of a life that will never 
happen—with Monty’s imminent prison term the causa causans for all. The 
adaptation faces a challenge the source text does not, in that the novel’s nar-
ration rather than staged dialogue can tell readers that the main character is 
headed for a seven-year term in Otisville, whereas the film seeks to reveal 
that visually.6 A daybreak scene opens with a long view of the East River, 
and the crane shot descends as a distant figure walks to the foreground to 
meet Monty seated on a bench overlooking the water. The shot emphasizes 
the perspective of the railing receding in the distance, and when the camera 
cuts to the next shot from the opposite side of the railing, its vertical slats 
stay between the camera and Monty, situating him literally behind bars. He 
refuses to sell drugs to the slovenly and strung-out Simon in a scene with two 
key matches later—one narrative and one visual. Nearly an hour later in the 
film, in a flashback to Monty and Naturelle’s first meeting, Simon appears 
briefly in the background as a well-dressed businessman buying drugs from 
Monty, the implication being that Simon has fallen far in the intervening 
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months. In that scene too, shot in a playground, Monty is situated behind 
the bars of the fence railing. And at the end of the film, after beating Monty, 
Frank takes Monty’s place sitting on the same bench, presumably to think 
about his past and his future, to account for the choices he has made.
On-screen it is Norton’s film—he appears in the poster and in most 
scenes, and he starred in Red Dragon (2002) in part to develop the capital to 
help fund Lee’s direction. The most charged scenes focus on his character’s 
forthcoming prison sentence, with all the other characters bleakly antici-
pating his future. His father suggests contacting an old-timer who did time 
two decades ago, tells his son to “keep your head down,” and blames himself 
for accepting Monty’s money. In a dialogue in Frank’s condo overlooking 
the concrete scar of Ground Zero, Frank and Jacob share their sense of 
what will happen to Monty even as they elliptically discuss the larger social 
tragedy below them. In a tightly blocked scene consisting largely of a five-
minute single shot, the distance between the actors makes the most of the 
wide aspect ratio; their differences are also marked by the pensive Jacob’s 
gaze out past his prominent mirrored image, contrasted with Frank’s turn 
away from the reflection. Frank’s blunt assessment of Monty’s future—“He’s 
going to hell for seven years, what are we gonna do, wish him luck?”—leads 
to his description of Monty’s choices: commit suicide, run, or do the time. 
In any case, he is gone forever, whether dead, vanished, or a fundamentally 
different man.
Not only the felon, his father, and his friends but also the police them-
selves anticipate that hellish future in prison. In a flashback to Monty’s 
arrest, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent played by Michael 
Genet, a regular in law-and-order television programming, proposes that 
Monty can expect to be regularly gang-raped “by a bunch of guys calling 
you Shirley.” Monty shares that expectation, as he tells Frank at the night-
club, though without the braggadocio he displays in the interrogation scene. 
That conversation between the men, like the earlier exchange between Frank 
and Jacob, takes place in front of glass overlooking the background below, 
and again the dialogue focuses on Monty’s incarceration, which he relates 
in racial and gendered terms of power: “Up there, I’m a skinny white boy 
with no friends.” In grim and highly specific detail, he describes his first 
night: an overcrowded prison, the complicity of the corrections officers, 
being overpowered by 200 inmates, his teeth knocked out, being repeat-
edly raped, initiated into seven years of more of the same. As the dialogue 
plays out, the framing grows tighter and tighter in the film convention of a 
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slow forward track amplifying emotional intensity, and the prison horrors 
of deprivation, isolation, and regimentation are subsumed under the sign 
of male rape.
Crime, Punishment, and Racial Difference
That dark sexual fantasy is rooted not only in repeated depictions in films 
raising the ante on realism and graphic personal trauma—prison films 
such as American Me (1992), The Shawshank Redemption, and American 
History X—but also in growing public awareness of the actual practice and 
an ambivalent response. Numerous studies conducted in the past ten years 
have generated conflicting results, largely due to the large and difficult-to-
access incarcerated population, the differences between prison and jail, 
male prisoners’ reticence to reliably relate incidents, and the overdeter-
mined power dynamics of the criminal justice system, making problematic 
distinctions between coercion and choice in the homosocial environment 
of threatened and actual violence, extortion, and a black-market economy. 
According to a 2006 Associated Press article, a “bitterly disputed, govern-
ment-sponsored study has concluded that rape and sexual assault behind 
bars may be rampant in movies and books but are rare in real life.”7 A survey 
of county jails the next year by the U.S. Department of Justice placed the 
rate of sexual assault at less than 3 percent for male inmates, whereas other 
analyses indicate frequencies ten times that rate.8 John Edgar Wideman 
describes the tension between imagination and actuality, pointing out that 
the good-evil symbolism of prisons and their same-sex organizations set 
the stage for them to operate with racially charged sexual violence: “Men 
must go to other men for sex, and given this necessity, prisons reify behind 
their locked doors the unspoken drama of homo-erotic interpenetration and 
exchange—the white fantasy of assault by the black males and assaulting 
black males. In the collective imaginary, prisons become a site of conflicted 
sado-masochistic desire.”9 In 25th Hour, the “skinny white boy” recognizes 
that racism can reverse its trajectory within prison walls, where dispropor-
tionate rates of incarceration turn minorities into majorities and “the man” 
into a threatened boy.
That power reversal is one of several in the film involving racial differ-
ence and criminality. Lee is well known as one of the first directors working 
outside the blaxploitation genre to showcase largely African American casts, 
but 25th Hour is his first effort to feature primarily white actors. It is also a 
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departure from his tradition of working with familiar talent; none of the cast 
appeared in Lee’s earlier work—a first for his fictional features. Also, Lee and 
his longtime casting partner Aisha Coley switch the pervasive racial binary 
of white cops–black criminals by making all the film’s offenders white and 
the prominent drug enforcement agents African American. Drug dealer 
Monty, partner Kostya, addict Simon, head mobster Uncle Nikolai, and all 
his henchmen are (in the simplest terms) white, while the two DEA agents 
with speaking roles are black. That seemingly simple switch counters more 
than thirty years of racial expectation in history and imagination. That is, 
as early as 1969, American Correctional Association (ACA) sociologists 
demonstrated that white expectations of black crime created demands for 
expanding law enforcement, even when white ignorance and fear rather 
than statistical actuality shaped those concerns, and more recent articles 
reproduce those findings.10 As Carole Stabile concludes in White Victims, 
Black Villains, “By the waning years of the century, U.S. society has created a 
narrative of fear and denial that had entirely transformed the political chal-
lenges that the Civil Rights Movement had presented into a saga about Afri-
can Americans’ inherent criminality.”11 For the film, Lee consciously reverses 
the racial expectation not only for criminals but also for law enforcement; in 
Benioff ’s novel, “There were four men, all white. . . . They showed Monty their 
badges, DEA.”12 The importance of such a gesture is  underscored in other 
recent law-and-order adaptations. For instance, John Carpenter’s Assault on 
Precinct 3 (1976) features a black police officer and his white prisoner, but 
the 2005 remake switches to a white officer and a black prisoner, perhaps 
a capitulation to popular expectation. Lee resists the conventional racing 
of criminality that has in part contributed to the vast overrepresentation of 
black men in prison through practices such as racial profiling.
We have, then, a number of misconceptions and related ambivalences 
regarding crime and punishment on which 25th Hour places pressure. First, 
long-standing racism creates self-fulfilling expectations of black men as 
criminals requiring punishment, but the film portrays white crime. Sec-
ond, long prison sentences generally presume violent crime, but Monty’s 
drug trafficking, though affiliated with the violence of the Ukrainian mob, 
involves none of the murder, rape, or robbery so prevalent in films. Third, 
the presumption of criminals’ inherent moral evil makes their brutal sexual 
assault part of the “just deserts” model of incarceration prevalent since the 
1970s, wherein prisoners get what they deserve.13 However, Monty hardly 
seems deserving of the seven years of beating and sexual assault that friends, 
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criminals, police, and the felon himself anticipate, and how such punish-
ment functions as any sort of rehabilitation escapes reason. His expectation 
to be released as “a 38-year-old punked-out ex-con with government-issue 
dentures” presents a throwback to what Michel Foucault describes as old 
regime punishment, the pre-Enlightenment approach of bodily torture 
that gave way to mental discipline in the nineteenth century.14 The lack of 
violence in the crime and Norton’s charismatic performance imply that the 
tacit torture violates the Eighth Amendment regarding cruel and unusual 
punishment and the accompanying Enlightenment principles of justice and 
self-ownership. And although the anticipation of such misery may function 
as a deterrent, it in no way resembles the intention to rehabilitate that led 
the American Prison Association to change its name to the American Cor-
rectional Association in 1955. The film’s narrative voice, its commitment 
to representing a criminal as guilty but not meriting the “just deserts” for 
which he is headed, speaks against the widespread silent assent to the mas-
sive expansion of imprisonment, especially for nonviolent offenses, and the 
accompanying dangers of overcrowded incarceration.
Lee’s 25th Hour carefully marks the specific legal history contributing to 
the extended criminalization of drug crimes, expanded prison terms, and 
jurisprudential dynamics of sentencing. During police interrogation, Monty 
proposes that as a first-time offender he might earn a light sentence, but 
Agent Flood (played by Law and Order and The Wire actor Isaiah Whitlock 
Jr.) corrects him. As part of an extended exposition, Flood offers to “educate” 
Monty and, by extension, the audience regarding the differences between 
A-1 and A-2 felonies: “You don’t read the papers much, do you, smart guy? 
In New York, we’ve got a wonderful thing called the Rockefeller laws. . . . 
Fifteen years to life minimum, first offense. Now with that much spread in the 
sentencing guidelines, the judges take their cues from the prosecutors—who 
take their cue from the DEA.” This dialogue occurs only in Lee’s film, not in 
the novel. Lee incorporates the history of the actual laws implemented by 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller in the early 1970s that expanded the crimi-
nalization of drug offenses, switched from treatment to incarceration for 
users, and instituted draconian minimum sentences (though slightly short of 
Rockefeller’s intent to impose life sentences on first offenders for marijuana 
possession). These New York laws expanded nationally after Rockefeller 
became vice president under President Gerald Ford. It is that expansion of 
criminalization and the harsh sentences for drug crimes, not an increase in 
violent or property crimes, that led the incarcerated population described 
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in 1977 by the ACA executive director as a “crisis” to more than quadruple 
in the decades since.15 These mandatory minimums worsened with the 
Anti-Drug Acts of the 1980s, designed to punish users and dealers of crack 
cocaine, which was widely (and inaccurately) believed to be used primarily 
by African Americans.
Lee’s explicit implication of legal history in the arrest of a white drug 
dealer by black police officers reverses the all too prevalent racist expecta-
tions of criminality. Still, Lee—as well as Benioff ’s script and Norton’s per-
formance—shies away from overtly politicizing the events depicted, and 
the director’s sometimes criticized bombast remains tightly constrained, 
offering an evenhanded but nevertheless dramatic appraisal that refuses 
to either glamorize crime in the fashion of Scarface (1983) and American 
Gangster (2007) or depict sentenced criminals in redemptive suffering, as 
in The Shawshank Redemption and American History X. Historically, crime 
films demarcate clearly between bad guys and good guys, and films with 
villains as protagonists tend to portray them as unabashedly, charismatically 
bad, at once fulfilling the audience’s dark fantasies and meeting the cultural 
need to see the social order maintained in their final punishment. It is not 
only 25th Hour that attempts to sort more carefully the racial, ethical, and 
moral nuances of drug crime. In the early 1970s the ACA pointed to a his-
tory of racism as a cause of the overrepresentation of black men in prison. 
Since the early 1990s the ACA and, to an extent, the American Bar Asso-
ciation have protested racial bias in sentencing, argued to reduce existing 
mandatory minimums, and proposed alternative sentencing.16 To a degree, 
25th Hour joins in their dissent by, in its simplest reading, suggesting that 
white men distribute and consume drugs, taking drugs is bad, selling them 
is worse, criminals are people who made poor decisions and had worse luck 
in negative situations, and prison is terrible.
Though thinly marketed and failing to make back its budget in its 
domestic theatrical run, Lee’s film remains a compelling narrative, visual, 
and cultural achievement, an entry in the genre of the humanist male melo-
drama. It helped the director become more of an inside man in Hollywood, 
and it allowed Benioff to join the ranks of celebrity. More pertinent to this 
collection, the film resists easy answers to commonly held assumptions of 
crime and punishment too prevalent in popular news and fiction. As head 
mobster Uncle Nikolai relates to Monty—and he should know, as he has 
served three sentences—“I learned prison is a bad place to be.” U.S. audiences 
already believe that, but the film invites us to ask, does it need to be as bad a 
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place as it currently is? Popular imagination supposes that (generally black) 
prisoners are invariably guilty of violent crimes, and prisons are intended to 
deter crime, separate criminals from the rest of society, punish them, and 
rehabilitate them to allow their return. Fictional representations often stage 
the contradiction of innocent protagonists imprisoned for violent crimes but 
nevertheless experiencing the transformative benefits of incarceration.
In contrast, 25th Hour offers multiple but invariably bleak expectations of 
incarceration, descriptions of drug crimes and enforcement based on actual 
legal history, and an unwillingness to capitulate to simple determinations 
of race, criminality, and innocence. Academics have lamented the power 
of film and television to shape popular perception, but movies present the 
opportunity not only for deflection, distraction, and hegemony but also for 
dissent.17 Critics as seemingly disparate as 1998 ACA president Reginald 
A. Wilkinson and scholar, activist, and former prisoner Angela Davis have 
disparaged the “misrepresentations” of “grossly sensationalized” fictional 
prison dramas.18 For a national audience confronting TV and films satu-
rated with images of incarceration that reproduce existing expectations of 
race, crime, and punishment, 25th Hour proposes an alternative discourse 
and an opportunity to think critically about one of the most important civil 
rights problems of our time.
Notes
I am grateful to Kathryn McGrath, a former student whose insightful paper on 25th 
Hour proved useful in developing this chapter. 
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O’Donnell’s Queer Politics and Controversial Antics on 
ABC’s The View
Katherine Lehman
Rosie O’Donnell made a splash at Sundance in 2006 as the star of the docu-
mentary All Aboard! Rosie’s Family Cruise. The film features the versatile 
comedian in a range of roles—from campy stage performer to gracious host 
to nurturer of her own brood—aboard the inaugural voyage of R Family 
Vacations, the gay-friendly travel company O’Donnell co-owns with spouse 
Kelli Carpenter. The same-sex couples captured by the camera seemed more 
comfortable cuddling babies and swapping wedding vows than sparking 
political upheaval. O’Donnell, too, chose her battles carefully, speaking about 
adoption by same-sex couples to a supportive crowd in Key West but refus-
ing to engage fierce anti-gay protesters who greeted the cruise ship when it 
docked in the Bahamas. O’Donnell feared that confronting the protesters 
would only lead to negative publicity. “I thought I’d get in a fight with some-
one,” she explained on camera. “If I saw them being rude to a passenger, I 
would have gone ballistic, and that’s all they want, is a little news clip.”1
With the release of All Aboard, the comedian who had risen to promi-
nence while masking her sexual preference was more visible than ever as 
an openly gay, recently married mother of four representing gay people as 
parents and consumers. All Aboard reached a wide audience through its 
HBO distribution and film festival screenings, and it attracted the attention 
of famed telejournalist Barbara Walters. Walters was reportedly so moved by 
an early screening of the documentary that she approached O’Donnell about 
joining her as cohost of the ABC daytime panel show The View. “There was 
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the warm, thoughtful, intelligent, charming, funny Rosie I’ve always known,” 
Walters told Newsweek in September 2006. “There were discussions with the 
ABC brass in which we talked about the new Rosie—not the woman who 
might have been aggressive or belligerent, but the woman I had seen that 
night. There were some concerns over which Rosie we were getting.”2
During the six-year run of The Rosie O’Donnell Show and through her 
work with children’s charities, O’Donnell had cultivated an accessible, family-
friendly image. However, O’Donnell’s career took an abrupt turn in 2002 when 
she publicly announced her sexual orientation, disappeared from daytime TV, 
and embraced what some saw as an aggressive political agenda. Was the “new 
Rosie” the affable host who had warmed housewives’ hearts, starred as the 
best friend in romantic comedies, and been dubbed the “Queen of Nice” by 
Newsweek in the mid-1990s? Or was she the acerbic activist who had lopped 
off her hair and castigated the president for forbidding gay marriage? 3
Though Walters may have hoped for the former, the news media knew 
better and braced for a firestorm. Indeed, O’Donnell’s eight months on The 
View were marked by conflict and controversy as she battled conservative 
cohosts, baited powerful celebrities, and espoused a left-wing political 
agenda rarely voiced on network television. Much of the media coverage 
and Rosie’s own memoir centered on the dramatic moments, such as her 
duel with Donald Trump and war of words with cohost Elisabeth Hassel-
beck; less attention has been paid to the subtle ways she foregrounded gay 
and lesbian families on a mainstream talk show.
This chapter simultaneously examines O’Donnell’s public role as lesbian 
parent and political pundit. I argue that her brief reign on The View directly 
engaged cultural understandings of gay and lesbian families and chal-
lenged expectations of how gay celebrities should behave in the mainstream 
media. While O’Donnell’s status as a middle-aged mother of four made her 
accessible to a key viewer demographic, her unapologetic advocacy for the 
normalcy of gay and lesbian families amplified the threat she posed to con-
servative interests. The network capitalized on the controversy O’Donnell 
created, welcoming the ratings boost but fearing the backlash her antics 
might cause. O’Donnell’s experience not only provides a fascinating case 
study of a contemporary lesbian celebrity but also illuminates the political 
possibilities and limitations posed by the feminized space of the daytime 
talk and variety show format typified by The View. Furthermore, the View 
debacle demonstrates the increasing power of online media to amplify and 
interpret television: O’Donnell addressed viewers directly from her blog 
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Rosie.com, and her View appearances still provoke debates on streaming 
video sites such as YouTube.
The Fight for Family Recognition
Long before her return to daytime television, O’Donnell had framed her 
struggle for family recognition as a political issue. Over the course of The 
Rosie O’Donnell Show (1996–2002), O’Donnell joked about her crush on 
Tom Cruise and mentioned her friendships with famous lesbians, but 
she rarely talked publicly about her romantic and family life. That silence 
ended in early 2002 when she announced her sexual orientation in an off-
stage comedy routine and discussed her partner’s pregnancy in interviews. 
O’Donnell ended her show two months later.4
Her decision to come out, she claimed, was prompted by Florida’s 
restrictive adoption laws. When O’Donnell and partner Kelli Carpenter 
were barred from adopting a three-year-old Florida girl they had fostered 
for nearly two years, O’Donnell became an advocate for same-sex couples 
denied the opportunity to adopt. As she told Larry King, “When the state 
of Florida said to me, ‘You are unworthy because you’re gay,’ I said it is 
time for me to stand up and say this law is wrong.” For the next few years, 
O’Donnell absented herself from daily television to tend to the challenge 
of raising multiple children. After adopting son Parker on her own, she 
and Carpenter adopted two more children, Blake and Chelsea. In late 2002 
Carpenter gave birth to Vivienne.5
In February 2004 O’Donnell and Carpenter were among the first same-
sex couples to legally wed in San Francisco. Again, O’Donnell combined her 
personal life with politics, using the occasion to criticize President George 
Bush’s recent call for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage. “I 
think the actions of the president are, in my opinion, the most vile and hate-
ful words ever spoken by a sitting president,” O’Donnell told ABC’s Good 
Morning America.6
O’Donnell’s return to daytime television came on the heels of a heated 
debate over same-sex marriage. In the 2004 election alone, thirteen states 
adopted amendments defining marriage as the sole prerogative of one man 
and one woman; nine of those amendments restricted other rights avail-
able to same-sex partners.7 (As of November 2008, all but six U.S. states had 
laws or amendments restricting marriage to heterosexual couples.8) Bush’s 
reelection, paired with the passage of state laws banning gay marriage and 
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voters’ stated concerns about “moral issues,” strengthened perceptions that 
same-sex marriage played a pivotal role in the election.9
In opposing same-sex marriage, groups such as Focus on the Family 
and Concerned Women for America emphasized the relationship between 
marriage and parenting, framing gay marriage as a “looming threat that 
endangers children and society.” Opponents claimed that same-sex parents 
deprived their children of opposite-sex role models, accusing lesbians in 
particular of undermining the importance of fatherhood. Some opponents 
characterized gay parenthood as inherently abusive because it exposed 
children to societal discrimination and ridicule and gave them misguided 
messages about sexuality. Furthermore, opponents warned that elevating 
same-sex relationships to the status of marriage would undermine the 
importance of marriage and the nuclear family.10
Gay rights organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign actively 
sought marriage rights as a means of accessing the legal, societal, and eco-
nomic privileges that heterosexual couples often took for granted. How-
ever, some gay and lesbian activists questioned the priority placed on gay 
marriage and proponents’ tendency to present their families as similar to 
heterosexual arrangements. As Judith Levine wrote in the Village Voice in 
2003, “Marriage . . . does not just normalize, it requires normality as the 
ticket in. Assimilating another ‘virtually normal’ constituency, namely 
monogamous, long-term, homosexual couples, pushes the queerer queers 
of all sexual persuasions—drag queens, club-crawlers, polyamorists, even 
ordinary single mothers . . . further to the margins.” A better strategy for 
equality, these activists suggested, was to challenge a system that attached 
legal and economic privileges to monogamous two-person partnerships.11
As an advocate for gay marriage and parenting rights, O’Donnell faced 
cultural prejudice heightened by the recent gay marriage debates. At the same 
time, her public role as mother and her previous popularity with mainstream 
audiences granted her greater legitimacy in the public sphere than a lesbian 
activist might otherwise enjoy. While O’Donnell’s embrace of nuclear family 
norms might appear to be wholesale assimilation, her political edge kept 
her at the margins of the mainstream.
Television Takes on LGBT Issues
Although the national political climate was hostile to gay marriage efforts in 
2006, O’Donnell herself acknowledged that television offered greater avenues 
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for queer representation than it had just a decade earlier. Fellow comedian 
Ellen DeGeneres parlayed the fame gained from her failed sitcom into a success-
ful talk show in 2003 and publicly shared her life with actress Portia de Rossi. 
The eight-year run of the NBC comedy Will and Grace—on which O’Donnell 
had guest-starred—and the debut of Showtime’s The L Word in 2004 made gay 
and lesbian themes more palatable to mainstream viewing audiences. Same-sex 
couples had long been fixtures on issue-oriented talk shows and increasingly 
factored in the casts of reality shows such as The Amazing Race.
However, these gay and lesbian celebrities and characters often made 
concessions to be accepted by mainstream audiences. Will and Grace couched 
its provocative subject matter in the close friendship of a gay man and a 
straight woman, rarely granting romantic relationships to the gay characters. 
The largely straight cast of The L Word offered an elite, svelte, and sexual-
ized portrait of lesbian life. Initially, DeGeneres rarely mentioned her sexual 
orientation on her talk show, and she claimed that her comedy acts were 
not concerned with gay issues.12
While talk shows have historically been a key venue for gay and lesbian 
visibility, media scholars have questioned this genre’s ability to create social 
change. The parade of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people 
on tabloid talk shows may serve primarily as spectacles for the audience’s 
shock and amusement, reassuring viewers of the normalcy of heterosexual-
ity. Less sensational hosts such as Oprah Winfrey often promote therapeutic 
fixes for personal relationships rather than broader solutions to societal 
issues such as sexism. As scholar Jane Shattuc notes, talk-show sets modeled 
after living rooms situate guests’ conversations in the domestic realm rather 
than the world of work and politics. The View’s assumed female audience 
and prominent product placements make it appear less weighty than its 
cable news counterparts—that is, more interested in meeting lifestyle and 
consumer needs than swaying political opinions.13
O’Donnell, then, challenged expectations for gays and lesbians on televi-
sion as well as the expected tone and function of The View. Androgynous and 
overweight, she lacked the glamour of lesbian characters on series such as 
The L Word. She spoke openly about her family and LGBT political issues, in 
contrast to the then-muted DeGeneres. As her diatribes addressed not only 
parenting issues and celebrity culture but also contentious political issues 
such as the war in Iraq, she moved The View’s domain from the domestic 
realm to the world of politics. Audiences were simultaneously intrigued and 
threatened by the changes she wrought.
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Changing Appearances, Challenging Expectations
From the beginning, observers feared that O’Donnell’s style and presentation 
would clash with The View’s. O’Donnell had been selected to fill the spot 
vacated by the elegant, even-keeled Meredith Viera, and she had already 
sparred publicly with View host Star Jones, who was fired before O’Donnell 
assumed the stage. In addition to Walters, the remaining hosts were Elisa-
beth Hasselbeck, a conservative mother and former reality TV star in her 
late twenties, and Joy Behar, a liberal comedian in her early sixties. Media 
pundits predicted that O’Donnell, accustomed to ruling her own talk show, 
might have difficulty working harmoniously as part of this ensemble.14
In her first appearance on The View in September 2006, O’Donnell, 
garbed in black, visibly dominated the set and the conversation. Fearing 
that Rosie’s size and sass would overshadow the formidable Barbara Wal-
ters, The View’s producers reformatted the set in week one. They trimmed 
the legs of O’Donnell’s chair, minimizing her height, and moved Walters 
to the opposite end of the table, placing O’Donnell beside the more petite 
Hasselbeck. As Rosie quipped on her blog, “My torso is so long I look like 
gigantor the spaceage robot. They cut 3 inches off the chair by day 2.”15 A 
promotional photo of the new View lineup with O’Donnell at the center was 
digitally altered to grant her a trimmer hourglass figure; O’Donnell reported 
on her Web site that she barely recognized the “Photoshopped” image of 
herself. Furthermore, her contract forbade her from cutting her hair, a rule 
that some reporters interpreted as homophobic.16
In her opening comments in September 2006, O’Donnell strategically 
distanced herself from her earlier politicized image. “I’m wearing high heels 
today because you girls are heel-wearers on this show,” she remarked. “I 
had that crazy, crazy haircut that scared America to death, so you know, it’s 
going to be long from now on. And,” she added in a dramatic whisper, “I’m 
taking my medication, so everything’s fine.”17
If a shorter chair, longer hair, and quick wit weren’t enough to soften 
O’Donnell’s abrasive image, perhaps evoking parenthood would do the trick. 
A segment prepared for The View explained her four-year absence from 
public life as a hiatus that enabled her to become a full-time mom. “I’ve 
sorta been home with Kelli and the kids,” she said, against the backdrop of 
a photo montage that showed her hugging her children and kissing Kelli on 
the cheek. “I needed to refocus.”18
O’Donnell frequently discussed parenting and family life as a means to 
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connect with her cohosts, both comparing and contrasting herself to the norm. 
When Behar announced on the season premiere that her daughter was getting 
married, O’Donnell cooed over pictures of the happy couple and empathized 
with Behar about empty-nest syndrome. Then the topic turned to weddings—
namely, Rosie and Kelli’s, which had been invalidated by the California Supreme 
Court. “We were married and then unmarried,” O’Donnell said. “We’ll get to 
that. Not on the first day.” She looked at the camera and mouthed the word 
“lesbian” conspiratorially, to the audience’s delight. When a cohost suggested 
that they remarry in Massachusetts, O’Donnell scoffed at the double standard: 
“What, are we going to do it state by state, have fifty weddings?”19
At other times, cohosts remarked on the significance of Rosie’s revela-
tions. When O’Donnell casually repeated a conversation with her southern 
mother-in-law, Behar expressed amazement. “They call you the daughter-
in-law,” Behar said. “They must have come a long way from Baton Rouge. 
That’s pretty cool.” The conversation that followed detailed Rosie’s rough 
road to acceptance from Kelli’s traditional, religious family.20
For some gay and lesbian viewers, these intimate discussions of family 
life were personally as well as politically affirming. The Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance Against Defamation recognized O’Donnell for providing “unprece-
dented visibility and equality in conversation” and bringing “those stories and 
issues into America’s living rooms.” Columnists on the site AfterEllen.com, 
a key space for debating the representations of lesbians in media, hailed the 
new “out and proud” Rosie:
she regularly refers not only to her children, but also to her wife, 
her in-laws, her now-rescinded marriage in San Francisco, gay 
marriage in general . . . and how important gay civil rights are to a 
civilized society. . . . Wait, this is daytime TV? On ABC? Owned by 
Disney? . . . She exhibits every day that gays are just like everyone 
else: As parents they are just as concerned about their kids’ safety as 
straights are; they’re just as caring and as crafty, just as involved and 
as cordial and as silly and as entitled to be treated fairly. And instead 
of an abstract concept, gay marriage is a real issue that’s serious to 
someone in straight viewers’ lives, even if that person only comes 
through their televisions for an hour a day.21
However, the need to present gay parents as “just like everyone else” 
often comes at the expense of individuality. Media portrayals of same-sex 
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families—the documentary All Aboard among them—tend to present them 
as virtuous and harmonious to counter cultural prejudices against gay parent-
ing.22 O’Donnell, in contrast, presented a truer picture of family life. On her 
first View appearance, she asked Hasselbeck how her child’s potty training was 
progressing. Elisabeth complained that her daughter “tinkled” in the bathtub as 
they bathed together. “That’s love,” Elisabeth groaned, “sitting in a tub of urine 
with your child.” Rosie upped the ante with an embarrassing story of bathing 
with her toddler. “I take a bath with Vivi, too,” she said. “Vivi always looks at 
me and says, ‘When am I getting my fur?’” O’Donnell contorted her face for 
the camera, adding, “Not soon, honey—don’t throw mama into a coma.”23
O’Donnell’s participation in this intimate, self-revelatory conversation 
serves to connect her with her cohost and to the daytime female demo-
graphic. Yet the story also evokes culturally ingrained fears about gay parent-
ing. Rather than de-emphasizing O’Donnell’s sexuality, it draws attention to 
her large, queer, nonmaternal body and reminds viewers of her pivotal role 
in shaping her adopted daughter’s sexuality and sense of self. Months after 
the fact, this conversation circulated on YouTube primarily as evidence of 
O’Donnell’s vulgarity rather than her parenting skills.
Toward the end of her View career, O’Donnell offered another provoca-
tive take on motherhood, confessing that she sometimes cursed at her young 
children in moments of anger and frustration. A shocked Barbara Walters 
rushed to clarify, “But you always hug them afterwards, right?” While the 
audience cheered at O’Donnell’s admission of imperfect parenting, conser-
vative critics cited this moment as evidence of her perversity. 24
All in the Family
Family not only was a prominent theme in O’Donnell’s repertoire but also 
structured her relationship to The View. In her 2007 memoir Celebrity Detox, 
O’Donnell presents her year on daytime television as an experiment in par-
enting and depicts the panelists as a dysfunctional family of sorts. She claims 
she took on the role of celebrity cohost partly because she hoped the show’s 
morning taping schedule would allow her to divide her day between work 
and home, public life and private life. Instead, she claims, the role took a toll 
on her family by placing her under heightened media scrutiny. Her struggles 
to balance professional success and parenthood parallel the challenges faced 
by many middle-class mothers.25
Her cohosts, she explained, felt more like family members than cowork-
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ers. She writes that she looked up to Barbara Walters as a mother figure, 
seeking support and approval that Walters was often reticent to provide. 
(Indeed, many media reports have similarly characterized Walters as a dig-
nified maternal figure trying desperately to reign in her unruly, bickering 
children.) As I discuss later in this chapter, the final argument with Hassel-
beck that led to O’Donnell’s abrupt departure from The View seemed less a 
matter of political difference than one of personal betrayal.26
The framing of The View as a dysfunctional family—with Rosie as its 
black sheep—may have made the drama that ensued more relevant and 
engaging for female audiences. However, the idea that these were family 
struggles rather than political discussions devalued the conversation by 
placing it in the domestic rather than the political realm. It also masked the 
power dynamics and corporate control happening behind the scenes, such as 
pressure on the female hosts to conform to male producers’ directives.27
Tokenism and Homophobia
Even as O’Donnell offered a sympathetic and sometimes less than flatter-
ing portrait of lesbian motherhood, she both played into and challenged 
expectations placed on her as the panel’s token lesbian. As feminist scholars 
have theorized, tokenism places individual minorities in the uncomfortable 
position of constantly speaking for their group and being solely responsible 
for educating others about discrimination.28
Early in her View career, O’Donnell accused fellow talk-show host Kelly 
Ripa of making a homophobic remark, arguing with Ripa via conference 
call as her cohosts watched.29 On a subsequent show in February 2007, 
O’Donnell discussed the controversy surrounding a short-lived Snickers 
commercial that showed two straight men accidentally kissing, reacting in 
horror, and tearing out tufts of their chest hair to reassert their masculinity. 
While Hasselbeck and Behar claimed that the commercial innocently made 
fun of “macho guys who are homophobic,” O’Donnell defended activists’ 
opposition to the ad. “The implication is that there is something so wrong 
with two men kissing that you need to do something and that two men 
kissing cannot be manly. In a country where the president says that gay 
people are not equal to the protections under the Constitution, it’s very 
hard not to feel sensitive,” she said, her voice trailing off. Yet she defended a 
diversity of opinion among LGBT viewers. “Not every gay person thought 
it was unfunny.” O’Donnell herself had a neutral reaction to the ad, and 
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her children found it “hysterical.” When Hasselbeck thanked O’Donnell 
for helping her see the commercial in a new light, Rosie chided her for her 
lack of awareness. “I’m tired of being the gay police,” she snapped. “That’s 
how I feel on this show.”30
In an earlier appearance, O’Donnell had refused to join in the grilling of 
Jim McGreevey, the former New Jersey governor who had hidden his sexual 
orientation and cheated on his wife before resigning in disgrace. She later 
expressed knowledge of the social pressures that compelled him to cheat. “It 
seemed to me he was the typical nerdy gay Irish Catholic kid. [He] couldn’t 
come out. I get it,” she wrote in Celebrity Detox.31
Warring with Donald Trump
O’Donnell wasn’t quite as forgiving when it came to Donald Trump’s infi-
delities. In her memoir, O’Donnell claims that her outburst against Trump 
in December 2006 was a spur-of-the-moment impulse stemming from her 
distaste for beauty pageants and paternalistic control of women’s sexuality.32 
When Trump publicly chastised a Miss USA contestant who had been caught 
partying, O’Donnell sided with the young woman. She flipped her hair into 
a fake toupee and entertained the crowd with an unflattering impression of 
Trump, then offered her view. “He’s the moral authority,” she said, sarcasti-
cally. “Left the first wife, had an affair. Left the second wife, had an affair. 
Had kids both times, but he’s the moral compass for twenty-year-olds in 
America. Donald, sit and spin, my friend,” she pronounced, as her cohosts 
laughed uproariously. She later compared Trump to a “snake-oil salesman” 
who went bankrupt and cheated his creditors. In this moment, a flawed but 
faithful lesbian mother claimed moral superiority over a powerful patri-
arch—and paid a high price.33
Although O’Donnell joked on the show that Trump was likely to sue 
her, she claimed to be taken aback by the personal attacks that came her 
way. Trump responded by berating her physical appearance and threatening 
Rosie’s relationship with Kelli. He pitted Barbara Walters against O’Donnell 
by criticizing her decision to hire the caustic comedian. O’Donnell fought 
back, joking at a media awards luncheon that she couldn’t care less if a 
“balding billionaire” found her sexually attractive. “Eat me,” she beckoned 
to her critics, grabbing her crotch. Conservatives castigated O’Donnell for 
her outburst, claiming that the routine was inappropriate for the occasion 
and offensive to the teenagers attending the luncheon.34
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Increasingly, O’Donnell’s comedic antics and political platforms were 
perceived as crude and out of control. Critics compiled a catalog of her worst 
moments: She offended Asian Americans by using the words “ching chong” 
to mimic Chinese speech in December 2006—later offering what some con-
sidered a halfhearted apology. She asked whether Iraqis might perceive the 
invading Americans as terrorists. She lent credence to conspiracy theories 
in March 2007 by suggesting that the U.S. government had foreknowledge 
of the September 11 attacks. She called for Bush’s impeachment more than 
once.35 Throughout her fiery stint on The View, she reportedly refused to 
wear an earpiece that would connect her to conservative producers’ direc-
tives and urged her cohosts to do the same. “I am not a puppet,” she wrote 
in her memoir. “Make TV live, truly live.” 36
The View’s conversations about public policy often devolved into shout-
ing matches, with O’Donnell on one side and Hasselbeck on the other. 
Although the outbursts may have been in character for O’Donnell, they 
defied expectations for a daytime talk show. And O’Donnell was hardly 
humble about her contribution to the conversation: “You’ve never talked 
about real issues until this year,” she told her cohosts.37 Conservative Fox 
News commentator Bill O’Reilly, who had earlier expressed a grudging 
respect for O’Donnell, reacted strongly to The View’s change of tone, accus-
ing Rosie of turning a “coffee klatch into Al Jazeera West.” Critics were 
clearly threatened by her role as a loud-mouthed Hollywood liberal with 
a live forum. As O’Reilly said: “If Rosie O’Donnell were a serious person 
with serious credentials, fine. I mean, if Hillary Clinton made these same 
comments about 9/11 [being] an inside job, you go to the bookstore and 
you confront her and no problem.” 38
O’Donnell’s sexual orientation amplified the threat she posed to crit-
ics. Conservatives claimed that she had protected status as a lesbian, that 
ABC’s need to demonstrate acceptance of her sexual orientation was the 
main reason she was not censured and fired. To the contrary, O’Donnell 
asserted on The View that her openly lesbian status made her politics more 
threatening, that she was seen as a large lavender menace picking on “poor 
little Elisabeth.”39
Ratings and Realities
O’Donnell’s escalating antics put ABC in a bind: although the feuds provided 
a boost for the show’s ratings, Rosie’s untamed tongue threatened to alien-
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ate advertisers and risked legal problems for the network. O’Donnell had 
been recruited partly to enhance the show’s marketing appeal by performing 
advertising jingles and announcing product giveaways.40 O’Reilly continually 
reminded his viewers that ABC is owned by Disney and that the family-
friendly company should be ashamed of O’Donnell’s “anti-patriotic” views.41 
Furthermore, the furor over radio host Don Imus’s racist comments in 2007 
provoked media outlets to police outspoken personalities more closely—and 
led conservatives to claim that O’Donnell herself had made racial slurs (the 
“ching chong” remark) and perpetuated “hate speech” against soldiers and 
fundamentalist Christians on a daily basis.42
Despite her many detractors, O’Donnell’s presence was good for busi-
ness. Even as her own approval ratings plummeted, The View’s overall viewer-
ship rose by 17 percent and increased even more dramatically among women 
aged eighteen to thirty-four, a key consumer group. Whether viewers loved 
or hated O’Donnell, they couldn’t stop watching.43
New Beginnings
In April 2007 O’Donnell announced she planned to leave her View post after 
only a year; ABC had reportedly sought a three-year contract. Her career 
on the panel came to a dramatic halt the following month when a heated 
argument with Hasselbeck escalated to name-calling. Hurt that Hasselbeck 
had failed to defend her in a media interview, O’Donnell called her cohost a 
“coward” and accused her of “double-speak.” That ABC captured the argu- 
ment in a split-screen format, visually pitting the women against each 
other, cemented O’Donnell’s decision to resign. Walters denied any role in 
O’Donnell’s decision, and the panel show entered its eleventh season with 
Whoopi Goldberg as O’Donnell’s replacement. (Roseanne Barr had also 
been considered for the role.)44
Rosie O’Donnell may be absent from daytime television, but she has 
maintained a formative presence in popular culture. She followed her abrupt 
View departure with a tell-all memoir and joined the “True Colors” celebrity 
tour to benefit the Human Rights Campaign. Although a proposed MSNBC 
news talk show with Rosie at the helm failed to materialize, NBC selected 
her to host a prime-time variety special in November 2008.45
O’Donnell also commands a presence on blogs and sites such as You-
Tube, where she is alternately vilified and idolized for her personal politics. 
Her own Web site provides a forum that is uncensored, deeply personal, 
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and entirely self-directed. While webcam videos show her at home without 
makeup and subject to the glare of unflattering lighting, Rosie posts poems 
and personal responses to fans in text speak, a style she claims mimics stream 
of consciousness. O’Donnell claims to be “detoxing” from her recent celebrity 
stint and relishing her return to a more domestic role. Yet her blog, comedy 
tours, and television guest appearances maintain a captive audience just 
waiting for her to resurface—out, proud, and as outrageous as ever.46
Notes
 1. All Aboard! Rosie’s Family Cruise, DVD, directed by Shari Cookson (New York: 
HBO Home Video, 2006).
 2. Marc Peyser, “Rosie’s New View,” Newsweek, September 11, 2006, 50.
 3. Ibid.; “Rosie O’Donnell Marries Girlfriend in San Francisco,” CNN.com, Febru-
ary 27, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/TV/02/26/odonnell.ap/index.html 
(accessed November 18, 2008).
 4. Rosie O’Donnell, interview by Larry King, Larry King Weekend, CNN, March 
16, 2002, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0203/16/lklw.00.html (accessed 
November 18, 2008); Peyser, “Rosie’s New View.”
 5. O’Donnell interview by King.
 6. “Rosie O’Donnell Marries Girlfriend.”
 7. Sean Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States: Focus on the Facts (Lan-
ham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 31.
 8. Human Rights Campaign, “Statewide Marriage Prohibitions,” November 6, 
2008, http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_prohibitions.pdf (accessed November 
18, 2008).
 9. Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, 98–99.
10. Ibid., 27–38.
11. Judith Levine, “Why Gays Should Oppose Same-Sex Marriage,” in Gay Marriage, 
ed. Kate Burns (Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2005), 78. This article originally 
appeared in the July 23–29, 2003, edition of the Village Voice.
12. Gail Shister, “Rosie Leaving ‘View,’” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26, 2007, D1. 
Shister writes that “hit daytime talker Ellen DeGeneres, who came out publicly several 
years before O’Donnell, avoids discussions on her show of her sexuality.” For an earlier 
analysis, see Malinda Lo, “The Incredible Story of Ellen DeGeneres: The Rise and Fall 
and Rise Again of a Reluctant Lesbian Icon,” AfterEllen.com, February 2004, http://www 
.afterellen.com/archive/ellen/People/ellen/html (accessed September 16, 2009).
13. Jane Shattuc, The Talking Cure: TV Talk Shows and Women (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1997), 48–49.
14. “Rosie Future May Turn Ugly,” Toronto Star, May 1, 2006, E3.
138 Katherine Lehman
15. Ann Marie Kerwin, “Ms. Walters’ View of Rosie,” Mediaworks, September 25, 
2006, 28; Jacques Steinberg, “On ‘The View,’ New Face, New Dynamics,” New York Times, 
September 21, 2006, E1; Rosie O’Donnell, Celebrity Detox: The Fame Game (New York: 
Grand Central Publishing, 2007), 70.
16. Marisa Guthrie, “ABC Takes Slim ‘View’ of Rosie,” New York Daily News, Sep-
tember 1, 2006, 122; Rebecca Traister, “No Butch Hair for Rosie,” Salon.com, July 11, 
2006, http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2006/05/02/rosie/ (accessed November 
18, 2008).
17. The View, ABC, September 5, 2006.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. The View, ABC, October 18, 2006.
21. Shister, “Rosie Leaving ‘View,’” D1; Anna Wahrman, “Rosie Returns Loud and 
Proud on The View,” AfterEllen.com, November 6, 2006, http://www.afterellen.com/
archive/ellen/TV/2006/11/rosie.html (accessed November 18, 2008).
22. Joy Matkowski, “Offensive Review of Rosie O’Donnell’s ‘Cruise,’” Washington 
Post, April 15, 2006, A13.
23. The View, ABC, September 5, 2006.
24. Bill O’Reilly, “Adieu to Rosie,” Creators Syndicate, April 28, 2007, http://www 
.creators.com/opinion/bill-oreilly/adieu-to-rosie.html (accessed November 18, 2008).
25. O’Donnell, Celebrity Detox, 22.
26. Ibid., 7, 10; Tara Ariano, “Rosie’s Wonderful Week,” National Post, September 
11, 2006, AL9.
27. O’Donnell, Celebrity Detox, 155–59.
28. For a foundational argument about tokenism, see Audre Lorde, “The Master’s 
Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches 
by Audre Lorde (Freedom, CA: Crossing Press, 1984), 110–13.
29. The View, ABC, November 21, 2006.
30. The View, ABC, February 6, 2007.
31. O’Donnell, Celebrity Detox, 92–93. McGreevey appeared on The View on Sep-
tember 20, 2006.
32. Ibid., 143.
33. The View, ABC, December 20, 2007.
34. John Gibson, “Rosie to Leave ‘The View,’” The Big Story with John Gibson, Fox 
News, April 25, 2007. 
35. Jacques Steinberg, “Rosie O’Donnell Says She Will Say Goodbye to ‘The View’ 
in June,” New York Times, April 26, 2007, E1; John Gibson, “Rosie O’Donnell Calls for 
Impeachment of President Bush,” The Big Story with John Gibson, Fox News, March 
28, 2007. 
36. O’Donnell, Celebrity Detox, 57, 85.
37. The View, ABC, May 3, 2007.
Riveted to Rosie 139
38. Bill O’Reilly, “How Is Media Covering Elections? OK to Ambush Rosie?” The 
O’Reilly Factor, Fox News, November 1, 2007.
39. Gibson, “Rosie O’Donnell Calls for Impeachment.”
40. Steinberg, “On ‘The View,’ New Face, New Dynamics,” E1.
41. O’Reilly, “Adieu to Rosie.”
42. Bill O’Reilly, “The Rosie Factor,” Creators Syndicate, April 7, 2007, http://
www.creators.com/opinion/bill-oreilly/the-rosie-factor.html (accessed November 18, 
2008).
43. John Maynard, “‘The View’ Suddenly in Rosie’s Rearview,” Washington Post, 
May 26, 2007, C1; Larry King, “What Happened on ‘The View’ Today?” Larry King 
Live, CNN, May 23, 2007.
44. The View, ABC, May 23, 2007; King, “What Happened on ‘The View’ Today?”
45. Carlis Davis, “Rosie O’Donnell Loses MSNBC Talk Show,” People.com, Novem-
ber 8, 2007, http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20159089,00.html (accessed 
November 20, 2008); Michael Schneider, “Rosie to Get ‘Variety Show’ on NBC,” Variety, 
October 1, 2008, http://www.variety.com/VR1117993209.html (accessed November 
18, 2008).
46. O’Donnell, Celebrity Detox, 12. O’Donnell’s Web site is located at http://www 
.rosie.com/.
This page intentionally left blank.
4
8
“gAbbIn’ About god”
Religion, Secularity, and Satire on The Simpsons
Matthew Henry
Many people [in America] remain convinced of God’s existence but 
realize increasingly that the reality of their world is secular. Thus, they are 
constantly coming to terms with this secularity—and suffering the pangs 
of adjustment associated with acquiring any new status.
—Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven
Religion is undoubtedly a prominent element of The Simpsons, and the highly 
contentious issues related to it are featured in episodes on a regular basis, 
either centrally or tangentially. Not surprisingly, no topic on The Simpsons 
has garnered more written commentary than religion, and the ensuing dis-
cussions have led to some of the most diverse interpretations of the show 
among fans and scholars alike.1 This raises some important questions about 
how The Simpsons engages the ongoing tension between religious and secular 
forces in the United States. Does The Simpsons operate from a theological or 
a philosophical position? Does it promote a religious worldview or a secular 
one? Answering such questions, of course, is not easy and requires careful 
consideration of the show and its historical contexts: namely, the rise of the 
Religious Right in the 1980s, the increasing influence of religiosity during the 
1990s, the debates over the roles of science and religion in the public sphere, and 
the intensification of religious fundamentalism in the post-9/11 environment. 
As the growing body of scholarship on The Simpsons attests, the show does 
more than simply mirror modern American life; it also regularly intervenes 
Never shying away from controversial issues, The Simpsons, television’s longest- 
running animated series, offers its own perspective on institutionalized religion and 
the American culture wars. (Jerry Ohlinger’s Movie Material Store)
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in the heated debates surrounding many of the issues gathered under the 
umbrella of “culture wars,” including racial integration, affirmative action, 
social welfare, prayer in schools, feminism, abortion, gay and lesbian rights, 
and the increased secularization of society.
A truly comprehensive treatment of religion and spirituality in The 
Simpsons is beyond the scope of this chapter; my treatment here is more 
selective and focuses only on the Judeo-Christian tradition that informs 
The Simpsons and the various ways in which this tradition is understood, 
represented, and commented on within the show. In general, I concur 
with the view of many commentators that The Simpsons is, overall, a very 
spiritual show; faith in both family and community, as well as the compas-
sion for others so commonly portrayed on The Simpsons, comes across as 
quite sincere. However, the fact that such positive qualities exist does not 
necessarily make The Simpsons a religious program. Although the Simpson 
family is associated by tradition with Christianity and Protestantism, this is 
modified in significant ways; in short, the “goodness” of the Simpsons is not 
presented as deriving solely from religion. Moreover, institutional religion 
(Christianity, in particular) is most often present on The Simpsons only to 
be satirized, usually via the comments and behaviors of the two representa-
tives of religion, Reverend Timothy Lovejoy and Ned Flanders. Marge and 
Lisa Simpson, who are inevitably the moral centers of the show, sometimes 
behave in accordance with Judeo-Christian religious beliefs; however, 
more often than not, they each operate from a philosophical and secular-
ized perspective. And although one can find examples of what appear to be 
“Christian” beliefs on the show, one must acknowledge that these examples 
can just as easily be seen as Humanist, since the more beneficent tenets of 
New Testament Christianity (compassion, brotherhood, love) run parallel 
to those of secular Humanism.2
I do not presume to speak here for Matt Groening or for the various 
writers and producers of The Simpsons regarding their personal religious or 
spiritual beliefs. In general, they have been reluctant to express their own 
beliefs, although many have stated that they are Jewish, and some have 
admitted in interviews to being former Catholics or atheists. Steve Tomp-
kins, who was a writer for The Simpsons for three seasons and worked as a 
coproducer alongside George Meyer and Mike Scully, has been most overt 
about such affiliations: he claims that The Simpsons’ writers are “atheist Jews 
or atheist Christians” and that during his tenure with the show, only two 
writers were “churchgoing Christians.”3 Regardless of the individual faiths 
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of those involved in creating the show, the predominant worldview on dis-
play in The Simpsons is generally in accord with the worldly, progressive, 
left-leaning position the show takes on many issues.
One quality that has kept The Simpsons so successful is its chameleon-
like ability to blur boundaries, and its treatment of religion is an excellent 
example. If one looks carefully at The Simpsons, one can see that alongside 
religion lies a faith in humankind and a moral and ethical stance that is based, 
more often than not, in reason and rationality rather than religious doctrine. 
Although I understand how the subtle humor of The Simpsons can prod the 
believer into seeing some aspect of his or her faith reflected, if not validated, 
I am less inclined to see the show redeeming Christianity as a faith system 
or, as Jamey Heit puts it, “helping Christianity retain its cultural relevance.”4 
Indeed, I believe The Simpsons aims to question (and perhaps lessen) the 
authority of Christianity through its satirical attacks on institutional religion 
and to promote a more ecumenical, individual, and secularized worldview. In 
short, I believe that provocative cultural issues are brought into the world of 
The Simpsons—and into the homes of its viewers—to showcase and satirize 
the hypocrisy, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness of institutional Christianity 
and to censure the zealotry of religious fundamentalism.
Culture Wars and American Religiosity
The debate between religious and secular forces in the United States is very 
old, predating the establishment of the nation itself, and its intensity waxed 
and waned throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The debate 
was given renewed life, however, in the second half of the twentieth century, 
partly due to the advent of television, which provided a new and powerful 
means by which both religious and secular groups could disseminate mes-
sages, but primarily due to the social and political upheavals of the late 1950s 
and 1960s. In general, since the end of the Second World War, evangelicals 
and religious fundamentalists have been concerned about many “secular-
izing” trends in the United States that have, in their view, moved the nation 
further toward pluralistic and relativistic perspectives. Indeed, as recent stud-
ies of religious affiliation and belief show, over the past forty years there has 
been a slow but steady movement away from traditional organized religions 
and toward a variety of more secular perspectives and activities. Currently, 
individuals who are not affiliated with any particular religion make up 
about one-sixth (16.1 percent) of the adult population and thus constitute 
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the fourth largest “religious” tradition in the country.5 It is, of course, these 
kinds of social shifts that initially inspired—and in many ways continue to 
fuel—the so-called culture wars of the post–civil rights era.
Some of the emphasis in these cultural debates has been on the way 
certain values or belief systems are reflected in or excluded from the main-
stream media, including television. In a now famous study of religion and 
spirituality on American network television in the early 1990s, researcher 
Thomas Skill and his colleagues determined that religion was “a rather invis-
ible institution” in prime-time television.6 In a more recent study, researcher 
Scott Clarke showed that prime-time characters were more than twice as 
likely as the general public to belong to a religion other than Christianity 
or to embrace a more individualized “spirituality.”7 Although Clarke’s study 
clearly indicates that religion remains “rather invisible” on prime-time 
network television, it also points up the fact that Christianity continues to 
be, by default, a “normative” religion on television, whereas non-Christian 
religions are overtly identified. The Simpsons is unique in that both Chris-
tian and non-Christian religions, as well as forms of secular spirituality, are 
not only visible but consciously foregrounded as important aspects of the 
geography of Springfield, the daily lives of many of the show’s characters, 
and the plots of innumerable episodes.
That religion figures so prominently in The Simpsons is not surprising, 
given the context in which the show developed. Although The Simpsons 
debuted as a television series in 1990, the Simpson family was created by 
Groening in 1985 and was first offered to viewers as part of Fox’s Tracey 
Ullman Show in 1987. Hence, The Simpsons appeared in the midst of the 
Reagan-Bush era, a time of revival and intensification of evangelical and 
fundamentalist religiosity in the United States. Among other things, the 
1970s and 1980s were witness to the rise of the Religious Right (sometimes 
called the Christian Right) and the advent of the culture wars, which often 
(but not exclusively) involved the differing positions taken by religious and 
secular camps on a variety of moral and legal issues. Although a powerful 
evangelical tradition was in place in the United States in the earliest decades 
of the twentieth century, this tradition operated largely outside of the politi-
cal sphere. The development of a more politically engaged evangelism began 
with the responses of certain fundamentalist leaders to the Supreme Court 
rulings in Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp 
(1963), which banned prayer and Bible reading, respectively, from public 
schools. Religious fundamentalists became even more visible and vocal in 
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their criticism of secularization in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Roe v. Wade (1973). These Supreme Court rulings, in addition to other 
secularizing trends in the culture, provided the impetus for the formation of 
a host of far-right religious organizations and the rise to national prominence 
of their leaders—most notably Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, James Dobson, 
Don Wildmon, Louis Sheldon, Gary Bauer, Ralph Reed, and William Dono-
hue—who increasingly turned their attention to national politics.8
The social and political influence of Religious Right leaders and orga-
nizations in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly during the Reagan-Bush era, 
marked a significant shift in American culture. During this same period, 
Groening was still struggling with his Life in Hell comic, and many of the 
writers for The Simpsons were still honing their skills on programs such as 
Late Night with David Letterman, Not Necessarily the News, and Saturday 
Night Live. By the late 1980s, when the work of turning The Simpsons into 
a series was begun, the creators of the show were working in a context in 
which evangelical and fundamentalist religiosity was a dominant part of the 
cultural and political landscape of the United States. As George Marsden 
notes, “secular humanism” came to be the conceptual framework for under-
standing the convergence of the many secularizing trends and thus “the code 
word for enemy forces in the dichotomized world” of the culture wars.9 The 
tenor of this cultural conflict in the early 1990s was perhaps best epitomized 
by Patrick Buchanan’s fiery statement at the Republican National Conven-
tion in 1992. “There is a religious war going on in this country,” Buchanan 
said, “a cultural war as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold 
War itself, for this war is for the soul of America.”10
It was inevitable that The Simpsons would become engaged in this “war,” 
partly because of its status as a social satire, and partly because of the con-
demnation it received from conservative political and religious quarters after 
its debut in the spring of 1990.11 Although The Simpsons does not explicitly 
reference Religious Right leaders or organizations, their collective influ-
ence is reflected in the show in many ways, including the characterization 
of religious believers, such as Reverend Lovejoy and Ned Flanders, and the 
framing of many episodes around the hot-button moral issues that have 
been politicized by those on either side of the culture war debates, such as 
abortion and gay marriage. These and many other controversial issues make 
their way into the scripts of The Simpsons in both large and small ways, and 
they are often positioned within the plotlines so they directly engage with 
and question, if not censure, religious traditions and dogma.
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The Simpsons, Christianity, and Fundamentalism
Given its regular presentation of prayer, church attendance, and other reli-
gious activities, in addition to its engagement with moral and theological 
issues, it is not surprising that some have called The Simpsons a “Christian” 
show. In its earliest seasons, The Simpsons did appear to be aligned with 
mainstream Protestantism, and it generally reflected the mores and behav-
iors typical of those following the Judeo-Christian tradition. Most notable, 
perhaps, was the second-season episode “Homer vs. Lisa and the 8th Com-
mandment,” which links morality and religion via Homer’s desire for and 
Lisa’s protest against an illegal cable connection. It would be much more 
accurate, however, to describe the worldview of The Simpsons as Judaic: 
although the generic Protestantism of Springfield does derive from a Judeo-
Christian tradition, it is the Old Testament that is most frequently referred 
to, quoted, parodied, and satirized on the show. As Heit notes, “A general 
tendency within Springfield is to focus heavily on the issues of prohibition, 
judgment, and God’s punishment that pervade the Old Testament.”12 I would 
argue that this is a general tendency among the writers for The Simpsons 
(many of whom are Jewish, former Catholics, or atheists), who are highlight-
ing and satirizing the continued emphasis on God’s wrath in the rhetoric 
of Christian fundamentalists today. Nonetheless, after the publication of 
Mark Pinsky’s The Gospel According to The Simpsons in 2001, religious and 
political conservatives, who had initially condemned the show, reconsidered 
and even attempted to (re)claim The Simpsons for Christian believers. How-
ever, since the show is often less than flattering to religion, this reclamation 
came in the guise of “family values,” a phrase that remains code for religious 
conservatism in U.S. culture. In the foreword to Pinsky’s book, for example, 
Professor Tony Campolo claims that, “contrary to what some critics say, the 
Simpsons are basically a decent family with good values. They go to church 
on Sunday.”13 The syntax here is quite revealing: Campolo clearly implies a 
connection between church attendance and possessing “good values,” thereby 
dismissing the idea that their values could possibly derive from something 
or somewhere else. This is a remarkably simplistic link, yet it is a central 
tenet of the “family values” and “pro-family” Religious Right.
As stated at the outset, The Simpsons has a very strong spirituality, but 
institutional religion—particularly Christianity—is most often present only 
to be satirized, most commonly through the words and actions of Reverend 
Lovejoy and Ned Flanders. A fine example of this satirical quality can be 
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found in The Simpsons’ presentation of prayer, particularly the contrasting 
representations of the (in)efficacy of prayer for Lovejoy and Flanders. For 
example, in the episode “She of Little Faith,” after Homer inadvertently 
destroys the First Church of Springfield, Lovejoy convenes the church council 
to assess the damage. “Fixing all that damage is going to be very expensive,” 
Marge says. “Yes,” Lovejoy responds, “barring some sort of miracle,” at which 
point he turns, looks heavenward, and expectantly waits a few beats. When 
nothing happens, he turns back and says, with a hint of resentment, “All 
right, we’ll help ourselves . . . yet again.”14 In stark contrast, we see that Ned 
Flanders’s prayers, no matter how trivial, are answered immediately. In “A 
Star Is Burns,” for example, we see Ned filming a scene from Exodus for the 
Springfield Film Festival, using his son Todd to replicate the scene in which 
Moses’ mother places her baby in a basket in the river. When a sudden strong 
current grabs the basket and threatens to send it far downriver, Ned hastily 
prays: “Flanders to God, Flanders to God, get off your cloud and save my 
Todd.” Immediately, lightning strikes a tree and a branch falls into the river 
to block the path of the basket. “Thanks, God,” Ned says.15 Heit concedes that 
such scenes are “contrived,” but he disregards any satirical intent by claim-
ing that these examples suggest “that prayer, when appropriately presented, 
has efficacy.”16 To me, the highly exaggerated way in which Flanders’s faith 
is portrayed seems to be an indication of satire: the writers are satirizing the 
presumption that, through prayer, one has the power to effect immediate 
change in one’s physical environment.
To fully understand how and why the representation of prayer is satiri-
cal, it is important to consider the context in which it arises. Many of the 
religious leaders prominent in the 1990s claimed to communicate directly 
with God and stated that their prayers could, among other things, avert 
or even cause a variety of natural disasters. Pat Robertson, for example, 
claimed in 1995 that his prayers to God helped steer Hurricane Felix away 
from coastal Virginia (which happens to be where his Christian Broadcast-
ing Network is headquartered). In due form, the writers of The Simpsons 
incorporated such cultural elements for satirical ends. Only a year after 
Robertson’s claims, The Simpsons premiered an episode entitled “Hurricane 
Neddy,” in which Ned Flanders’s house is destroyed by a hurricane and he 
momentarily questions his faith in God. “Hurricane Neddy” is quite reveal-
ing about how the show deals with both faith and prayer. Prior to the storm, 
the Simpson family gathers in the cellar of their home, where Marge prays to 
God to spare their house. After the storm passes, they emerge to find their 
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house intact. Pleased, Marge says, “It just goes to show you that everything 
will work out if you have faith.” Clearly, however, that is not the case, as the 
Flanders house has been utterly destroyed. Ned, who considers himself a 
devout Christian, assumes that he is being punished by God, although he 
cannot fathom why—as he notes, he does “everything the Bible says, even 
the stuff that contradicts the other stuff.”17 Such contradictions are what the 
writers of The Simpson latch on to to satirize religiosity. In this and other 
episodes, it is clear that they intend to mock a number of beliefs, including 
the idea that the “reverent” have some exclusive access to God; the belief 
that God would, at their behest, micromanage the lives of individuals; and 
the notion that the “faithful” are treated in some preferential way.
Flanders’s fundamentalism is evident, of course, from the start of The 
Simpsons. One early example is “Homer the Heretic,” which aired in October 
1992 and is perhaps the most widely analyzed and commented on episode 
of The Simpsons. It concerns Homer’s decision to skip church and, subse-
quently, to abandon his faith altogether in search of a more individualized, 
spiritual path. Marge, positioned in this episode as a devout Christian, is 
understandably concerned and calls on Reverend Lovejoy to intervene, but 
she and Lovejoy fail to persuade Homer to return to church. Ned Flanders, 
who has heard of Homer’s “heresy,” makes it his family’s mission to win 
Homer “back to the flock.” The satirical critique of religious fundamental-
ism is well demonstrated in one short sequence involving Ned’s missionary 
zeal. After trying to convert Homer in person and over the phone, Ned and 
his family confront Homer in his car. “Leave me alone,” Homer grumbles, 
and speeds off. “Dad,” Todd says, “the heathen’s getting away.” “I see him, 
son,” Ned says, narrowing his eyes. What ensues is a high-speed car chase 
through Springfield. Homer, desperate to escape, sees an opportunity at a 
railroad crossing and accelerates his car, making it over the tracks just in 
advance of the approaching train. Surprisingly, Ned also accelerates rather 
than stopping, despite the fact that the train is now blocking the road; Ned’s 
car safely leaps though a gap, and the pursuit continues. Given the wide 
range of viewing positions, it is conceivable that someone could interpret this 
moment as an act of “divine intervention.” But to do so, one must ignore the 
markers of satire: the scene is highly exaggerated, bordering on the absurd. 
That the otherwise intelligent and caring Ned Flanders would risk the lives 
of his family to “save” Homer is somewhat surprising, given that Flanders 
is normally more mild-mannered. Considering the Flanders family’s earlier 
harassment of Homer and their casting of him as a “heathen,” not to mention 
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the generally satirical aims of The Simpsons, this scene is most appropriately 
read as a condemnation of zealotry.18
Remarkably, none of the commentary on “Homer the Heretic” includes 
a discussion of the car-chase scene; most commentators focus instead on 
Ned’s later efforts to save Homer in a physical sense, after Homer inadver-
tently sets his house on fire. Ned is seen to be doing the “Christian thing” 
by entering the house, risking his own life, and dragging Homer to safety. 
Shortly thereafter, the volunteer fire department arrives to put out the fire as 
Homer and Lisa stand watching. “Truly, this was an act of God,” Lisa says, 
still invested, like Homer, in the concept of a vengeful God. At this point the 
flames from the roof leap over to the Flanders rooftop. “Hey, wait a minute,” 
Homer says, “Flanders is a regular Charlie Church, and God didn’t save his 
house.” With that, a dark cloud appears above Flanders’s house and, to the 
strains of a pipe organ, releases rain to douse the fire, after which a rainbow 
appears. “D’oh!” Homer exclaims. Like the scenes discussed earlier involv-
ing prayer, this is another moment that is open to multiple interpretations, 
highly dependent on the viewer’s social position, experiences, and beliefs. 
One can see how a religious “believer” might read this scene in “Homer the 
Heretic” as affirming the idea that God plays favorites, punishing Homer for 
his heresy and rewarding Flanders for his faith. However, to read the text 
in this way is to ignore the irony and the gratuitous exaggeration and thus 
to miss the satirical critique.
In the final scene of “Homer the Heretic,” everyone is gathered in the 
Simpsons’ kitchen, where they discuss the “moral” of Homer’s experience. 
Asked by Marge if he has learned his lesson, Homer replies that he has 
learned that God is vengeful. Lovejoy laughs and tells Homer that God didn’t 
set his house on fire. “But he was working in the hearts of your friends and 
neighbors,” Lovejoy says, gesturing toward Ned, Krusty, and Apu, “whether 
they be Christian, Jew, or . . . miscellaneous.” “Hindu,” Apu says; “there are 
seven hundred million of us, you know.” “Aw, that’s super,” Lovejoy responds. 
Oddly, Lovejoy’s dismissive observation and condescending reply to Apu 
are not examined in any of the analyses of “Homer the Heretic” either. In 
their essay on this episode, Lisle Dalton, Eric Michael Mazur, and Monica 
Siems subordinate Lovejoy’s comments to a parenthetical phrase, offering 
no reflection on them whatsoever, yet they later claim that Lovejoy’s overall 
view “represents the sort of generic Christianity prevalent in today’s mainline 
Protestant churches and in most television portrayals of religion.”19
Based on Lovejoy’s attitude toward Hindus (and presumably other faiths 
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outside the Judeo-Christian tradition), it would be more accurate to say that 
Lovejoy represents a generic ignorance and prejudice, which is also prevalent 
in certain mainline churches today—for example, in “megachurches” such 
as the Thomas Road Baptist Church in Virginia, the Saddleback Church in 
California, and the Fellowship Church in Texas—and which is clearly the 
target of the satire in “Homer the Heretic.” In Understanding Theology and 
Popular Culture, Gordon Lynch briefly discusses “Homer the Heretic” and 
claims that, in the end, Lovejoy voices a “humane and tolerant vision of 
religion,” altogether ignoring Lovejoy’s rather intolerant dismissal of Apu’s 
faith as “miscellaneous.”20 Considering how the narrative resolves itself, it is a 
mistake to argue, as Lynch does, that “the narrative tends towards a view that 
organized religion is a good thing in so far as it makes people more humane 
and concerned for those around them.”21 But organized religion had nothing 
to do with the compassion extended to Homer: he was saved by the collec-
tive efforts of Ned Flanders and the Springfield volunteer fire department, 
which includes Krusty the Klown, a secularized Jew who does not practice 
Judaism, and Apu, a Hindu who is not part of an institutionalized tradition 
in Springfield. It is quite a stretch to say that the humanity of Krusty and 
Apu is derived from organized religion and thereby to dismiss the satirical 
critiques of fundamentalism and intolerance offered in this episode.
The evangelical and fundamentalist aspects of the Flanders family 
are also satirized quite effectively in “Home Sweet Home-Diddily-Dum-
Doodily,” which first aired in October 1995. Due to a variety of mishaps 
and misunderstandings, the Simpson children are taken away from Marge 
and Homer by Child Protective Services and placed in foster care with the 
Flanders family. In the course of playing a game called “Bombardment . . . 
of Bible Trivia,” Flanders discovers that Bart and Lisa are not baptized; after 
recovering from this shock, Flanders takes it upon himself to “save” the kids 
from their “hell-bound family” and brings them to the Springfield River for 
a ritual baptism. The final scenes of the episode speak powerfully of Ned’s 
zealotry and the satirical aims of The Simpsons. When Marge and Homer 
discover Ned’s intentions, they are both angry and race to the river to stop 
him. They arrive just in time to see Ned about to anoint Bart with a drop 
of holy water. “Noooo!” Homer cries, and dives toward Bart to knock him 
out of the way. In the process, Homer himself is hit by the droplet of holy 
water, at which point we hear an audible hiss, and Homer begins to writhe 
and thrash in the water, presumably because his demonic self is being seared 
by the power of God. Bart runs to Homer and says, “Wow, Dad, you took 
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a baptismal for me. How do you feel?” Homer, in a reverent tone, replies, 
“Oh, Bartholomew, I feel like St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion 
by Ambrose of Milan.” Ned, understandably shocked, asks, “Homer, what 
did you just say?” “I said shut your ugly face, Flanders!” Homer yells, clearly 
over his momentary conversion. The ridiculousness of this scene indicates 
that the writers are satirizing a variety of things, including Ned’s view of the 
world as a stark contrast between good and evil, the belief that holy water 
has some kind of power to fight evil, and the idea that religious conversion 
can be so easily attained. Above all, however, the episode is most invested 
in satirizing the actions of religious fundamentalists, represented by Ned, 
who operate out of sheer zealotry, without regard for the beliefs and values 
of those they condemn or proselytize.
As the seasons have progressed, the satire on The Simpsons has become 
more specifically directed against evangelical Protestantism and the religious 
fundamentalism this often generates, and the tone has become increasingly 
harsh. As Chris Turner accurately notes in Planet Simpson, after the first few 
seasons, Ned Flanders and his family became “an extended satirical study 
in American evangelical Christianity.” According to Turner, “The Simpsons’ 
writers have lost patience with the Flanders brand of fundamentalist Chris-
tianity in recent years, their somewhat playful ribbing turning into palpable 
disgust.”22 A fine example of this appears in the season 12 episode “HOMR,” 
which aired in January 2001. Although the central narrative is not concerned 
specifically with religious issues, there are two very potent satirical scenes 
that express the heightened frustration with fundamentalism that Turner 
mentions. In one scene, we see the Flanders boys, Rod and Todd, watching 
a show called Gravey and Jobriath, a parody of the 1960s Christian clayma-
tion program Davey and Goliath. Here, Gravey is busily making something 
in the garage. “Whatcha making there, Gravey?” Jobriath asks. “It’s a pipe 
bomb, Jobriath, for to blow up Planned Parenthood,” Gravey says. When 
Jobriath expresses some doubt about this action, Gravey shouts, “I’m sick of 
your lack of faith,” then lights the bomb and stuffs it into Jobriath’s mouth. 
An explosion is heard, and Rod and Todd righteously cheer: “Yay!”23 We also 
learn in “HOMR” that Homer was once quite intelligent (he became stupid 
after sticking a crayon up his nose). In a flashback, we see Homer explain 
to Ned that he has stumbled upon a mathematical proof that definitively 
demonstrates God does not exist. Skeptical, Ned reviews the proof, deter-
mines it is accurate, and then whips out a lighter and sets it on fire. “Can’t 
let this little doozy get out,” Ned says. The satire here ought to be clear, as 
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it is consistent with a point raised repeatedly on The Simpsons: reason and 
rationality have the potential to undermine the belief system fundamental 
to Christianity. Ned recognizes this truth and, like many before him, feels 
threatened. So he destroys the evidence in another example of the extremes 
to which believers will go to maintain the mystique of religion.
The critique of religious fundamentalism is a central part of several more 
recent episodes, including “Thank God, It’s Doomsday” (May 2005), “The 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Guest Star” (May 2005), and “The Monkey 
Suit” (May 2006). In “Thank God, It’s Doomsday,” a series of events leads 
to Homer becoming a prophet of the Apocalypse, convinced that he knows 
the specific date of the Rapture and determined to warn and thus save his 
fellow citizens. Lisa is skeptical, of course, but so is Marge, who tells Homer 
he is acting “crazy.” Collectively, Marge, Lisa, and Bart express their concern, 
telling Homer they don’t believe the world is coming to an end and asking 
him to “lighten up on the left below stuff.” However, as usual, the residents 
of Springfield exhibit a group-think mentality and are quickly persuaded to 
follow Homer to Springfield Mesa and await the Rapture. Although Homer 
is an unlikely (and ultimately unreliable) prophet, they are willing to listen 
to his advice. On Judgment Day, Springfield’s residents dutifully gather 
and take a bus to the Mesa. Of course, at the appointed time specified by 
Homer, nothing happens: there is no Rapture. Everyone waits patiently—a 
few minutes, then a few hours—but they finally realize the end is not com-
ing and leave, muttering angry curses at Homer. After discovering an error 
in his calculations, Homer recalculates and concludes that the Rapture is 
due later that same day. At this point, however, no one is willing to listen to 
him, so Homer goes alone to the Mesa and settles in to await the Judgment. 
He soon falls asleep and dreams of the Rapture.
In Homer’s dream, heaven is like a resort spa, complete with concierge, 
hotel rooms, and entertaining activities. Homer enjoys himself until he 
inquires about those “left below.” He is then shown (on a large-screen tele-
vision) an image of his suffering family, surrounded by a lake of fire and 
being tormented by the devil. Disturbed, Homer goes to speak to God about 
the situation. “God,” Homer says, “you’ve got a first-class destination resort 
here—really top-notch—but I can’t enjoy myself knowing my family is suf-
fering.” “Oh, don’t tell me about family suffering,” God replies. “My son went 
down to Earth once. I don’t know what you people did to him, but he hasn’t 
been the same since.” The camera then pans to an image of Jesus sitting alone 
on a swing set, spinning aimlessly in his seat with a blank look on his face. 
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This is a curious moment in the episode, and it raises some provocative ques-
tions about theology and humanity. Jesus appears to be psychologically or 
emotionally damaged, much like a human being, which calls into question 
his “divine” nature. Moreover, God’s comments imply that he did not send 
Jesus to Earth and is not aware of what happened to him there, which calls 
into question both the omnipotence and the omniscience of God. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, considering the concerns of the show’s writers, the 
responsibility for the damage done to Jesus is placed on humankind—“you 
people,” as God puts it—which could be read as a metaphorical indictment 
of the perversions of Christian doctrine (the harm done to the faith) or of 
the cruelties committed in its name (the harm done to fellow beings).
When God refuses to spare the Simpson family, Homer goes on a ram-
page, destroying the “resort.” Like a frustrated father with an incorrigible 
child, God reprimands Homer and then asks him what he wants. What 
Homer wants, of course, is for things to return to the way they were. “To 
do what you’re asking, I’d have to turn back time,” God says. “Superman 
did it,” Homer taunts, interestingly pitting a secular “all-powerful” being 
against a religious one. “Fine, mister smarty-pants,” God says, “I will undo 
the Apocalypse.” God then intones “Deus ex machina” and claps his hands, 
and we are returned to Homer asleep on the Mesa. “It was all just a dream,” 
Homer says with relief, just as his family arrives. In the final scene, Homer 
returns to Moe’s bar to be with his friends. Seated at the bar and sipping a 
beer, Homer quietly says, “This is heaven.” At this point, the camera slowly 
pulls back to reveal a parodic replication of Da Vinci’s The Last Supper, with 
Homer seated at the center of the iconic image in lieu of Jesus, accompa-
nied by a chorus of voices singing “Hallelujah.” This is a remarkably secular 
intervention into the iconic imagery of religious art, and it puts a final and 
clear punctuation point on the statements made in this episode: the Rapture 
is nothing more than the wild imagining of false prophets, and focusing so 
zealously on the “end-time” prevents people from appreciating and enjoying 
what they have in the here and now, such as a loving family, good friends, 
or a cold bottle of Duff.
Religious zealotry is also openly dealt with in “The Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Guest Star,” which aired just one week after “Thank God, 
It’s Doomsday.” This episode involves Bart going to a Catholic school and 
being taken under the wing of the sympathetic Father Sean. When Marge 
questions Bart’s newfound allegiance to Catholicism, pointing out that the 
church doesn’t allow birth control, for example, Bart accuses her of “blas-
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phemy” and offers to say a rosary for her. Homer, also displeased with Bart’s 
behavior, is sent to intervene, but he is quickly seduced by the concept of 
absolution and decides to convert as well. This, of course, creates a bit of a 
scandal, both at home and in the community. The following Sunday, Rev-
erend Lovejoy confronts Marge, claiming that Homer and Bart are “under 
the spell of a man in a pointy white hat.” Marge initially tries to defend their 
choice as “an interest in spirituality,” but Lovejoy tells her that “a different 
faith means a different afterlife.” Frightened by this prospect, and deter-
mined to win Homer and Bart back, Marge, Ned Flanders, and Reverend 
Lovejoy team up for an intervention. On the ride home, Bart complains to 
Marge: “You’re always telling me to go to church, and now that I am, it’s 
the wrong one.” Lovejoy responds, “We’re here to bring you back to the one 
true faith—the Western Branch of American Reform Presbylutheranism.” 
The remainder of the episode makes it abundantly clear that The Simpsons 
aims to satirize the idea of “one true faith” and the intolerance this breeds, 
even among Christians themselves.
In an effort to show Bart that “Protestants can be hip too,” Marge takes 
him to a Protestant youth festival. Bart is unimpressed until he sees the 
Onward Paintball Soldiers tent. With gun in hand, Bart proceeds to wreak 
havoc, splattering a nativity scene with red paint and “shooting” Rod and 
Todd Flanders. When Father Sean and Homer arrive, sporting their own 
paintball guns, Homer is determined to show Marge that “our God kicks 
your God’s butt.” Homer then cocks and aims his gun, and everyone around 
him follows suit, ready for battle. At this point, Bart steps up and says, “Easy 
on the zeal, church-os. I’ve got something to say. Don’t you get it? It’s all 
Christianity, people. The little stupid differences are nothing compared to the 
big stupid similarities.” “He’s right,” Flanders says, “can’t we all get together 
and concentrate on our real enemies: monogamous gays and stem cells?” 
Father Sean agrees and shakes hands with Flanders. Lovejoy concedes that 
Bart has taught them all a valuable lesson, saying, “We Christians have been 
niggling over details for far too long.” “Amen,” Father Sean says, “and from 
this day forward, I hope we all learn to take Bart’s message of tolerance and 
understanding to heart.” On the heels of Father Sean’s statement, we see 
the words “1000 Years Later” superimposed over dark clouds and set to 
ominous music. The camera then pans down to reveal two rival factions, 
both followers of “God’s last prophet, Bart Simpson,” facing each other on a 
battlefield and arguing over the message of “the holy Bartman”: one group 
claims that he “preached a message of tolerance and love”; the other that 
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he “preached a message of understanding and peace.” With shouts of “Eat 
our shorts!” and “Cowabunga!” the rival groups rush into battle, and the 
end credits roll. The irony of the ending should not be lost on anyone, nor 
should the satirical critique of religious zealotry.
Voices of Reason
One of the ways The Simpsons offers opposition to mainstream Christi-
anity and Christian fundamentalism is through the words and actions 
of the show’s two most rational characters, Marge and Lisa. As might be 
expected, Lisa Simpson is the most overtly secular voice on the show and, 
eventually, the most vocal critic of institutional religion. Although Lisa was 
closely aligned with the Judeo-Christian tradition at the start of the series, 
she moves toward a more rationalist and skeptical position as the series 
progresses—ultimately rejecting Christianity altogether and converting 
to Buddhism in the 2001 episode “She of Little Faith.” Lisa demonstrates 
along the way that her views—and I would venture to say the views of her 
creators—are shaped primarily by the traditions of Enlightenment phi-
losophy, rationality, and scientific inquiry. Lisa’s scientific rationality is the 
centerpiece of episodes such as “Lisa the Skeptic” (November 1997), “I’m 
Goin’ to Praiseland” (May 2001), “She of Little Faith” (December 2001), and 
“The Monkey Suit” (May 2006). In “Lisa the Skeptic,” faith and science are 
pitted against each other over the discovery of an unusual looking skeleton, 
which is quickly presumed to be the remains of an angel. Lisa is bothered 
that nearly everyone unquestioningly accepts that the skeleton is an angel 
and takes a sample of it to the Springfield Museum, where noted evolution-
ary biologist Stephen Jay Gould (guest starring in the episode) calls the idea 
“preposterous.” When Gould informs the townspeople that the test results 
were “inconclusive” (though we later learn he never ran tests at all), Reverend 
Lovejoy gloatingly says, “Well, it appears science has failed again, in front 
of overwhelming religious evidence.” Lisa, still convinced that science will 
prove her right, continues to challenge people’s belief by offering a variety 
of plausible explanations for the skeleton. Frustrated, Lisa complains to her 
mother about the “morons” in town who refuse to listen. Marge, however, 
does not take Lisa’s side; she is positioned once again as a believer, and she 
encourages Lisa to make a “leap of faith.” Lisa cannot and continues to pres-
ent her case with an appearance on the television show Smartline, where she 
matter-of-factly states to the audience, “You can either accept science and 
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face reality or you can believe in angels and live in a childish dream world.” 
Tensions run high, a mob gathers, and Lisa, the “unbeliever,” is chased by 
the townsfolk back to the dig site where the skeleton was first found. Here 
they discover that the angel was merely part of an elaborate publicity stunt 
for the grand opening of the Heavenly Hills Mall. Lisa attempts to channel 
the outrage she expects the townsfolk to feel at having their faith exploited, 
but they don’t even hear her; good consumers all, they rush headlong to 
the mall, having already forgotten their religious devotion. With such an 
ending, the writers are clearly satirizing the substitution of one religion for 
another—here, consumerism for theism—but it should not be forgotten that 
the primary concern of the episode is Lisa’s rationality and faith in scientific 
explanation, and her view is vindicated in the end.
Lisa’s rationality also figures prominently in “The Monkey Suit,” which 
focuses more specifically on religion’s general anti-intellectualism and its 
opposition to scientific inquiry. “The Monkey Suit” was inspired by the 
events leading up to the 2005 decision in Kitzmiller v. Dover, which settled a 
rancorous debate over science curricula in the small town of Dover, Pennsyl-
vania.24 True to form, The Simpsons incorporated this contemporary debate 
for satirical ends. “The Monkey Suit” begins with a trip to the Springfield 
Museum of Natural History, where Ned and his sons stumble into the Hall 
of Man and an exhibit on evolution. Shocked by what he sees, Ned covers 
his sons’ eyes and confronts the docent, asking, “Excuse me, but how can 
you have an exhibit on the origins of man and not have one mention of the 
Bible?” “Oh, we do,” he replies, pointing to a rather low-tech exhibit labeled 
“The Myth of Creation,” which features the finger of God reaching down 
from a cloud to create a tree, a rabbit, a sheep, and Adam and Eve—all to 
the tune of the Doobie Brothers’ “What a Fool Believes.” Unnerved by the 
idea that his cherished beliefs are a “myth,” and angered by the suggestion 
that he and others are descended from apes, Ned consults with Reverend 
Lovejoy, and the two of them approach Principal Skinner to demand that 
an alternative to evolutionary theory be taught in the school. The following 
day, Skinner tells Lisa’s class that they will now be taught about creationism. 
Lisa, of course, protests, saying that creationism is not science. To mollify 
her, Skinner shows a videotape, a propaganda piece called “So You’re Calling 
God a Liar” that provides an “unbiased” comparison of evolutionism and 
creationism. According to the video, the Bible was written by “our Lord,” 
whereas The Origin of Species “was written by a cowardly drunk, Charles 
Darwin,” who is shown making out with Satan. Lisa attempts to counter the 
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slander rationally—explaining that “evolution is a widely acknowledged sci-
entific fact and is even accepted by prominent conservatives such as George 
Will and the late Pope John Paul”—but as usual, she is ignored. In short 
order, Mayor Quimby bans the teaching of evolution in Springfield, and Lisa 
is subsequently arrested for conducting a secret class for the scientifically 
“faithful” where she reads passages from Darwin’s book. At her trial, which 
Kent Brockman dubs God vs. Lisa Simpson, Lisa is represented by “ACLU 
appointed liberal Clarice Drummond,” a clear stand-in for Clarence Dar-
row. Prosecuting the case is “humble country lawyer Wallace Brady.” The 
key witness winds up being Ned Flanders, who claims that he is positive that 
man and ape cannot be related—that is, until Homer, trying unsuccessfully 
to open a bottle of Duff beer, tests Ned’s patience until he blurts out: “Would 
you shut your yap, you big monkey-faced gorilla.” Clarice Drummond uses 
this as a wedge and gets Ned to confess that Homer (and thereby man) could 
possibly be related to an ape. The judge then orders the repeal of the law 
banning the teaching of evolution, in a victory for reason and rationality.
Marge Simpson figures more prominently in episodes that deal with 
ethical issues and satirize the widespread belief in an exclusive link between 
religion and morality. Many people—particularly those within the Judeo-
Christian tradition—have a hard time comprehending that morality and 
religion are not synonymous, as they have been trained to see the two as 
inextricably linked.25 Marge is a Christian, and she appears to abide by the 
laws of that faith. But Marge is also a rationalist, and her choices do not 
always align with doctrine—indeed, they often contradict it. In “Homer vs. 
Lisa and the 8th Commandment,” for example, Marge is at a loss to iden-
tify the rule she is breaking when she pilfers two grapes at the local grocery 
store. Lisa, at this point rather intensely focused on sin and damnation, asks 
Marge, “Don’t you remember the eighth commandment?” “Of course,” Marge 
replies, “it’s ‘Thou shall not . . . um . . . covet graven images’—something 
about covet.” “It’s ‘Thou shall not steal!’” Lisa shouts. Marge’s more secularist 
position is also seen in the season 8 episode “In Marge We Trust,” in which 
Marge becomes the “Listen Lady” of the First Church of Springfield after 
Reverend Lovejoy loses interest in helping his parishioners. As she tells Rev-
erend Lovejoy, “Sermons about ‘constancy’ and ‘prudissitude’ are all well and 
good, but the church could be doing so much more to reach out to people.” 
What Marge proceeds to do is offer friendly, commonsense advice to the 
troubled citizens of Springfield. In short, Marge Simpson straddles the reli-
gious and secular realms, drawing on the strengths of both and using what 
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is most appropriate from each in response to a given situation. According to 
Gerald Erion and Joseph Zeccardi, this quality classifies Marge as a “Chris-
tian-flavored Aristotelian.”26 Marge is a good and virtuous person, and the 
character traits that make her so—friendliness, honesty, compassion—are 
as much a consequence of adhering to certain tenets of Christianity as they 
are of employing reason and rationality. As the authors state, “To resolve 
her moral dilemmas, Marge simply allows reason to guide her conduct to a 
thoughtful and admirable balance between extremes.”27
One of the finest examples of Marge’s moral reasoning is in the Febru-
ary 2005 episode “There’s Something about Marrying,” which deals with the 
topic of gay marriage. To increase tourism and raise money, Mayor Quimby, 
following the suggestion of Lisa Simpson, legalizes gay marriage. As might 
be expected, before we see any marriages take place, we see a showdown 
between the religious and secular forces in Springfield, the former led by Rev-
erend Lovejoy and the latter by Marge Simpson. As a large group of couples 
approaches the First Church of Springfield, Lovejoy is seen rapidly nailing a 
board over the door. Lovejoy explains that he cannot (more accurately, will 
not) perform same-sex marriages. As the dejected crowd disperses, Marge 
steps up to confront Lovejoy and challenge the religious viewpoint. She says, 
“As long as two people love each other, I don’t think God cares whether they 
have the same hoo-hoo or ha-ha.” Though couched in the language of emo-
tion, her statement is an implicit defense of civil rights. Lovejoy responds, 
“The Bible forbids same-sex relations.” “Which book?” Marge asks. Marge is 
clearly “striking a blow for civil rights,” as Lisa puts it, but she is also directly 
challenging Lovejoy’s perspective and thereby challenging the authority of 
religion as an arbiter of morality. The writers are also making an important 
point about the selective interpretation of the Bible to justify persecution. 
They know that viewers will be familiar with the citation from Leviticus, but 
for Lovejoy, it is all one book: “Which book?” he incredulously asks. “The 
Bible!” Lovejoy then begins to ring the church bell to silence Marge’s protest. 
One can hear her begin to say, “But Reverend, scriptural scholars disagree 
on the significance of. . . .” Her words are briefly drowned out by Lovejoy’s 
ringing of the bell, but a moment later, one can hear Marge conclude: “Jesus’s 
teachings stress inclusiveness and compassion.” Despite her best efforts and 
her rationality, however, Marge cannot get through to Lovejoy.
Marge’s comments underscore what is fundamental to the view of reli-
gion on display in The Simpsons: a distinction between Old Testament and 
New Testament worldviews. For believers, the intolerance practiced by the 
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pious and the religious is “justified” by scripture, but that scripture is invari-
ably in the Old Testament. As is well known, that part of the Bible has long 
been used to justify slavery, abuse, torture, and the subjugation of women, 
among other things. In light of the social and political changes wrought by 
the modern civil rights movement, such texts are rarely referred to today out-
side of fundamentalist circles. In general, Christianity has largely shifted its 
focus to the New Testament, to the teachings of Jesus, and to the very virtues 
Marge Simpson embodies—virtues that, as she attempts to remind Reverend 
Lovejoy, are part of the Christian faith. Of course, the dichotomized view 
of the Bible presented by The Simpsons is an oversimplification of matters; 
in many ways, the New Testament is as troublesome and problematic as the 
Old Testament, such as its continuing support of patriarchal structures of 
dominance. But the creators of The Simpsons are simplifying things with a 
purpose: in this case, to condemn the recourse to fear, hatred, and violence 
so often promoted by Old Testament Christianity and a strictly religious 
worldview, and to highlight the potential links between New Testament 
Christianity and a more Humanistic worldview, which are evident in their 
shared emphases on qualities such as compassion, brotherhood, and love.
The two most sustained treatments of religious themes on The Simpsons are 
Mark Pinsky’s The Gospel According to The Simpsons and Jamey Heit’s The 
Springfield Reformation. In his final chapter (entitled “Concluding Trumpet 
Blast”), Heit makes his larger concern perfectly clear: “While the extent to 
which The Simpsons is critical of American Christianity suggests that the 
faith tradition has lost its ability to be relevant in American culture, one can 
see in the show’s inevitable emphasis on coming together that The Simpsons 
does not give up on Christianity.”28 Pinsky expresses a similar sentiment in his 
concluding chapter, the title of which poses a question about The Simpsons: 
“Cloaking the Sacred with the Profane?” For Pinsky, the answer is clearly 
yes. However, even Pinsky acknowledges that “whether the series, once con-
sidered so antiauthoritarian, is subversive or supportive of faith is largely in 
the eye of the beholder.”29 Indeed it is, and one’s interpretation is dependent 
on many factors, not the least of which is what one means by faith.
For all the dogmatic quoting of scripture in Pinsky’s and Heit’s texts, 
their claims boil down to three things: family, brotherhood, and love, which 
they find in abundance on The Simpsons. Does Christianity have an exclu-
sive claim to these values? Of course not. As I note previously, the aims of 
mainline Christianity and Humanism run along parallel tracks, and this is 
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reflected in many episodes of The Simpsons. But it is not enough to simply 
note that a degree of ambiguity exists and that viewers can read the show 
in accordance with their own beliefs. Above all, The Simpsons is a satire, 
and as such it has a particular take on elements of the culture seen to be 
problematic. What the show regularly satirizes are elements of a far-right 
religious fundamentalism, an outgrowth of Religious Right perspectives that 
has come to have a powerful influence in American culture. As Kevin Phil-
lips astutely notes in American Theocracy, “the radical side of U.S. religion 
has embraced cultural anti-modernism, war hawkishness, Armageddon 
prophecy, and in the case of conservative fundamentalists, a demand for 
government by literal biblical interpretation.”30 Religious organizations such 
as the Moral Majority, Christian Coalition, Southern Baptist Convention, 
and Focus on the Family have had an enormous impact on the American 
political system over the past three decades: they have shaped the national 
conversation about the “moral issues” that have been centerpieces of the 
culture wars for the past forty years, and they have been very successful in 
prompting the populace to react to these issues with emotion rather than 
reason. As Phillips further argues, changes in affiliation away from mainline 
Protestantism and toward more “radical” sects have pushed the United States 
toward a “national Disenlightenment.”31
Such righteous moralizing and anti-intellectualism are widely evident 
in Springfield, which is representative of America in general, and these are 
on display on The Simpsons to be satirized. The impatience with religion that 
has been building over many years is evident in the blunt way it is dismissed 
in another recent episode, “Bart Has Two Mommies,” which aired in March 
2006. This episode opens with the Simpson family entering the grounds of the 
church fund-raiser (which, according to the banner at the entrance, “Does 
Not Count as Church”), where they pass games such as Whack-a-Moses, 
Holy Roller-Coaster, and the Tunnel of Abstinence. One scene shows Lenny 
and Carl playing Halo Toss, a game in which they try to toss rings onto the 
heads of saints. Like any carnival game, it’s rigged such that the odds are 
against the player. Frustrated, Lenny says, “Who knew saints had such big 
heads?” Carl asserts, “Ah, it’s all a big scam.” “This booth?” Lenny asks. “No, 
religion in general,” Carl replies. Of course, it is safe to put this view into 
the mouths of somewhat peripheral characters rather than members of the 
Simpson family, even Lisa. Nonetheless, there is a thread running through 
the narrative of this episode—indeed, through the entirety of The Simpsons 
as a series—that underscores the idea that religion, particularly Christian-
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ity, is a sham. This lends support to the view that the critique offered by 
Lenny and Carl is not just the opinion of two minor characters but that of 
the creative voices behind The Simpsons as well.
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Eco-Horror and the Politics of Postenvironmentalism in 
The Happening
Joseph J. Foy
Ecologically based horror films, or “eco-horror,” are fright flicks in which 
nature turns against humankind due to environmental degradation, pollu-
tion, encroachment, nuclear disaster, or a host of other reasons. As a genre, 
eco-horror attempts to raise mass consciousness about the very real threats 
that will face humanity if we are not more environmentally cautious. The pop-
ularity of ecologically based documentaries such as An Inconvenient Truth, 
The th Hour, and Flow have helped spark a cinematic revival of apoca-
lyptic tales of nature turning on humanity that were popular in the 1950s 
and 1970s.
Larry Fessenden, producer and director of many independent films, 
argues that horror movies are “cautionary tales.” Fessenden’s 2006 film The Last 
Winter is an eco-horror about an oil company’s attempts to drill in the pris-
tine environment of a northern Alaskan wildlife refuge. The drilling releases 
something that affects the psychology of the drilling team, and many of them 
begin to suffer what seem to be delusions that threaten the lives of the crew. 
According to Fessenden, such films are designed to scare us into realizing that 
“we don’t want to be in a horror film. We don’t want to wake up in a horrible 
superstorm . . . [or] have wars over the last drops of water.”1 According to 
Neda Ulaby of National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, the purveyors of 
eco-horror are trying to “affect the cultural conversation” with their films.2 In 
essence, eco-horror is an example of popular culture attempting to transform 
a marginalized, disempowered voice into a mainstream dialogue.
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Although directors like Fessenden are often described as having only cult 
appeal, which relegates them to the cinematic fringe, apocalyptic films with 
environmental messages are hitting the mainstream of popular culture. For 
example, the 2004 blockbuster action film The Day after Tomorrow focuses 
on a heroic climatologist attempting to counteract the problems of global 
warming and an oncoming ice age. The sci-fi thriller Sunshine (2007) por-
trays humanity’s last-ditch effort to reignite a dying sun, and even the 2008 
Disney-Pixar hit WALL-E uses environmental themes and the effects of 
human consumption and pollution as a backdrop for its robotic love story. 
Although none of these films falls into the “horror” genre of moviemaking, 
their popularity has helped cult-fringe film devices such as eco-horror obtain 
the necessary financing and production support to achieve a more main-
stream box-office appeal. One example is the 2009 film The Thaw, starring 
Val Kilmer, which uses global warming as the basis for unleashing a deadly 
plague that has lain dormant in the ice for thousands of years.
Joining the ranks of those spreading an ecological message on the sil-
ver screen is M. Night Shyamalan. His film The Happening finds its roots in 
creature features such as The Creature from the Black Lagoon, Frogs, Godzilla, 
and The Swarm, and it is one of several modern eco-horror films that are 
revitalizing these past warnings in an urgent, contemporary context. The 
Happening is a mainstream attempt to scare people into realizing the poten-
tially disastrous effects of ecological encroachment and what might happen 
if, as Shyamalan asks, “nature one day turned on us.”3
Eco-Horror and the Transformation of the  
“Cultural Conversation”
In a departure from some of Shyamalan’s more fantastical films such as 
The Sixth Sense, Unbreakable, Signs, and Lady in the Water, the suspense 
generated in The Happening is neither mythical nor mystical. And unlike 
in The Village, in which the threat posed by the “monsters” is purely arti-
ficial, created by Covington’s founders to keep its citizens from exploring 
the woods and discovering the world beyond, the events that transpire in 
The Happening are not manufactured. Instead, The Happening is a natural-
ist parable of what might occur if the earth began rejecting humanity as a 
virus. The original working title of the film, The Green Effect, establishes this 
ecological link, and in commenting on the film, Shyamalan acknowledges 
its eco-horror foundations. In one interview he downplays the fright fac-
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tor in his first R-rated film by claiming that the seminal horror film of the 
century has already been made—Al Gore’s Oscar-winning documentary 
An Inconvenient Truth.4
The Happening opens in New York City’s Central Park. Two young 
women (Alison Folland and Kristen Connolly) are sitting on a bench reading 
when a scream is heard in the distance. People start clawing at themselves 
and drawing blood, and then everyone around them in the park freezes, 
and some start walking backward. One of the young women on the bench 
reaches up and pulls out a hairpin. Without hesitation, she jams it into her 
own throat. Soon, similar events begin happening in areas surrounding the 
park. At a construction site, a foreman (Cornell Womack) stands in horror 
and disbelief as the bodies of his crew come raining down from the top of 
a building. Suicide becomes a pandemic, breaking out in areas throughout 
the Northeast, as people begin shooting, hanging, and cutting themselves, 
while others feed themselves to lions or lay underneath the blades of a lawn 
mower.
Meanwhile, in a Philadelphia high school, Elliot Moore (Mark Wahl-
Ecologically based horror films, such as M. Night Shyamalan’s The Happening, 
attempt to confront and transform contemporary conversations and approaches 
to environmental politics. (MovieGoods)
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berg) is teaching a science class. He is giving a lesson about the disappear-
ance of bee populations throughout North America, making a desperate 
and impassioned plea to his students to take an interest in science. He asks 
the students to use the scientific method to generate hypotheses about what 
is causing the disappearance of bee colonies. One student speculates that it 
could be due to a virus, while another blames global warming. After some 
prodding, a seemingly disinterested student, Jake (Robert Lenzi), concludes 
that what is going on is “an act of nature, we’ll never fully understand it.” It 
is then that the vice principal (Kathy Lee Hart) interrupts Elliot’s class to 
take him to an emergency meeting, where he and other teachers are told 
that terrorists have attacked Central Park. Classes are canceled, and every-
one is sent home. Elliot meets up with his wife, Alma (Zooey Deschanel), 
and they join his friend Julian (John Leguizamo) and Julian’s daughter Jess 
(Ashlyn Sanchez) to catch a train to the Pennsylvania countryside, where 
they will presumably be safe from attack.
Events similar to those in New York City begin to occur in smaller 
and more remote areas, however, debunking the theory that terrorists are 
responsible for unleashing a neurotoxin that causes people to kill themselves. 
Soon other theories are developed to explain what is happening. Some blame 
nuclear power, while others blame the government and secret testing being 
performed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). After separating from 
Julian, who catches a ride to Princeton to search for his wife, Elliot, Alma, 
and Jess meet the owner of a plant nursery (Frank Collison) and his wife 
(Victoria Clark), who speculate that the outbreak is being caused by plants. 
The nursery owner theorizes that plants are releasing neurotoxins into the 
air as a way of defending themselves against human beings in the same way 
that plant volatiles and terpenoids are released from herbivore-damaged 
plants to attract wasps that will feed on the offending caterpillars.5 Elliot 
refines this theory, deducing that the plants emit a neurotoxin when they 
feel threatened by people in groups. Larger populations were affected first, 
but as the plants became more sensitive to the presence of humans, smaller 
groups caused the discharge of the neurotoxin.6
As a parable, The Happening provides several lessons regarding ecologi-
cal awareness and sustainability. First, the film pulls together the cautions 
from a host of scientific, sociological, and political thinkers who have long 
warned against the dangers of ecological devastation. Second, it invites a 
comparative analysis of U.S. security policy in the global war on terror and 
the public policy response to impending environmental threats such as cli-
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mate change, environmental exploitation, and overpopulation. Finally, its 
use of actual environmental issues as the basis of the eco-horror narrative 
provides a critical look into the current state of global ecology. Together, 
these combine to raise awareness and begin a dialogue that, when critically 
examined, can help transform the current political dialogue about domestic 
and global environmental policy.
We’ve Seen the Signs—Now It’s Happening
In 1798 Thomas Malthus published An Essay on the Principle of Population, 
in which he argues that population growth occurs in a manner that tends 
to outstrip an ecosystem’s carrying capacity—the supportable population of 
an organism within a given environment. Malthus suggests that unchecked 
populations grow at an exponential (or geometric) rate that outpaces food 
production, which grows only at an arithmetic rate. Shyamalan alludes to 
this Malthusian growth rate when Julian offers a young woman a math 
riddle to try to distract her from her fear. Julian asks how much money the 
woman would have if he gave her one penny on the first day, two pennies 
on the second, four on the third, and so on, doubling the amount each day 
for a full month. The terrified woman shouts out several low figures, none 
of which is right. Finally, right before they are afflicted with the neurotoxin, 
Julian tells her, “It’s over ten million dollars. You’d have over ten million dol-
lars at the end of the month.”
Such unchecked growth, as demonstrated in the riddle, reveals some 
obvious problems related to populations and carrying capacity. When a 
population begins to outstrip food supplies and essential resources that sus-
tain an organism within an ecosystem, something must give. According to 
Malthus, there are two inevitable scenarios: a human response and a natural 
response. The human response would be a war over scarce resources. This 
would likely have an impact on the population, but if it did not do enough to 
check the population’s numbers, a natural response would result. The natural 
response would come in the form of famine, disease, and pestilence, such 
that the population would be rapidly reduced to sustainable levels (or likely 
well below them). In essence, the ecosystem would attack the organism, just 
as the human body attacks a virus in an effort to save itself.7
The Malthusian perspective on population is certainly present through-
out Shyamalan’s film. Not only is nature turning against humanity; it is 
prompted to do so by large population concentrations. Smaller populations 
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are affected only after the plants develop a greater sensitivity to smaller 
groups of individuals. Not until right before the happening subsides, when 
scientists project it to be at its most intense stage, are single individuals 
affected. Thus, nature is responding to overpopulation and encroachment 
in a distinctly Malthusian manner in the film.
The concerns over a natural response to rapid population growth, 
resource exploitation, and ecological devastation are becoming more preva-
lent. With the world population in 2008 reaching over 6.7 billion, the issue 
of Earth’s carrying capacity is becoming a serious issue. The United Nations 
predicts that at current rates, the population will increase by 2.5 billion by 
2050, bringing the total population to 9.2 billion. Regionally, population 
growth is having a significant impact on some states’ ability to maintain 
order and provide necessary services for their citizens. Nearly one-third of 
the total world population is concentrated in two countries—China (over 
1.3 billion) and India (over 1.1 billion). Moreover, less developed countries 
are facing domestic and regional instability because of resource scarcity, 
disease, pollution, and conflict. The United Nations predicts that the popula-
tion of these less developed countries will increase from 5.4 billion in 2007 
to 7.9 billion in 2050.8
Crises resulting from ecological instability are already occurring 
throughout the world, and a number of analysts are predicting that cur-
rent worries over energy costs and other economic concerns will pale in 
comparison. Current levels of consumption have stretched food supplies to 
the limit, and the demand for products such as corn to be used as a biofuel 
alternative is placing an even greater strain on supply.9 In the United States 
the threat looms, but in many other countries the threat has been actual-
ized. Food riots have broken out in parts of Africa, leading to several deaths. 
Riots due to food shortages are not isolated to one city or one country; they 
have occurred in Cameroon, Haiti, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Madagascar. The World Bank 
estimates that at least thirty-three countries are at risk due to shortages in 
supply and price inflation.10 Each of these instances stands as a testament 
to the immediate problems being caused by ecological instability, as well as 
microcosms of the much larger, impending global crisis.
Problems related to food production throughout the world make envi-
ronmental catastrophes all the more devastating. In June 2008 the United 
States began experiencing violent storms and massive, record-setting flood-
ing throughout the Midwest, affecting states such as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
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Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin. The flooding throughout the Midwest 
not only affected those in the immediate area but also sent food prices soar-
ing due to scarcity created when crops were destroyed. For instance, the 
price of corn nearly doubled from 2007 to 2008.11
While the Midwest was experiencing heavy rain and flooding, other 
parts of the country were having a heat wave that registered record high 
temperatures in more than fifty cities. These temperatures, reaching well 
above 100 degrees in some places, pose serious health threats.12 Researchers 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who (along 
with former vice president Al Gore) were awarded the 2007 Noble Peace 
Prize for their work on human contributions to climate change, indicate that 
flooding and drought in neighboring regions are predictable outcomes of 
global warming. The findings of the IPCC suggest that human systems impact 
natural ones in a manner that increases overall warming. This warming then 
causes shifts in weather patterns, increasing the intensity of storms. While 
violent weather in one area may be creating a deluge that results in mas-
sive flooding, nearby regions may be suffering from intense heat waves that 
cause drought. Drought, in turn, creates problems of scarcity and increases 
the risk of prairie and forest fires. Thus, it is not surprising that the United 
States has been hit by massive flooding and drought simultaneously, given 
the research into the effects of climate change.13
In addition to droughts and flooding resulting from climate change 
and the overconsumption of available resources due to population growth, 
there are increased problems of disease. According to a 2007 report released 
by the World Health Organization (WHO), “In our increasingly intercon-
nected world, new diseases are emerging at an unprecedented rate, often with 
the ability to cross borders rapidly and spread.”14 According to the WHO, 
thirty-nine new pathogens have been identified since 1967, including HIV, 
Ebola, and SARS. The WHO also warns that centuries-old threats, “such as 
pandemic influenza, malaria and tuberculosis, continue to pose a threat to 
health through a combination of mutation, rising resistance to antimicrobial 
medicines and weak health systems.”15
The threat of a global pandemic is scarily similar to the neurotoxin 
outbreak in Shyamalan’s film, and the spread of diseases, due in part to 
pollution, scarcity, waste, and lack of proper sanitation, poses an almost 
unimaginable threat. In “The Next Pandemic?” Laurie Garrett explores the 
potential outbreak of one such disease, avian flu. Making comparisons to 
the 1918 Spanish flu, which resulted in the deaths of 50 million people in 
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the span of eight months, Garrett demonstrates how lethality rates result-
ing from overpopulation, the rapidity of global travel, and existing health 
problems in developing nations could well eclipse such figures. Garrett 
postulates that deaths in the United States alone would soar to around 16 
million, well beyond the conservative estimate of 207,000 deaths by the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC).16
Of course, not only does nature respond in a Malthusian manner; people 
begin to implement a form of self-preservation that reflects the principles 
articulated by Malthus. When Elliot, Alma, Julian, and Jess are stuck in a 
small-town diner, word spreads that ninety miles to the west there have 
been no reported outbreaks from the neurotoxin. All the people in the diner 
immediately scramble to their cars to make a run for the area beyond the 
“hot zone.” Elliot and Alma struggle to find a ride, but in numerous acts of 
selfish self-preservation, one car after another ignores their pleas and takes 
off down the road.17 Perhaps even more illustrative of this principle of self-
preservation is what happens when two teenagers—Josh (Spencer Beslin) 
and Jared (Robert Bailey Jr.)—join Elliot, Alma, and Jess. They make their 
way to a farmhouse to beg for food. At first the farmhouse seems aban-
doned, but Josh and Jared see two people moving around inside, and they 
try to persuade the residents to give them food for young Jess. Their pleas 
fall on deaf ears, however, and the people inside demand that they leave. 
Josh becomes aggravated and begins yelling obscenities at the people inside. 
A gun appears out of the front door, and Josh is shot in the chest. As Jared 
looks on in shock and fright, another gun barrel appears out the window 
and fires point-blank into Jared’s head. Such a lack of concern for others in 
light of the desire for self-preservation is a theme highlighted throughout 
the film, and it illustrates the human response to overpopulation described 
by Malthus.
The conflict and instability resulting from scarcity and attempts at self-
preservation create a significant threat to humanity. In 1994 Robert Kaplan 
described in horrific detail actual events in the developing world related to 
overpopulation, scarcity, and disease, which in turn heightened the prob-
lems of crime and tribalism. In a shockingly dystopian vision of the future, 
Kaplan describes the collapse of global governments resulting from regional 
anarchy and intertribal conflicts (like those witnessed in Rwanda or Darfur); 
the subsequent mass migration of populations to other states makes these 
truly transnational problems.18 The “coming anarchy” described by Kaplan is 
reinforced by research into intergroup conflict and environmental instability 
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performed by Thomas Homer-Dixon and others at the University of Toronto. 
Homer-Dixon summarizes the problem of the scarcity of vital renewable 
resources such as soil, water, forests, fish, the ozone layer, and an equitable 
climate by asserting that they are “already contributing to very violent con-
flicts in many parts of the developing world. Moreover, these conflicts may 
be early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming decades—especially 
in poor countries—that is caused or aggravated by environmental change.”19 
A decade and a half later, bearing witness to the genocide in Rwanda and 
Sudan, as well as conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South 
Africa, and Indonesia, these claims seem less an apocalyptic future than a 
nightmarish reality.
Threat Level Green?
It is telling that when the first outbreak is reported in The Happening, 
everyone assumes it is some type of biological terrorist attack. In post-9/11 
America, it is clear why people would immediately assume so. Soon after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans faced the looming 
threat of bioterror. In October 2001 law enforcement officials in Florida dis-
covered a case of anthrax; soon after, anthrax-laden letters were mailed to 
government officials and civil servants.20 The threat of bioterrorism became 
a reality that struck fear throughout the United States.
The Happening invites comparisons between the U.S. response to the 
attacks of 9/11 and to terrorism in general and its response to the global 
ecological crisis, revealing a large disparity.21 After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the cold war, many Western scholars began shift-
ing their focus to new security challenges. Many predictions, like those 
of Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Thomas Homer-Dixon, indicated that 
the biggest challenge to global security in the post–cold war world would 
arise from ecological instability.22 These scholars point to overpopulation, 
nonsustainable growth, resource depletion, immigration, and conflict as 
creating environmentally based threats that could lead to large-scale war, 
famine, and the spread of disease. However, the global terror threat quickly 
pushed the concept of ecological security out of the mainstream political 
consciousness.
From 2005 to 2007, the National Counterterrorism Center of the 
U.S. Department of State reported a total of 40,225 incidents of terror-
ism worldwide. Of those, 19,829 (49.3 percent) resulted in the death of at 
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least one person, and 877 (2.2 percent) resulted in the death of at least ten 
people.23 The total number of deaths attributed to terrorism worldwide for 
this three-year period was 58,173. This means that there was a three-year 
average of 13,408 incidents of terrorism resulting in 19,391 deaths per year. 
These numbers are tragic, and there is no arguing that governments must 
take appropriate steps to prevent such brutal attacks. However, eco-horror 
films like Shyamalan’s provoke a comparison of these figures to the deaths 
resulting from climate change.
According to studies released by the WHO, the worldwide death toll 
attributable to global warming was an estimated 150,000 in 2005 alone—
three times the total number of deaths worldwide from terrorism in a 
three-year period. The WHO estimates that those numbers could double by 
2030. Likewise, the WHO estimates that nearly 5 million cases of diseases 
contracted worldwide in 2005 can be linked to global warming, and approxi-
mately 600,000 deaths occurred in the 1990s due to “weather-related natural 
disasters” that are intensified by global climate change. In addition to the 
deaths directly attributable to global warming, the United Nations estimates 
that in just five countries in Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and 
Somalia), 8 million people face starvation due to drought conditions, with 
15 million more at risk. Such conditions are said to be growing worse due 
to complications from climate change.24
Focusing on the United States specifically, 2,998 people were killed in 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, making it the worst terrorist 
attack in world history. Comparatively, 1,836 died as a result of Hurricane 
Katrina, with 1,577 of those deaths occurring in New Orleans. Although 
more than 1,000 more people died in 9/11 than in Katrina, the Department 
of Homeland Security estimates that the devastation of Katrina directly 
affected 1.5 million people and forced 800,000 people to relocate in the 
“largest displacement of people since the great Dust Bowl migrations of the 
1930s.”25 Finally, in comparing the economic impact of the two events, the 
total cost of the attack on the World Trade Center (earnings losses, property 
damage, cleanup and restoration) was estimated at $33 billion to $36 billion 
through the first year, whereas the total cost of the damage done by Hur-
ricane Katrina was estimated at around $81 billion through the first year.26
Despite the relatively comparable damage and loss of human life in these 
two events, the U.S. government’s responses to 9/11 and Katrina were wildly 
dissimilar. From September 11, 2001, to December 2007, the total amount 
of federal money allocated to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other war on terror 
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operations was approximately $700 billion—three and a half times more 
than has been spent on the recovery efforts following Katrina. Moreover, 
when looking at the amount of federal money allocated to combat terror-
ist threats versus ecological ones, it should be noted that the entire annual 
budget for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2007 was $7.3 
billion. This means that the EPA could operate at current levels for almost 
a century before equaling the total amount spent in just over five years of 
waging the global war against terrorism. It is also noteworthy that, according 
to the Office of Management and Budget, following September 11, 2001, the 
Bush administration worked with Congress to more than triple nondefense 
homeland security spending. Compare that to the budget cuts at the EPA 
that caused numerous research facilities to close across the United States, 
even after the devastation of Katrina.27
In addition to inviting comparisons between reactions to global climate 
change and responses to terrorism in the United States, The Happening pro-
vides interesting commentary on overt versus covert threats to American 
security.28 It may be that our minds are unable to process the overwhelming 
reality of the millions of people directly affected by environmental disaster 
in the same way that we processed the horrific images of people jumping 
from the burning Twin Towers being broadcast on television. The enormity 
of ecological crises all over the world may devastate us to paralysis, and we 
begin to think of them as being removed from our everyday lives. As Julian 
remarks to Elliot in the film, “People are comforted by percentages.” The 
events of 9/11 shocked the American consciousness in a dramatic fashion,29 
prompting a swift and fully supported response by all relevant government 
agencies. However, such a coordinated effort has not been undertaken by the 
United States to deal with the environmental threats looming at home and 
abroad. Shyamalan’s film attempts to dramatize, through a work of fiction, 
the ecological threat in a manner that shocks and scares people into action 
so that the American consciousness is raised before it is too late.
Colony Collapse Disorder and the Politics of 
Postenvironmentalism
Shyamalan places his ecological nightmare in the context of recent world 
events when he has Elliot talk to his class about the real-world phenom-
enon known as colony collapse disorder (CCD). A catchall phrase used to 
describe the rapid decline of western honeybee populations, CCD has been 
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attributed to pesticide exposure, inadequate food supplies, possible viruses 
that affect the bees’ immune systems, and genetically modified foods.30 
However, despite the numerous hypotheses advanced, there is no definitive 
evidence that pinpoints a single cause. Shyamalan acknowledges this when 
he has the student in Elliot’s class conclude that the bees’ disappearance is 
an act of nature that can never be fully understood. One thing is clear from 
the lesson, however: the decline in bee populations is a harbinger of things 
to come. On the chalkboard in Elliot’s classroom is a quotation attributed 
to Albert Einstein that reads, “If the bee disappeared off the surface of the 
globe, then man would only have four years of life left.” Though probably not 
actually uttered by Einstein, the quotation goes on to explain that without 
bees there would be “no more pollination, no more plants, no more animals 
. . . no more man.”31
The introduction of CCD in the film provides a number of important 
contributions to popular perceptions about ecological crises, but two in 
particular. First, it serves as a reminder that the “warning signs” discussed 
in the film are not mere fictions invented to provide a backstory. These 
are actual events happening right now in North America and elsewhere. 
Second, and perhaps most important, the discussion of the disappearance 
of honeybee colonies enables Shyamalan to emphasize the multiplicity 
of potential causes of the ecological devastation that leads to the horrific 
events portrayed in the film. The students provide many possible and 
commonly accepted explanations as to why the bees have disappeared so 
rapidly. Elliot praises their insights but finds reasons to challenge their 
assertions. He concludes the conversation by noting, “Science will come up 
with some reason to put in the books, but in the end it’ll be just a theory. 
I mean, we will fail to acknowledge that there are forces at work beyond 
our understanding. To be a scientist, you must have a respectful awe for 
the laws of nature.”
This discussion of CCD is reminiscent of the critique of the archaic 
nature of the contemporary environmental movement offered by Michael 
Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, authors of the controversial 2004 article 
“The Death of Environmentalism.” Shellenberg and Nordhaus criticize the 
single-issue focus of many environmentalists who warn against the dangers 
of pollution, deforestation, acid rain, and more, claiming instead that the 
problem is much broader and more multifaceted than any one of these things 
(or all of them combined).32 In their follow-up book Break Through: From 
the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, Shellenberger 
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and Nordhaus expand on this critique by providing a postenvironmentalist 
vision of the global climate crisis. The authors contend that if humanity is 
to truly make progress in averting ecological disaster, we must shift focus 
from the so-called pollution paradigm. Instead, the world must be ready to 
embrace a revolutionary reevaluation of wealth and prosperity not in terms 
of monetary net worth or material possessions but in terms of overall well-
being.33 Elliot’s agreement with his student’s assertion that the disappearance 
of honeybee populations is a natural phenomenon that can never be fully 
explained by any one theory seems to raise this type of postenvironmental-
ist critique of single-issue ecology.
Supporting the notion that The Happening is a portrayal of the posten-
vironmentalist critique of traditional approaches to solving environmental 
problems is the ending of the film. In a move that is unusual for Shyamalan, 
he does not tie everything together through a series of flashbacks or full dis-
closure from any of the characters. Instead, the film ends with the audience 
in limbo as to what the exact cause and solution might be. Left only with 
the knowledge that Paris and surrounding areas are about to be hit by the 
same ecological nightmare, the audience takes on the role of Elliot’s class at 
the start of the film—offering hypotheses and best guesses, but having no 
definitive answers to explain this act of nature.
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’s postenvironmentalist critique should not 
be taken as a call to stop pushing for reforms and public policy designed to 
encourage more environmentally friendly methods of production and con-
sumption. To the contrary, such measures would likely result from a shift 
in mind-set and a reevaluation of wealth in terms of a life of well-being. In 
fact, Shellenberer and Nordhaus have worked with many of the existing eco-
logically based interest groups and organizations to improve environmental 
quality and ecologically friendly coexistence between human beings and 
nature. Instead, they are calling for these groups to shift from the single-
issue approach to a more culturally revolutionary method of dealing with 
the politics of environmentalism, which they see as the only way to produce 
lasting, meaningful change.
We Just Have to Be Alive When It’s All Over
Having survived the ecological nightmare, Elliot and Alma find a deeper 
love for each other that results in a renewal of their once faltering marriage. 
They have taken Jess into their home, Alma discovers that she is pregnant, 
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and their lives are being redefined in terms of what really matters. In the 
background, talking heads debate the phenomenon three months later, and 
it is evident that no one can fully account for what has happened. The movie 
ends with an outbreak similar to that in New York occurring in a park in 
Paris, France. Fade to black.
Shyamalan’s apocalyptic vision is enough to scare people into thinking 
about what might happen if nature turned against us, but it leaves audiences 
with more questions than answers. Though this may be unsatisfying for some, 
it is necessary if we are to draw broad and far-reaching conclusions from 
the film. For example, in what is perhaps the most obvious environmental 
lesson throughout the film, Shyamalan constantly emphasizes the scientific 
method as a means of approaching problems. Hard science, not mysticism 
or faith or the paranormal, offers Elliot insight into the happenings and gives 
him a strategy for survival. Shyamalan seems to be directing his audience to 
look to science and take seriously the overwhelming research that indicates 
we are spiraling toward imminent ecological disaster.34
Shyamalan’s conclusion reveals not only how easily people reject sci-
entific claims about global ecology but also how they dismiss natural signs 
and warnings as isolated events or anomalies. For example, because the hap-
penings were confined to the northeastern United States, a talk-show host 
(Armand Schultz) criticizes the environmental warnings proffered by his 
guest, Dr. Ross (Stephen Singer), as nonsense. He insists that if the events had 
occurred in any other place, then Ross might be believed. In the meantime, 
classifying the events as a natural warning against ecological exploitation 
and destruction should be dismissed. Because the film ends with the start 
of a second outbreak in France, it is impossible to tell whether people were 
awakened by the second disaster. However, as we look around our own world, 
we see more violent and destructive hurricanes, severe droughts, flooding, 
mudslides, tsunamis, earthquakes, diseases, food shortages, population 
die-offs, and colony collapse. The natural world has been offering sign after 
sign, but some governments seem unwilling to look at the interconnected-
ness of these events and recognize them as constituting a larger narrative 
of ecological instability.
That France is the target for the second wave of the ecological nightmare 
in The Happening offers yet another insight into the politics of environmen-
talism. The European Union has been very proactive in attempting to combat 
the problems resulting from ecological degradation.35 However, the member 
states of the EU are not immune from the impending natural disaster because 
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the politics of environmentalism requires truly global solutions. In their 2003 
release Ecological Security: An Evolutionary Perspective on Globalization, 
Dennis Pirages and Theresa Manley DeGeest explain how environmental 
issues transcend traditional politics by transcending national boundaries. 
The traditional approach to political, economic, and security questions was 
state centered, with sovereign governments responsible for their own well-
being. However, single states cannot battle environmental disaster and win, 
because the violent weather patterns caused by climate change will not affect 
only those states responsible for the most pollution or the most degradation. 
It takes an entirely new approach that involves multinational cooperation 
and solutions arising out of the interconnectedness that has emerged due to 
globalization. States must be willing to embrace globalization and intercon-
nectedness to solve problems of ecological devastation and environmental 
scarcity, which will require a change from our traditional understanding of 
concepts such as national interest and security.36
The Happening is a warning to heed the clarion call of impending envi-
ronmental catastrophe, and it provides the foundation for future social and 
political action. Though not clearly defined in the film, it is possible for us 
to draw conclusions about how to transform modern modes of living to 
embrace a safer and more ecologically friendly way of life.
First, as evidenced in the postenvironmentalist message of the film, 
environmental groups must be willing to embrace new modes of action to 
effectively combat the most serious threats to ecological sustainability and 
preservation. This does not mean abandoning the critical work these groups 
perform in terms of social and political reform, but it does mean that they 
must work more comprehensively to change the mind-set of what it means 
to be ecologically friendly. Mass education must be undertaken to inform 
people that it is not enough to change to new eco-friendly lightbulbs or to 
recycle their trash. Currently, people are purchasing more fuel-efficient cars, 
using mass transit, carpooling, and traveling less not because it is beneficial 
for the environment but because it is too expensive to behave any other way. 
The campaign to get people to use new, energy-saving lightbulbs was based 
primarily on convenience and saving money. People are being induced to 
display the right behavior, but for reasons that do not promote the long-
term viability of the ecological movement. A shift in mass culture must be 
made to pull people away from market incentives and toward incentives of 
overall quality of life and well-being.
Second, security must be redefined in terms of well-being, which means 
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taking the ecological threat as seriously (if not more so) as threats of ter-
rorism or other more traditional defense priorities. The 9/11 Commission 
indicated that the single biggest threat posed by terrorists, because of the 
overwhelming devastation, would be for an organization like al-Qaeda 
to possess a nuclear device. Hundreds of thousands of people would be 
at risk if a nuclear device were detonated in a densely populated area, 
which is certainly a threat worthy of serious attention. However, we must 
begin to question why similar gravity and resources are not dedicated to 
the very real and potentially more devastating environmental disasters 
mentioned throughout this chapter. The CDC’s conservative estimate of 
U.S. deaths due to an avian flu pandemic is more than 200,000, with a 
potential death toll upward of 16 million. Thousands of people were killed 
when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, and the displacement and 
destruction were nearly unprecedented in U.S. history. Looming food 
shortages, water and resource scarcity, and other ecological problems 
pose a very real international and domestic threat. Just as the government 
has the responsibility to take action to defend us from potential threats 
from terrorism, it must mobilize to prevent ecological disaster at an almost 
unimaginable level.
Finally, regarding issues of public health, Margaret Chan, director-
general of the WHO, calls not only for increased preparedness but also for 
the elimination of old models of international thought in which interest 
is defined solely from a national perspective. Chan argues that there must 
be increased global cooperation and multilateralism to combat what are 
truly transnational problems. According to Chan, “International public 
health security is both a collective aspiration and a mutual responsibil-
ity. The new watchwords are diplomacy, cooperation, transparency and 
preparedness.”37
Perhaps what is most needed is a reality check from the likes of a classic 
M. Night Shyamalan ending, such as that in The Sixth Sense or Signs, when 
we are pulled back through the story and shown the overlooked pieces that 
reveal the answer to the mystery—clues that were present all along for those 
who knew where to look and how to fit the pieces together. Perhaps then 
governments and their citizens would see the interconnectedness of human 
activity and the global ecosystem. In the absence of such a revolutionary shift 
in consciousness, eco-horror films serve as a reminder of the nightmarish 
future that awaits, and they may advance the type of dialogue that can truly 
change the cultural conversation.
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Those on the Left, politically or otherwise, use a variety of cultural media 
to advance their goals. In the modern world, leftist ideologies are advanced 
in myriad ways, yet many have disseminated into popular culture. Few can 
overlook the radicalism inherent in lyrics from the band Rage Against the 
Machine, the internationally iconic image of Che Guevara posted on walls 
around the world, or progressive online publishing such as MoveOn.org. 
Yet the radicalism and left-wing politics of today, broadly conceived, are not 
unique in their use of cultural elements, including literature, imagery, and 
song, to further agendas. Radicals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries used, with great competence, stylistic, societal, and media means 
not only to respond to a frustrating world around them but also to propa-
gate their causes of reform.
Radicalizing the Left: The Gilded Age and Progressive Era 
As the nineteenth century closed, a new era of mechanization, mass produc-
tion, and speculation brought rapid and sweeping changes to the American 
workplace and its laborers, creating, in the words of several historians, “the 
seedbed of a new social and economic order.”1 The nation’s new consumptive 
culture, far from being benevolent, placed a premium on want and wealth. 
While the “captains of industry” prospered, the nation’s rank-and-file wage 
earners struggled. Across the nation industrial and agricultural laborers 
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increasingly found themselves locked in antagonistic relationships with 
financiers, venture capitalists, and managers.
These conditions of a new, “modern” America allowed new challengers 
to emerge on the political scene. Democrats and Republicans still dominated, 
of course, but now there were dissenting voices that effectively argued on 
behalf of political “outsiders.” The Gilded Age and Progressive Era (circa 
1877–1918) witnessed, among others, the Populists of the 1890s and the 
Progressives of the pre–World War I era, parties and activists that called 
for sweeping economic and social reforms. However sweeping their calls, 
labor-minded organizers on the political Left offered some of the most radi-
cal—at times, revolutionary—agendas.
Two particular organizations, the Socialist Party of America (SPA) and 
the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), arrived on the American land-
scape in the first years of the twentieth century. These radical organizations 
enjoyed considerable success at the ballot box and in local labor fights, but 
these successes did not come without help. The work of “labor” was not con-
fined to simply organizing workers and holding strikes. Instead, forming a 
class culture, as labor historians have emphasized in recent interpretations, 
was equally important to working class-identity. Radical labor’s agitators, 
inspired by the increasingly antagonistic relationship between producers 
and employers, were far from passive in confronting the changing world 
around them. And workers and their politically dissenting outlets put great 
emphasis on “propagandizing” as a means of educating and radicalizing 
the American proletariat. The SPA and IWW used, with great efficacy, a 
variety of cultural elements—notably, cartoons, songs, and newspapers—to 
propagate their message of working-class radicalism and simultaneously 
legitimize their causes.
Established in 1901, the Socialist Party of America became the per-
manent institution for socialism in the United States. Formed out of the 
remnants of the Socialist Labor Party and the Social Democratic Party, 
it offered a viable third-party challenge for nearly two decades. Although 
disagreements continued to arise over ideology, the party and its orga-
nizers brought a message of industrial socialism to potential voters. The 
SPA emerged, in the words of historian John Graham, as “the dominant 
expression of insurgent politics” in the early twentieth century. For opti-
mistic socialists in attendance at the 1901 “Unity” convention, according 
to historian David Shannon, “the question was when, not if, the American 
people—the American working people—would see the logic of industrial 
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history and vote the Socialist Party into office to socialize and democratize 
the American economy.” Party members mobilized under the new banner 
of the SPA to organize locals, propagandize the masses, and offer candidates. 
Accordingly, during its first decade and a half, the SPA experienced growth 
unequaled in American history.2
Four years after the establishment of the SPA, a meeting was held that 
organizer and socialist William “Big Bill” Haywood called “the Continental 
Congress of the Working Class.” Established in Chicago at that 1905 meet-
ing, the Industrial Workers of the World, also known as the “Wobblies,” 
preached a message of universal unionism and working-class emancipation. 
Among the 203 delegates sat an eclectic mix from the Western Federation 
of Miners, SPA, Socialist Labor Party, American Labor Union, and Ameri-
can Federation of Labor (AFL). The IWW emerged as a much more radical 
alternative, particularly over time, to the trade union organization of the 
AFL and the politically minded SPA. According to historian Greg Hall, the 
IWW had two goals, “one practical and one revolutionary.” The IWW first 
hoped to organize workers outside of the conservative AFL, regardless of 
trade, gender, or race. In addition, the Wobblies preached a “one big union” 
philosophy that would emancipate the working class from the grasp of capi-
talism through such tactics as the general strike.3
With varying brands of socialism and propensities for radicalism, the 
SPA and IWW both worked diligently to create and enhance movements 
that represented the interests of exploited labor. For both organizations, 
though, working-class radicalism was not simply forged at meetings. Instead, 
the SPA, the Wobblies, and their activists used media and the arts to define 
who they were and what they thought.
Reporting the Left: Newspapers
At the head of party and labor propaganda work were newspapers and peri-
odicals. In the same way that more “mainstream” labor organizations had 
publications, such as the AFL’s American Federationist, the SPA and IWW 
effectively used publications to further their mission and cause. In print, a 
number of nationally distributed newspapers and periodicals, in addition 
to countless regional and local publications, publicized the socialist and 
unionist agenda. Nationally significant periodicals included the Interna-
tional Socialist Review (1900–1918), Appeal to Reason (1895–1922), and 
The Masses (1911–1917). These papers tracked, encouraged, and celebrated 
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socialist ideology and successes as the publishers and distributors of these 
journals committed themselves to educating the working class. An “army of 
idle workers,” according to the Appeal to Reason, was “thinking, studying, 
asking questions, beginning to understand the cause.”4
The Appeal to Reason billed itself as a “pioneer propaganda paper,” cen-
tral to local organizing. “The Appeal Army is the backbone of the Socialist 
Party in America,” proclaimed the Girard, Kansas, paper. Circulation var-
ied, depending on election cycles, but it managed to break a single-issue 
publication record, as the staff was proud to remind readers, of 4.1 million 
copes.5
Based in Chicago, the International Socialist Review also played an 
important role in reporting regional and local events as well as in recruit-
ment and the discussion of issues. Published in Chicago from 1900 to 1918, 
it offered readers a “monthly journal of international socialist thought.” 
Yet the Review offered more than simply doctrine. In fact, reports of local 
activism and international socialist campaigns, struggles, and successes 
filled many of its pages.
If the Appeal to Reason and, to a lesser extent, the International Social-
ist Review represented, at least implicitly, Midwest sensibilities, New York’s 
The Masses typified a more urban and cosmopolitan take on socialism and 
society. The Masses blended socialism with discussions of feminism, litera-
ture, race, and the arts during its publication from 1911 to 1917. Its illustra-
tions not only celebrated the labor cause but also resoundingly attacked war 
and the conflict in Europe, ultimately leading to the publication’s demise. 
What The Masses, Appeal to Reason, and International Socialist Review all 
demonstrated was the ability of an active socialist and radical labor press 
to distinguish the SPA as a legitimate alternative to the Democratic, Repub-
lican, and Progressive parties. In addition, the Left’s newspapers created a 
sounding board for ideology and grassroots activity.6
Inking the Left: Cartoons
In the pages of these effective radical newspapers and journals appeared 
another important mechanism of socialist culture: the cartoon. Socialist car-
toonists, Ryan Walker, John F. Hart, and Art Young among them, used their 
work with great effectiveness to both enhance and legitimize the socialist 
message. They mocked financiers and capitalists, celebrated candidates and 
electoral successes, and chided ignorant and uninformed laborers.
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Ryan Walker, the chief cartoonist for the Appeal to Reason and later an 
illustrator for the socialist New York Call, drew countless pieces. Walker, 
a man Eugene Debs accurately described as “clever and resourceful,” had 
worked as a cartoonist for the Kansas City Times and St. Louis Republic 
before joining the Appeal in 1911. He quickly became one of the more 
prolific cartoonists for the socialist cause, with his most popular character, 
named Henry Dubb, illustrating the trials and tribulations of the rank-and-
file worker.7 One 1912 cartoon for the Appeal to Reason depicts Theodore 
Roosevelt moving closer to a worker saying, “I love you as a brother! I’m 
Moses sent to save you from socialism.” Behind Roosevelt’s back, though, 
is a spiked club labeled “capitalism.” The clever caption reads, “Speak softly 
and carry a big stick.” For years Walker offered those who were sympathetic 
to socialism, and even those less sympathetic, biting critiques of the capi-
talist system.
Similarly, cartoonist Art Young took aim at greedy landowners and ill-
informed farmers. In a 1922 illustration, a man in a top hat and suit walks 
away from a farmer carrying a basket full of corn labeled “the fat of the land.” 
The farmer is shown scratching his head, left with only a pile of husks. “The 
Boss: Don’t think; stay on the job,” jabs the caption. Socialist cartoons not 
only pointed up labor’s plight, as the Young example indicates; they also 
mocked labor’s opponents, political and otherwise, but they sometimes 
attacked those who were “for labor.” A Chicago Socialist cartoon, for example, 
depicts AFL head Samuel Gompers as a dog, complete with a dollar-sign 
tail blocking a bridge to socialism.8
Cartoons lampooning socialism’s message and pervasiveness also 
appeared in the mainstream press. Spokane’s Spokesman-Review printed 
a satirical look at socialism in a 1908 cartoon. The caricature depicts an 
ailing Uncle Sam with a neck tumor of “socialism.” Meanwhile, Theodore 
Roosevelt, labeled “Doctor Roosevelt,” stands nearby and offers an elixir of 
his “reform remedy” to aid Uncle Sam’s “problem.”9
The socialist cartoon served as an effective tool in educating the 
masses and deriding opponents. Many who were curious about socialism 
read articles in periodicals or even took “study courses” with pamphlets 
and books by Marx and Debs. But cartoons persisted as an approachable 
and effective device. They had a lasting legacy, too, as the political state-
ments in cartoons pioneered new approaches. The Masses, some believe, 
originated the ubiquitous one-line cartoon popularized later by the New 
Yorker.10
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Composing for the Left: Songs
The real work of socialists, particularly in specific communities, occurred at 
and around the “local.” Devised as chapters, locals held meetings, distributed 
literature, collected dues, and sponsored events. At local meetings, another 
important element of labor’s culture was the song. Labor songs, in the words 
of historian Clark Halker, served as “the cultural documents of the work-
ing class.” Since the advent of the Knights of Labor in the mid-nineteenth 
century, songs proved important in building solidarity among a varied labor 
movement. They also assisted, like the socialist press, in articulating labor’s 
objects and aspirations. The popularity of labor song-poems seemed to par-
allel the highs of the labor movement’s success. In other words, when songs 
enjoyed their greatest popularity and use, labor and the SPA had their most 
notable successes at the ballot box.11
Socialists boasted a number of central tunes. In a 1901 compilation of 
forty-eight socialist songs, compiler and publisher Charles Kerr proclaimed, 
“We American socialists are only beginning to sing.” And sing they did. 
Socialist musical compositions such as “True Freedom,” “I Will Join the Party 
Mother,” and “No Master,” often sung at party encampments, typified how 
songs provided unity for activists. Accordingly, songs remained an impor-
tant part of the political culture and gatherings. Socialists often attended 
local-sponsored encampments, meetings that took place over several days 
and nights. At this kind of event, voices also rang out. Many of the songs 
had Populist roots, and participants sang them to the tune of something 
recognizable. For instance, they sang their beloved “Red Flag” to the tune 
of “Maryland My Maryland.” It celebrated the determined socialist spirit in 
its chorus: “Then raise the scarlet standard high; Within its shade we’ll live 
and die. / Though cowards flinch and traitors sneer, We’ll keep the red flag 
flying here.”12
Despite their hopes for a homogeneous working-class movement, social-
ists did not always agree on doctrine or strategies. They were often divided 
into the “Reds,” the most radical, class-conscious, Marxist, revolutionary 
socialists, and the “Yellows,” who advocated gradual public ownership 
campaigns and held union-friendly positions. Nevertheless, socialists could 
agree on song. At the 1912 SPA convention, amid factionalism that helped 
destroy the party from within, disagreeing delegates took time to sing the 
“Marseillaise” and “Red Flag” during hotly contested vote counts on amend-
ments. Although some socialists believed that socialist ideology, not song, 
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provided the best means of understanding the relationship between capital 
and labor, labor songs lingered as a valuable method of disseminating pro-
paganda and fostering culture.13
The IWW, too, used songs, such as those gathered in the popular Little 
Red Songbook (1916), to encourage working-class solidarity. Poets and 
songwriters including Joe Hill, Ralph Chaplin, T-Bone Slim, and Harry 
McClintock gave the Wobblies spirited and at times sarcastic tunes of soli-
darity. On their way to a 1908 IWW meeting, John Walsh led an “Overalls 
Brigade” of workers aboard a seized cattle car they dubbed the “Red Special.” 
Holding rallies and distributing literature as they traveled east, the group 
sang songs from sheets they also sold. These song sheets were precursors to 
the titles compiled in the Little Red Songbook.14
As composers and organizers understood, song offered an approach-
able medium for ideology. Joe Hill, famed IWW songwriter, understood 
the song’s power: “A pamphlet, no matter how good, is never read more 
than once, but a song is learned by heart and repeated over and over; and 
I maintain that if a person can put a few cold, common sense facts into a 
song, and dress them up in a cloak of humor to take the dryness off of them, 
he will succeed in reaching a great number of workers who are too unintel-
ligent to read a pamphlet or an editorial on economic science.” Hill did his 
part for the cause, penning a number of songs for the Little Red Songbook, 
including famous pieces such as “The Preacher and the Slave” and a parody 
of the Salvation Army’s tune “In the Sweet Bye and Bye”: “Workingmen of 
all countries unite; Side by side we for freedom will fight.” Songs remained 
a central part of IWW culture. Even in his last years in Moscow, Big Bill 
Haywood welcomed guests to his hotel room, where, according to Melvyn 
Dubofsky, the group went “through the Little Red Song Book until they col-
lapsed in a drunken stupor.”15
Writing for the Left: Literature
In addition to newspapers, cartoons, and songs, fiction with socialist mes-
sages stood as one final piece in socialist culture. In books, poetry, and other 
literary forms, authors creatively mixed literature with propaganda. Utopian 
or broadly socialist literature, such as Edward Bellamy’s 1888 book Looking 
Backward, also remained important to the popularization of socialist prin-
ciples. The book tells the tale of Julian West, a late-nineteenth-century Bos-
ton aristocrat. West has trouble sleeping and constructs a basement sleeping 
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area. When a fire destroys his home he awakes, à la Rip Van Winkle, to the 
futuristic Boston of 2000. The book chronicles his wonder and amazement 
at a society without want, one of divided labor, social and economic equality, 
and harmony. Organizers took this work to heart. They formed “Bellamy 
Clubs,” and the book brought many to socialism. J. F. Mabie, one of the most 
active socialist organizers in Montana, explained his conversion to social-
ism: “In 1902 I read Bellamy’s Looking Backward[.] I discovered myself and 
from that time called myself a socialist.”16
Pieces of popular socialist fiction sometimes got their start in periodicals. 
The Appeal to Reason regularly featured implicitly political works of poetry 
and prose. The caliber of the authors is striking. The Appeal boasted works 
from Stephen Crane, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Edward Bellamy, and Jack 
London. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle first appeared as a serial in the Appeal 
to Reason. In late 1904 Appeal editor Fred Warren took a chance on Sinclair 
and gave the author a $500 advance. For seven weeks Sinclair lived among 
Chicago’s packinghouses, researching his novel about exploited workers 
and the unsanitary conditions. When the novel appeared in the Appeal to 
Reason’s pages in 1905, editors believed the readership doubled or even 
tripled. The Jungle came out in book form the next year, but the Appeal to 
Reason is where it got its start.
Even Portland, Oregon’s John Reed, founder of and columnist for The 
Masses, became involved with celebratory travel literature. Reed (immortal-
ized by Warren Beatty in the 1981 film Reds) holds the distinction of being 
buried in the Kremlin wall in Moscow’s Red Square. As an on-the-scene 
chronicler of the Bolshevik Revolution, Reed provided a firsthand account 
of those events in his seminal 1919 work Ten Days that Shook the World. 
Reed penned the book, which boasted an introduction by Lenin in the 1922 
printing, while working on assignment for The Masses.
Labor’s Voice in Popular Culture
Through socialist newspapers, cartoons, songs, and literature, radical labor 
gained, in the first years of the twentieth century, a foothold as a legitimate 
third-party voice for labor. During this turbulent era, as historian Stephen 
Skowronek contends, the fight became one for power and control over new 
bureaucratic and administrative systems, and third-party political oppor-
tunity proliferated. Socialists had successfully positioned themselves as the 
third-party voice for American labor. Socialism in the United States achieved 
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its greatest electoral success in 1912, when socialist presidential candidate 
Eugene Debs mustered 5.9 percent of the national vote. No other socialist 
contender in American history has managed to gain such a significant por-
tion of the electorate’s support. Even as socialists and their agenda remained 
fervently radical, their ideological and political positions did not hinder 
socialist political legitimacy. In fact, as historian Stephen Diner observes, 
socialists seemed unchallenged in their ability to keep “‘the labor question’ 
as a central issue in the policy debates of the Progressive Era.” And it was 
their effective use of media and cultural representations that strengthened 
their movement.17
For socialists, Wobblies, and others on the Left, some of the very media 
that helped bring success proved devastating. On the eve of World War I, as 
suspicions mounted about “radicals” infiltrating the country, repression of 
leftist political dissent reached a fevered pitch as fervent patriots increasingly 
labeled radicals, socialists, and antiwar advocates as disloyal troublemakers. 
Consequently, the federal government initiated several antiradical measures. 
The Espionage Act of June 1917, the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 
1917, and the Sedition Act of May 1918 all targeted radicals through restric-
tions on speech and expression. America’s socialists immediately felt the sting 
of these events. The socialist press had always experienced some backlash. 
Staff at the Seattle, Washington, Public Library, for example, barred the Inter-
national Socialist Review after a member of its board of trustees deemed the 
journal “hot stuff.” Library officials also called the Review’s language “too 
intemperate.” The “intemperate” Review editors had an answer. “No doubt 
the Ladies’ Home Journal is safer,” quipped the Review, “saner and milder 
mental pabulum for sissys in general and capitalist lackeys in particular.” 
But by World War I, the Espionage Act and Trading with the Enemy Act 
had dire consequences for the socialist press. These acts authorized postal 
officials to deny postage to disloyal publications. By the middle of 1917 post 
offices regularly denied distribution to the International Socialist Review and 
Appeal to Reason. Later in the year authorities blacklisted approximately 
sixty papers nationally.18
Interestingly and ironically, during this famed period of the “Red scare” 
(1918–1919), cartoons helped demonize “radicals.” During and after World 
War I, socialists faced continued opposition and discrimination, often in 
print, that portrayed them as disloyal and violent. The doors to “free gov-
ernment,” in one 1919 Outlook cartoon, characterized the crackdown on 
radicalism, with “anarchy” and “murder” left outside. A 1919 New York Eve-
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ning World cartoon showed the IWW digging under “industry” and “labor,” 
leaving them unbalanced and sabotaging their work; in other words, 
radical Wobblies had undermined the cause of workers. Some cartoonists 
understood that socialism was under fire. In one Outlook piece, published 
in January 1920, a sketch of a cat, named “socialism,” was bandaged with 
dressings labeled “expulsion” and “criticism.” As the cat meowed, the cap-
tion read, “the cat with the nine lives.” The era of the Red scare and the per-
secution that came with it sent socialists and other radical labor advocates 
scurrying, for good reason. The SPA and IWW saw considerable declines 
in membership and never fully recovered from these critiques that took the 
form of government policy as well as media attacks.19
For socialists, Wobblies, and the ranks of radical labor in the Gilded 
Age and Progressive Era, the connections between the use of approachable 
and direct media, in lieu of Marxist thought and ideology, and their politi-
cal and organizational success were sizable. As much as “typical” organizing 
activities galvanized their leftist movements, print media, cartoons, songs, 
and other literature propagated their cause with great efficacy. Today, those 
on the Left employ literature, other published media, and cultural images 
for radicalization efforts—just as their activist predecessors did—to point 
up the strained relationship between capital and labor.
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IrAq Is ArAbIC For vIe tnAm
The Evolution of Protest Songs in Popular Music from 
Vietnam to Iraq
Jerry Rodnitzky
Mark Twain supposedly noted: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but sometimes 
it rhymes.” In comparing the Vietnam War to the Iraq war of the past five 
years, George W. Bush is hardly a Lyndon Johnson, and Saddam Hussein 
isn’t vaguely similar to Ho Chi Minh. However, Vietcong guerrilla tactics 
are similar to Iraqi insurgent techniques, and both wars deeply entrenched 
America in a foreign civil war. Indeed, the most appropriate antiwar bum-
per sticker cementing the two wars might read: “How Many Vietnamese or 
Iraqis Died in the American Civil War?”1
Even if the U.S. government learned nothing from the Vietnam fiasco, 
protesters against the Iraq war have. The anti–Iraq war protest songs 
rhyme with the Vietnam War protest songs in some ways, but they have 
their own unique style, viewpoints, rationale, and substance. They build 
on the past but reflect the present. For example, Iraq war protesters don’t 
disrespect the troops in any way; they center on the commander in chief. 
The big difference in the two wars can be pinpointed with one name and 
one event—Osama bin Laden and 9/11. The simultaneous war in Afghani-
stan clearly involves American security, as the Vietnam War never did. 
Also, there is no draft now, the casualties are much lower, and the high 
costs of war are being paid for by deficit. Meanwhile, income taxes have 
actually been cut.
Protests against the Vietnam War by young college students were 
immersed in unspoken guilt. They were, after all, hiding behind their student 
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deferments while the neighborhood gas station attendant had been drafted. 
Clearly Vietnam was no real threat to America, so many young protesters 
asked themselves: why didn’t the draftees at least question conscription, 
rather than blindly cooperating with this illegitimate war? The unspoken 
assumption was not that the conscripts were patriotic, but that they were not 
very bright. Thus, on many campuses, both the ROTC and military recruit-
ers were attacked or picketed. Many Vietnam protest songs such as “Fixin’ 
to Die Rag” by Country Joe and the Fish presented the troops as mindless 
victims of an even more mindless political administration. The war seemed 
so pointless that many Vietnam protest songs adopted the pacifist view that 
all wars are stupid and immoral.2
Pacifism and Protest Songs
Many protest singers against the Vietnam War, such as Joan Baez, Tom Pax-
ton, and Phil Ochs, identified with pacifism because of their involvement 
with Martin Luther King’s nonviolent civil rights movement. Also, singing 
protest marchers reflected a communal pacifist spirit manifested in slogans 
such as “Make love, not war.” However, on August 30, 1968, Baez jokingly 
admitted on television (on Les Crane’s show) that she once told a Berkeley 
protest crowd: “Be nonviolent or I’ll kill you.”
Yet some pacifist songs of the later 1960s had double-edged lyrics that 
mirrored the ambivalent nonviolence common to the youthful activists. 
While these songs spoke eloquently for nonviolence, they also warned of 
“the fire next time.” Behind the New Testament gentleness was a violent Old 
Testament image of a wrathful, avenging Jehovah. For example, Phil Ochs’s 
songs were usually pacifist but often harbored veiled threats of violence in 
tone and lyrics. In “Links on the Chain” Ochs sang that past violent union 
struggles had taught his generation “you gotta fight” and strike “to get what 
you are owed.” More than anyone, Ochs traced the rising youthful tides of 
both idealistic pacifism and frustrated violence, while suggesting the close 
relationships between the two.3
As Ochs and others moved closer to the young “New Left,” they reflected 
the inconsistent position of antimilitarism and pacifism at home, coupled 
with a call for revolutionary guerrilla warfare in several developing coun-
tries. Even Pete Seeger, a pacifist in most of his songs, had joined the U.S. 
Army during World War II. And in his best anti-Vietnam song, “Bring 
Them Home,” Seeger notes that he is not “really a pacifist” because if his 
Iraq Is Arabic for Vietnam 205
country were invaded as Vietnam had been, you would find him “out on 
the firing line.”4
Also, small, infamous groups such as the Black Panthers and the 
Weathermen’s Students for a Democratic Society faction claimed the right 
to violent protest and retaliation. Yet John Lennon’s 1969 pacifist hit “Give 
Peace a Chance” seemed to sum up the general mood of the war protesters. 
That same year Bobby Darin (usually nonpolitical) wrote “Simple Song of 
Freedom,” a ringing pacifist song with the key chorus line “We the people 
here don’t want a war.” The song was covered by Tim Hardin in 1969 and 
became a big hit with protesters.5
The Iraq war has not particularly encouraged pacifism. The 9/11 
attacks generally negated both pacifism and the view that small, relatively 
weak countries such as Afghanistan cannot be dangerous to America. 
And the American troops in Iraq were sometimes the same troops fight-
ing in Afghanistan and searching for those who had supported the attack 
on America. Thus Iraq protest songs have centered on the political leaders 
who deliberately used misinformation to trick us into engaging in a stupid, 
unnecessary war and were now keeping us there. My purpose here is not to 
argue about the rationales for the two wars but to note the differences and 
similarities in their respective protest songs to show how they have evolved, 
for good or bad.
In 1965, history and the accelerating Vietnam War brought America 
into dangerous waters. President Lyndon Johnson had accepted the Penta-
gon’s argument that the war could be won with large numbers of American 
ground troops and massive airpower. Whereas discrimination had harmed 
African Americans, embarrassed the nation, and fueled civil rights protest 
songs, the Vietnam War was lethal to young Americans black and white. 
The civil rights issues had been relatively simple to argue; Vietnam was far 
more complex and divisive. The war merged issues of patriotism, anticom-
munism, and world peace, and it splintered traditional American political 
and class alliances. The clearest division on the war was between young 
and old. Antiwar slogans such as “Make love, not war” and “Don’t trust 
anyone over 30” were hardly directed toward older Americans. The war 
slowly destroyed Johnson’s administration and his political career, and it 
left his successor, Richard Nixon, with a war-torn nation that he could not 
bring together.
Glen Campbell’s cover of Buffy Sainte-Marie’s 1965 pacifist song “Uni-
versal Soldier” was the best example of early public distaste for the war, as 
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it rose to the top-ten list. Yet ironically, as the war accelerated, Campbell 
pointedly rejected pacifism and said, “Any man who would not fight for his 
country is not a real man.” And later that year the California-based rock 
duo Jan and Dean parodied “Universal Soldier” in a song titled ”Universal 
Coward,” about a coward who ran “from Uncle Sam” and ran “from Viet-
nam.” This was one of the few pro-war rock songs.6
Although specific protest songs no longer made the top-forty charts 
after 1965, as the antiwar movement grew, songwriters such as Phil Ochs, 
Pete Seeger, and Tom Paxton led the way with a stream of very specific 
anti-Vietnam protest songs. They also encouraged a host of younger protest 
songwriters. Perhaps the most controversial antiwar song was Pete Seeger’s 
“Waist Deep in the Big Muddy.” It tells the story of a 1942 army platoon 
being pushed by its captain to ford a dangerously deep river. The punch line 
notes that “the big fool” told his men “to push on.” It was clearly a parable 
about Vietnam, and the “big fool” was obviously Lyndon Johnson. Seeger 
sang the song in 1967 on the Smothers Brothers television show, but CBS 
censored it because Seeger refused to omit the last verse, which tied the song 
to Vietnam and Johnson. In response to protests against network censor-
ship, CBS finally permitted the song to be sung in full in January 1968 on 
the Smothers Brothers. Also on the Smothers Brother that year, Joan Baez 
was allowed to dedicate a song to her husband, David Harris, but she was 
not allowed to say that he was in prison for refusing the draft. In late 1968, 
after the CBS Nightly News (anchored by Walter Cronkite) became sharply 
critical of the Vietnam War, antiwar censorship on television was much less 
of a problem. Thus, on a 1969 Smothers Brothers show, Seeger was allowed 
to sing “Bring Them Home,” a direct call for America to bring home its 
troops and end the war.7
Antiwar songs were generally not played on the radio because stations 
did not want to alienate any listeners, but protest singers continued to record 
them. Among the best Vietnam protest songs were two of Tom Paxton’s from 
1966: “Lyndon Johnson Told the Nation,” which satirizes Johnson’s duplicity 
in explaining the war to Americans, and “We Didn’t Know,” which compares 
Americans’ unawareness of Vietnam atrocities with Germans who claimed 
they didn’t know about Nazi war crimes. Also noteworthy was Holly Near’s 
1969 song “Hang in There,” which pictures the Vietnamese rebels as long-
suffering patriots, and the still popular Country Joe McDonald song “Fixin’ 
to Die Rag.” McDonald’s song was featured at Woodstock, but it became even 
better known when it was covered by The New Bohemians on the sound 
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track for the 1989 anti-Vietnam film Born on the Fourth of July. Near per-
formed on the antiwar GI coffeehouse circuit with actors Jane Fonda and 
Donald Sutherland.8
Many antiwar songs had mixed or hazy messages. Good examples are 
John Lennon’s 1970 “Imagine” and Melanie’s 1970 “Candles in the Rain.” 
Like Lennon’s 1969 hit “Give Peace a Chance,” “Imagine” is pacifist, but it also 
attacks nationalism, religion, and wealth in favor of universal togetherness. 
“Candles in the Rain” describes Melanie Safka’s experience at a candlelight 
anti-Vietnam protest on a rainy night in the nation’s capital. But since this 
top-forty song’s vague themes of peace and brotherhood are never explicitly 
tied to the war, few listeners knew what it was really about, and this made it 
playable on national radio. Many obscure yet interesting anti-Vietnam songs 
were collected in The Vietnam Songbook, compiled by left-wing folk protest 
professionals Barbara Dane and Irwin Silber in 1969. It provides words and 
music for more than 100 protest songs against the Vietnam War.9
Both wars featured presidential lies and cover-ups, but since the 1990s, 
comedians and songwriters have felt free to attack the president, which made 
George W. Bush even more vulnerable than Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon. 
All three presidents were caught in the same trap. Once American lives were 
lost, none could admit the mistake and withdraw, because that would have 
been political suicide. The more soldiers who were killed, the more necessity 
a victory became to prove that their lives had not been lost in vain.
Yet songwriters were somewhat slower to protest the Iraq war because it 
followed the less costly Gulf War of 1990, the 9/11 attacks, and the contro-
versial but very successful overthrow of Saddam Hussein in the 2003 Iraq 
war. The wars of 1990 and 2003 had been accomplished with relatively few 
casualties. Indeed, many Americans saw the interventions in the Persian 
Gulf as “splendid little wars”—a phrase used to describe the 1898 Spanish-
American War, which also resulted in few casualties. In contrast, protesters 
had early on compared the Vietnam War to the catastrophic Korean War, 
and protest songs appeared as soon as the American “technical advisers” to 
the South Vietnamese army turned into American combatants.
Pro-War Anti-Protest Songs
The best-known pro–Vietnam War songs were not so much pro war as anti 
protester. Good examples were Merle Haggard’s “Okie from Muskogee” and 
“Fightin’ Side of Me,” which crudely put down and threatened campus war 
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protesters.10 Most criticism of protest music has come from the political 
Right. And especially since 1945, left-wing songwriters have perpetuated the 
myth that protest songs are always humanitarian, leftist attacks against the 
status quo. But clearly, Ku Klux Klan political songs do not fit this descrip-
tion, nor do Nazi songs. In the 1960s, however, conservative country songs 
made popular music an ideological battleground. Today, fifty-somethings 
usually remember antiwar protest songs and acid-rock music, but they have 
forgotten 1960s conservative country songs.
Country music did not emerge commercially on records until the 1920s, 
so World War II was its first chance to demonstrate its fervent patriotism. 
And from 1941 through the 1950s, country songs uncritically supported 
America’s troops and foreign policy. During the Korean War, country 
songs by popular singers such as Ernest Tubb criticized communism and 
championed America’s hard-line cold war stance. Not surprisingly, 1960s 
country songs immediately supported the Vietnam War. For example, 
Johnny Wright’s recording “Hello Vietnam” made the top country chart in 
1965. It was followed by pro-war songs such as “Vietnam Blues,” written by 
Kris Kristofferson and recorded by Dave Dudley. But Kristofferson steadily 
moved Left and actually recorded an anti–Iraq war song, “In the News,” in 
2006. Pat Boone’s country recording of “Wish You Were Here, Buddy” in 
1966 features a soldier in Vietnam ridiculing protesters and threatening to 
come looking for them after the war.11
The biggest pro-war hit was Sergeant Barry Saddler’s “Ballad of the 
Green Berets.” Saddler, an actual Green Beret, sang it on the Ed Sullivan 
Show in January 1966, and by March it was number one on the Billboard 
chart as a country crossover. By the late 1960s conservative songs no lon-
ger mentioned the war specifically but instead concentrated on criticizing 
unpatriotic protesters. The previously mentioned Merle Haggard songs 
are good examples, as is Ernest Tubb’s 1969 tune “It’s America: Love It or 
Leave It.” “Love It or Leave It” became a popular patriotic bumper sticker 
during this period, but it also led to the most popular American Indian 
movement bumper sticker: “America: Love It or Give It Back.” Perhaps the 
most controversial pro-Vietnam country song was “The Battle Hymn of 
Lt. Calley,” recorded by Terry Nelson and C Company in 1971. The song 
defends the court-martialed Calley for his part in the 1968 My Lai mas-
sacre of Vietnamese civilians. Major record companies refused to release 
the song, providing certain proof that the musical struggle over the war 
was over.12
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The Decline and Revitalization of Protest Songs
Protest songs in general declined in the 1970s as the Vietnam War wound 
down, and they have never fully recovered. In the late 1960s some singers 
such as Judy Collins gave up protest music because they no longer wanted to 
be musical political agitators, constantly facing the same audiences they rec-
ognized from the last rally. Increasingly singers began to feel that they were 
preaching to the choir. Even earlier, in 1965, Bob Dylan suddenly stopped 
writing protest songs of any kind and declared his artistic independence 
from movements and issues. Dylan made it crystal clear in the song “My 
Back Pages,” which proclaims that he had oversimplified right and wrong 
in his earlier songs and become what he hates most—a preacher.
Also, the combination of folk music and rock, labeled folk-rock, brought 
hazy message songs to teenagers and the best-selling singles chart. Good 
examples are Dylan’s “Mr. Tambourine Man” and Paul Simon’s “Sounds of 
Silence.” These were really do-it-yourself protest songs, since listeners could 
read many different issues into them. By saying everything, they in effect 
said nothing. Folk and topical music still highlighted specific issues. After 
1975, however, there were few well-defined mass social movements to tie 
them to. Yet, ever since the 1960s, music has continued to have a mesmer-
izing grip on American youth. Frank Zappa said it best in 1967 when he 
noted that many youths are loyal to neither “flag, country, or doctrine,” but 
only to music.13
Some very popular singer-songwriters of the 1970–2000 era, such as 
Bruce Springsteen and Billy Joel, still wrote songs with social messages. For 
example, in 1983 Billy Joel sang songs about victimized Vietnam troops in 
“Goodnight Saigon” and displaced Ohio factory workers in “Allentown.” 
Springsteen, who personally opposed the Vietnam War, often wrote songs 
that highlighted problems of blue-collar Americans and became steadily 
more politically active. However, these constituted only a small part of their 
work, given their numerous songs about personal love and heartache.
A few somewhat less popular singers who had been affected by folk 
protest in the 1960s while growing up continued to write subtle message 
songs, along with some personal ones. Good examples are John Prine in 
the 1970s, Charlie King in the 1980s, and Iris Dement in the 1990s. All 
three became known as singer-songwriters or sometimes just country 
singers, because nobody knew what to call singers who played acoustic 
guitar with electronic backup bands. The generic singer-songwriter label 
Celebrity musical activist and working-class hero Bruce Springsteen, known 
affectionately as “The Boss” to his fans, confronts politics and political power 
in songs such as “Born in the USA,” “American Skin (41 Shots),” and “The 
Rising.” (MovieGoods)
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was also pinned on some of those who wrote lyrics with a social message 
or in a poetic style.
The 1985 Live Aid concert, Willie Nelson’s Farm Aid concerts since the 
1980s, and even Bruce Springsteen’s Rock the Vote concerts in 2004 and 2008 
all took place in a political vacuum. Most concertgoers went to hear famous 
performers play their most popular songs, not to support causes. Springsteen 
is likely the most politically active of these singers. Yet all these performers 
(now including Sheryl Crow—a surprising Obama supporter in 2008) are 
really celebrity musical activists, not protest singers or writers.14 
Without famous singers to consistently champion them, protest songs 
mostly floundered in the shadowy, fringe folk revival nurtured by folk fes-
tivals and the coffeehouse circuit since the mid-1970s. If this movement 
had a starting point, it was the Kerrville Folk Festival in Kerrville, Texas, 
close to San Antonio. The first festival in June 1972 attracted 2,800 fans 
from around the United States. In 1990 attendance reached 25,000, and the 
festival ran for eighteen days.15
After 1972 protest music existed largely within this folk music move-
ment—itself a very small segment of the burgeoning popular music indus-
try. Although most songs described as folk music were very personal, a 
few touched on broad social and political problems. At least once every 
decade there was a song so “protesty,” such as Iris Dement’s “Wasteland of 
the Free” in 1996, that it cataloged America’s faults. This 1960s flashback 
criticized commercial religion, schools, CEOs’ pay, job outsourcing, and, 
more notably, the Gulf War, while supporting war resisters. It concluded 
that America now blamed its “troubles on the poor,” a “Hitler remedy” that 
made America the “Wasteland of the Free.”16
Since the 1990s folk music flourished only in coffeehouses and at small 
record companies such as Philo, Rounder, and later Red House. A few older, 
more popular folk artists such as Mary Chapin Carpenter and Emmylou 
Harris recorded on major labels and performed in large auditoriums, but 
they were usually seen as country artists. Coffeehouses were a throwback 
to the small 1960s folk clubs, which often featured protest songs and sprang 
up near college campuses in coffee shops, taverns, and sometimes churches. 
The performer generally received only a few hundred dollars a night and 
the right to sell his or her recordings.
By touring nationwide and developing personal mailing lists or Web 
sites, folk performers often organized small but devoted fan clubs. One can-
not judge their social effect by the number of records they sold or the size 
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of the audiences they attracted. Their songs often influenced more popular 
performers. Even when their songs were not covered, they may have subtly 
influenced socially conscious singers such as Bruce Springsteen or Willie 
Nelson, just as largely unknown folksingers had influenced Bob Dylan in 
the early 1960s.
Another genre that subtly replaced protest songs was satiric songs. By the 
1980s, satire, whether on talk shows, in cartoons, or in songs, had become 
more politically effective than editorials or speeches in shaping mass politi-
cal opinion. Perhaps the best example of musical political satire is the path-
breaking Washington, D.C., group the Capitol Steps. This group originated in 
1981 as sixteen young Washington staffers—male and female, Democrat and 
Republican. They poked fun at everything political (but especially presidents) 
with clever, wicked satire. They usually used popular rock music and stand-
ard tunes for political parody—a process known as adaptation. Thus Dolly 
Parton’s hit “Working 9 to 5” became a song satirizing President Reagan’s 
work habits, titled “Workin’ 9 to 10.” And “Puff the Magic Dragon” became 
“Dutch the Magic Reagan” (about Reagan’s political magic). All subsequent 
presidents have received the same irreverent treatment.17
The folk and satiric traditions developed in the 1980s and 1990s were 
still the major platforms for protest songs after the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003. As the United States became increasingly bogged down in 
Iraq’s civil war, the first specific protest songs against the Iraq war surfaced. 
They came from coffeehouse folksingers such as Eliza Gilkyson in 2004. 
A year later some older, somewhat fading celebrity singers, notably Neil 
Young and John Mellencamp, also wrote antiwar songs, but they attracted 
little attention.
Gilkyson put her bright, subtle song “Hiway 9” on her 2004 CD, Land of 
Milk and Honey. The song uses an actual highway in Iraq to cleverly criticize 
the war and its architects. She set the pattern for many future anti–Iraq war 
songs. The song never mentions Bush or any specific leader by name, but it 
clearly identifies him with phrases such as “his daddy’s kin,” “chickenhawks,” 
and “neocons” (chickenhawks are men who talk and act warlike but escaped 
combat themselves). Gilkyson never even says Iraq in the song. Instead, she 
calls it the land between “the Tigris and Euphrates,” where “the white god” 
is going to “liberate” the population and its oil. The song also asks “whose 
tax dollar” will pay for the war, “yours or mine?”18
Gilkyson also took direct aim at Bush on her next CD, Paradise Hotel, 
with a song titled “Man of God.” Again without mentioning Bush by name, 
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she sings about a “cowboy from the “West” with a “bulletproof vest” and a 
“big war chest.” She characterizes him as a fake man of God by comparing 
him with Jesus, and she accuses him of hiding “bodies” from “view” while 
channeling wealth toward “the chosen few.” Each chorus reminds us that 
these are not the actions of a man of God. In an artistic way, reminiscent 
of Bob Dylan’s protest songs, Gilkyson’s two songs pioneered the style and 
substance of the anti-Iraq protest songs that followed. She said she felt an 
urgent need to write “Man of God” to separate “true Christians, who really 
fashion their lives after . . . Christ,” from those with a “wrathful warring 
mentality.” Gilkyson lives in Austin, Texas—a somewhat unlikely center for 
antiwar activity. Another irony is that her more successful folksinger father, 
Terry Gilkyson, the writer of “Puff the Magic Dragon” and other hits, clearly 
shied away from political controversy in the 1950s and 1960s.19
Earlier, three more well known Texas singers—the Dixie Chicks—inad-
vertently made themselves more famous as war protesters. At a March 2003 
concert in London, England, band member Natalie Maines said, “We’re 
ashamed the president of the United States is from Texas.” The Chicks were 
immediately called traitors, terrorist sympathizers, and worse by many 
country music fans—their fan base. Chick Emily Robison thought it was 
part sexism, noting, “We were made into these traitorous sluts. A guy would 
have been an outlaw.”20 This incident also showed that many Americans 
considered it traitorous to criticize any American president while abroad. 
This geopolitical nationalism shows why Neil Young, a Canadian citizen, 
and Mick Jagger, a Brit, had little currency in America as antiwar singers. 
However, the Chicks made new fans, and their notoriety and antiwar posi-
tion put them on the cover of Time magazine on May 29, 2006.
Country music had defended past unpopular wars such as Korea and 
Vietnam by identifying them with patriotism. And after 9/11 many country 
singers such as Toby Keith followed that tradition and supported the war 
with patriotic, aggressive songs that waved the flag and threatened America’s 
enemies, including war protesters. Keith’s 2002 song “The Angry American 
(Courtesy of the Red, White and Blue)” and his 2003 ballad “The Taliban 
Song” were good early examples. They were similar to the pro–Vietnam 
War songs but had an added urgency provided by 9/11. However, by late 
2006 many country songs by popular artists began to center on tragic songs 
about troops who questioned the war and their loved ones left behind. Good 
examples include “If I Don’t Make it Back” by Tracy Lawrence and “Come 
Home Soon” by SheDaisy. Daryl Worley, who wrote “Have You Forgotten” 
214 Jerry Rodnitzky
in 2003, supporting the war, wrote in 2006 about a soldier who just came 
back from a place “where they hated me and everything I stand for.” These 
songs stop short of saying the war is a stupid mistake, but they don’t voice 
support either.21
Since the 1990s, the Internet has added a new musical dimension and 
base. Perhaps the most well-known antiwar song distributed free on the 
Internet is “Talking Chickenhawk Blues,” written and sung by Peter Dyer in 
2003. On his Web site, Dyer notes that the song “was written as a reaction 
. . . to the war being led by so many people who avoided the shooting when 
it was their time.” The song identifies Bush only as “chickenhawk #1,” the 
“leader of the nation” who “starts wars” but “never had to go.” Vice Presi-
dent Cheney is identified only as “chickenhawk #2,” who got out of service 
because his wife had a child and who helped start the first Gulf War and 
became a “millionaire along the way.” “Chickenhawk #3,” described only as 
a “roly-poly talk-show host” who could not “enlist” because a doctor wrote 
a note “about some anal cyst,” is obviously Rush Limbaugh, the conservative 
radio commentator. At last count, an Internet site listed some forty-eight 
little-known songs satirizing President Bush or his advisers. A good example 
is Chuck Brodsky’s “Liar Liar, Pants on Fire.”22
A more recent, influential, and very moving anti-Iraq song, “The Road 
of Good Intentions” by John Gorka, a veteran coffeehouse folksinger, became 
famous as an artistic YouTube video in December 2007. The subtle, poetic 
song doesn’t mention any names but clearly blames the war in Iraq on a 
White House that puts out “more fiction” than “Hollywood.” The video 
plays the song against photos of suffering Iraqis and U.S. soldiers and some 
of Bush and Cheney dancing with their wives. Gorka, whose father served 
in Vietnam, is very sympathetic to the troops. The song notes that while 
soldiers risk “their life and limb,” the leaders who “sent them marching” can 
“dance the night away.” The war is called a “tragic venture” that shocks you 
only when “the bill arrives.” Gorka’s song notes that on the road of good 
intentions, everything becomes “justified to hell.”23
Periodically one might find a song protesting the Iraq war by the likes of 
Bruce Springsteen, John Mellencamp, or even a hip-hop group. But whereas 
the best Vietnam protest songs were by famous folksingers such as Bob 
Dylan and Pete Seeger, the best Iraq protest songs have been by seasoned 
yet relatively unknown songwriters such as Eliza Gilkyson and John Gorka. 
The contemporary folk performers on the coffeehouse circuit are generally 
more polished and innovative than their predecessors because they built on 
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what the 1960s singers started. Several would have been famous in the 1960s, 
but so far, they lack a mass national audience. However, as history shows, 
what goes around often comes around. There may be another golden age of 
folk protest coming. Meanwhile, the best collection of subtle, artistic Iraq 
protest songs is 3 Ways to Live, which features Eliza Gilkyson and twelve 
other folksingers.24
The group satirizing President Bush’s handling of the war and his general 
image most effectively and consistently is the Capitol Steps. Even before Iraq, 
they satirized Bush as a managed president with two songs: “Son of a Bush” 
and “My Staff Belongs to Daddy.” A song titled “Don’t Go Faking Your Smart,” 
sung to the tune of Elton John’s “Don’t Go Breaking My Heart,” appeared on 
their 2002 CD, When Bush Comes to Shove, and questions Bush’s knowledge 
and intelligence. Since then, Between Iraq and a Hard Place (2003), Four More 
Years in the Bush Leagues (2004), and I’m So Indicted (2005) have mercilessly 
satirized the Iraq invasion, Bush’s problems in stabilizing Iraq, his general 
foreign policies, and his educational deficiencies. These clever, adaptive-style 
songs have become the most effective vehicle for protest songs. They are the 
musical equivalent of television’s political satire. The Capitol Steps are the 
new court jesters of our era. And even when political sarcasm and satire’s 
goal is entertainment, the main effect is often political.25
In the Vietnam era, protest songs found many people and conditions to blame 
for the war and thus were fairly complicated. Generals who advised sending 
troops and the silent majority of citizens were blamed, as well as presidents. 
In contrast, songs protesting the Iraq war blame only a managed president, 
his powerful vice president, and his political advisers. These songs constantly 
say, “Look at what those fools are doing,” taking the average citizen off the 
hook. The Vietnam generation often took personal responsibility. Young 
protesters more often said, “Look at what we’re doing.” In a democracy, citi-
zens as well as leaders are responsible. And Vietnam protest songs such as 
“We Didn’t Know,” comparing American voters to Germans who supported 
Hitler, make this precise point. It is a generational difference and a lesson 
worth learning. Many 1960s activists felt superior to older generations, both 
in their understanding of new issues and in their willingness to respond. The 
present generation doesn’t feel superiority or any special responsibility for 
change. Most college students oppose the war but don’t believe it is their job 
to stop it. And they don’t want too much political change before they cash 
in their degrees. Whereas the 1960s slogan was “Don’t trust anyone over 
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thirty,” for some survivors of that decade, the new slogan could be “Don’t 
trust anyone under fifty.”
The serious protest singers were on the fringes of mass culture in both 
eras, but their influence cannot be measured statistically, for there is a mul-
tiplier effect. The few people they inspire may be particularly vigorous and 
influential leaders of mass movements. And clearly, generations brought 
up on music can still learn things from songs—even from Bobby Darin’s 
“Simple Song of Freedom,” with its resounding chorus line: “We the people 
here don’t want a war.”
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hIP-hoP And rePresentIn’
Power, Voice, and Identity
Tanji Gilliam
In the introduction to Black Popular Culture, Gina Dent states the following: 
“Black Americans in the United States now have unprecedented access to 
cultural and economic capital. . . . We must therefore begin to analyze the 
relative power derived from our position as citizens, however unsatisfied, 
of these United States.”1 Here, Dent indirectly acknowledges that both the 
hip-hop and the film industries have renegotiated the status of blacks in 
American society. Blacks have entered these industries in increasing num-
bers as artists and executives, and blacks frequently inform the “subjects” 
of music and video projects. Furthermore, Dent introduces the notion 
of “power” and calls for an investigation of the various manifestations of 
power that oral and visual media have granted blacks in our postfilm era. 
She continues, “This means thinking through the hall of mirrors in which 
our cultural power gets projected as political power.”2
It is important to question the lack of distinction made by the American 
public between cultural presence (the actual amount of time blacks spend 
on TV and film screens) and political presence in formal government and 
other significant alternative political arenas. However, I would argue that 
the hall of mirrors Dent refers to isn’t the distorted reflection of conflated 
cultural and political representations alone. Hip-hop can be pervasive and 
political. However, the blanket generalization that all hip-hop is political is 
problematic. It is not necessarily wrong but troubling, because this declara-
tion is often made without a concrete consideration of how hip-hop’s politics 
manifests. It is my contention that hip-hop does not exist at either pole of 
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this continuum. Instead, it often wavers in the middle. It is therefore neither 
entirely political nor apolitical.
Here, I explore the multiple meanings of power hip-hop represents, par-
ticularly those notions that are invested in consciously locating hip-hop poli-
tics. Hip-hop cultural production does in fact hold the potential for political 
empowerment. However, many critics are crippled by preestablished defini-
tions of what political empowerment actually is.3 When scholars interrogate 
political voids in hip-hop culture, they are often disappointed by the seeming 
divorce of cultural participants from grassroots political organizing. Again, 
this connects directly back to Black Nationalist models of political behavior. 
These critics are not satisfied with the model of media “standing in” for the 
political agency of artists. Furthermore, these same critics express concern 
about hip-hop’s reliance on the commercial recording industry and other 
capitalist structures. Their disappointment over hip-hop’s commercialism, 
in addition to its lack of sustained grassroots activism and formal political 
participation such as campaigning, voting, or registering in a political party, 
discourages them from conceptualizing hip-hop as a political movement 
rather than as an artistic and cultural phenomenon.
Hip-hop culture responds to former pitfalls of representation in rather 
progressive ways. First, it presents a more balanced picture of class among 
its representatives than did earlier black cultural models.4 Second, hip-hop 
artists deliberately manipulate ideas of authenticity. Last, the “burden of 
representation,” as scholar Kobena Mercer terms it, is consciously affirmed 
in a manner that sometimes advances group interests and critiques the 
inequalities of black class disparities.5 When Lani Guinier notes, “By criti-
cally examining certain fundamental assumptions about representation, I 
hope to revive our political imagination,” the representation she refers to 
has to do with the politics of the vote.6 Likewise, when Guinier discusses 
a politics of representation, she calls for a revolution of formal political 
structures. Formal and cultural political concerns meet in hip-hop, with 
respect to black cultural representation. Guinier argues specifically for 
“group representation” in the wake of a society “deeply cleaved by issues of 
racial identity.”7 Although racial groups and cultural groups are certainly 
not analogous formations, I think Guinier’s theory can and should apply to 
hip-hop culture as well.
Adam Krims suggests that although rap music has historically been 
identified as a fundamental “element” of hip-hop culture, we should look at it 
now—in its late, “commodified,” and “globalized” form—as “media content” 
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exclusively.8 Here Krims attempts to separate industry rap productions from 
hip-hop culture. Krims’s investment in rap music as an “impure” product 
is troubling, particularly because it romanticizes underground or noncom-
mercial rap, and it unfairly divorces commercial rap artists from the culture 
that reared them.9 It separates the two arenas of music production and cir-
culation as if they always reflect competing interests. Rap produced within 
the context of music and other media industries does not always reflect 
all the concerns of the greater hip-hop community; however, it is unlikely 
that any one hip-hop artist represents the culture in a comprehensive way. 
By referring to rap as “impure,” Krims extends this logic to challenge the 
“realness” of rap representations and to deny the cultural convention of rap 
as “something that represents.” Hip-hop’s stake in self-representation often 
leads to the (mis)representation of various “cultural truths” because of its 
misuse of authenticity and the real.
Hip-hop’s representin’ results in part from rappers’ desire to identify 
regionally. Rap music, and hip-hop culture more broadly, is identified as 
an outgrowth of urban black and Latino communities. Rappers’ desire 
to represent these cities and, more importantly, specific neighborhoods 
within them, results from both an awareness of New York City as the center 
of hip-hop culture and an attempt to carve out representational space for 
other locales. Also, the representation of particular “hoods” stems from an 
acknowledgment that local and national politicians have often abandoned 
these neighborhoods, and artists feel a sense of commitment to put their 
“forgotten” communities back on the map. An excellent example is Lil Wayne 
and Robin Thicke’s “Tie My Hands,” a message rap–R&B song about Hur-
ricane Katrina. Lil Wayne, a New Orleans native, raps,
They try tell me keep my eyes open
My whole city under water, some people still floating
And they wonder why black people still voting
’Cause your President’s still choking
Take away the football team, the basketball team
Now all they got is me to represent New Orleans, shit
No Governor, no help from the Mayor
Just a steady beating heart and wish and a prayer
Let’s pray!10
Among the many signal elements of these bars is the agency he attributes to 
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athletes and rappers as hip-hop cultural representatives of their regions. He 
also critiques national, state, and local governments, representing George 
W. Bush as “your President” despite his own U.S. citizenship.
Often, hip-hop’s investments in representation and authenticity involve 
the presentation of the individual self and the representation of cultural 
groups, including religious groups, gangs, hip-hop “crews,” and the like, 
with which the self is identified. This process of self-representation heralds 
authenticity as a way to foster self-esteem and to validate cultural affiliations. 
For instance, rapper Rakim, in his song “Mahogany,” raps about a counterpart 
black female “moon” to personally self-identify as a “sun [son],” a reference 
to the Five Percent ideology that the black man represents the sun and the 
black woman the moon.11 Therefore, Rakim identifies a female Five-Percenter 
as his partner to authenticate himself as a male member within the Nation 
of Gods and Earths culture. Rakim raps to Mahogany, “Come to me so we 
can glow in the dark.” He tells her, “You can represent the moon / as long as 
I keep ya in tune.” Although Rakim informs Mahogany, “I’ll tell ya who ya 
are and why ya here,” he really enables his own self-representation, telling 
the audience who he is and why he is there, while clearly representing the 
Five Percent Nation’s masculinist cultural norms.
In the mid-1990s the language of representin’ came to the fore of hip-
hop culture. In Jay Z and Notorious B.I.G.’s “Brooklyn’s Finest,” for instance, 
representin’ is about locating the geographic origins of rappers. The lines 
“Brooklyn represent ya’ll” and “Representin’ BK to the fullest” are pronounce-
ments that mark the two emcees as natives of that particular borough.12 
Similarly, on rapper Raekwon’s “Heaven and Hell” he announces, “Big Booth 
represent the Q [Queens].”13 When rap group Outkast became the first to 
break commercial rap music produced by southern emcees, they established 
a larger southern representation. In their single “Slump” the chorus states, 
“I’m strictly dressin’ Dirty Dirty / Gonna represent it to the T-Top / Born 
and bred up on the street top / Get to the money and the sweet spot / And 
forever hollerin’ ‘Hootie Hoo!’ when we see cops.”14 Here, Outkast begins 
by representing the “Dirty”  South to the “T-Top” (the fullest). They also 
flesh out a portrait of their southern environment by representing drug 
trafficking locales, specific environments where they are meeting police 
with resistance.15
In similar moments, rappers seek to identify with various community 
blights. Masta Killa, for instance, admits that he “represent[s] the school 
of the hard knocks and glocks.”16 “The school of the hard knocks” is an 
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important phrase that was popularized in the hip-hop culture of New York 
ghettoes, which comments critically, albeit simply, on the collapse of the 
public education system and the subsequent role the inner-city streets play 
in the “raising” of children. The phrase derives, however, from Ralph Albert 
Parlette’s book The University of Hard Knocks: The School that Completes Our 
Education, published in 1919.17 When Masta Killa represents “the school of 
the hard knocks and glocks,” he locates himself in a gun-ridden community 
Big Boi (left) and Andre 3000 (right), members of the hip-hop duo known as 
Outkast, frequently invoke political messages in their music as well as embody a 
representation of life in the South. (MovieGoods)
224 Tanji Gilliam
and essentially reestablishes himself, as his name already does, as an agent 
of that violence. In 2Pac’s “Life Goes On” he represents for victims, likely 
of gun violence—“dead homiez” and “niggas doin’ life” in prisons.18 Rap-
per Nas uses the trope of representation to announce his taste in alcohol: 
“Heine[ken] dark drinker, represent the thinker.”19 Here, “dark” simultane-
ously represents a beer and the rapper’s racial identity.
Explicit markers of race and ethnicity are rare, however, when it comes 
to representin’ in hip-hop. More often we get cultural referents, such as the 
one outlined earlier by Rakim’s “Mahogany,” that allude to racial or ethnic 
representations. Implicit black cultural referents are plentiful, and they often 
take the form of lyrical and musical samples. These more indirect referents 
work to establish “insiderism” and often police the borders of the hip-hop 
(inter)national community. Frequently, these cultural samples are used to 
reinforce the community descriptors and examples of urban criminality 
referred to earlier. The Wu-Tang Clan’s “Clan in the Front” evidences this. 
On this single, they identify Wu-Tang member GZA as “the one who just 
represent the Wu-Tang click / With the game and soul of an ol’ school flick 
/ like The Mack and Dolemite who both did bids.” Here, GZA is represented 
along a black cultural continuum with black pimp characters from 1970s 
blaxploitation films. Although he is not linked to them by voiced referents 
to his sexual activity, The Mack and Dolemite are celebrated because they 
were incarcerated, another experience that hip-hop particularly commends. 
Through the citation of these two figures from film history, GZA’s ethnicity, 
gender, and sexual orientation are represented, and he is identified as a black 
American heterosexual male. Furthermore, hip-hop is represented here as an 
art form connected to black film and black male actors and comedians.20
In these and other ways, hip-hop’s cultural and community references 
seek to establish local and national identities for the culture. Codes of all 
varieties—linguistic, behavioral, and ideological—are developed, exhibited, 
and embraced as a means of crafting a hip-hop nation. As Bakari Kitwana 
notes, “By the early to mid-1990s hip-hop’s commercialized element had 
black kids on the same page, regardless of geographic region. In this hip-
hop friendly national environment . . . multi-platinum sales for rap artists 
were routine . . . and hip-hop expressions like ‘blowin’ up,’ ‘representin’’ 
and ‘keepin’ it real’ worked their way into the controversial language of 
black youth around the country.” As Kitwana notes, the politics of repre-
sentation, pronounced by the mass marketing of hip-hop lexicons such as 
representin’ itself, assembled a national identity for what he refers to as the 
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hip-hop generation.21 Although he notes that this happened “regardless of 
geographic region,” it is important to point out that nationalism in hip-hop 
developed, in rather interesting ways, because of hip-hop’s persistent regional 
representin’. As New York discontinued its reign as the only mass-marketed 
urban landscape in hip-hop culture, rappers from other cities such as Los 
Angeles, Atlanta, and New Orleans began to “represent” their hoods in their 
rhymes, radio spots, album and press photography, and video promotions 
of all varieties, including TV interviews, music videos, and documentary 
films. Although this regional pride seemingly created beefs between various 
rap regions, evidenced by the notorious East Coast–West Coast rivalry or 
even southern rappers’ relentless struggle to gain notoriety and credibility, 
it also fostered and nurtured a hip-hop nation. As hip-hop cultural partici-
pants began to notice that emergent urban centers in the rap game were 
very similar to one another, the greater culture developed a sense of shared 
cultural background with black and Latino communities across the nation. 
For some better-informed participants, this extended to global oppressed 
communities.22 Although these regional identifications are connected to 
cultural nationalist trends in hip-hop culture, particularly as a result of 
their shared “linked fate” rhetoric, regional representation may have had 
an even greater effect on the development of nationalism in hip-hop than 
explicitly nationalist ideologies such as those espoused by groups such as 
Public Enemy or Queen Latifah or the Islamic nationalism of artists such 
as Rakim and The Wu-Tang Clan.23
Although it is difficult to measure the difference between the influence 
of regional representation and that of cultural nationalist rap on hip-hop 
nationalism, it is worth noting that a review of the vinyl album artwork for 
sixteen of the forty-three classic rap albums demonstrates the importance of 
regional representation for the artists. This 37 percent represents albums by 
thirteen of the twenty-eight artists or groups (almost 50 percent) included 
among the classic emcees. The albums can be divided between New York 
and New Jersey rappers (ten) and Los Angeles ones (six).
The back of Jay Z’s Reasonable Doubt lists the previously discussed 
“Brooklyn’s Finest.” Main Source’s Breaks the Atom contains a shout-out to 
their “New York Posse.” A Tribe Called Quest’s People’s Instinctive Travels 
and the Paths of Rhythm has several cartoon city backdrops with the names 
of East Coast artists and activists De La Soul, Jungle Brothers, Zulu Nation, 
The Violaters, and Latifah, as well as tags for the illustrators Paige Hunyday 
and Bryant Peters, graffitied on top of them. Mobb Deep’s The Infamous lists 
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the song titled “Q.U.—Hectic,” an acronym for Queens University, which 
represents their Queens education and terrain. Eric B. and Rakim’s Paid in 
Full shows B. on the backside in a New York sweatshirt.24 Big Daddy Kane 
thanks New York City urban radio stations WBLS and 98.7 KISS on the back 
of Long Live the Kane. Nas’s Stillmatic cover foregrounds the artist against 
the New York skyline (in a New York hat), as does Slick Rick’s The Great 
Adventures of Slick Rick. The cover of Nas’s first-edition Illmatic features a 
sepia-toned image of the artist as a child superimposed on a photograph 
of the Queensbridge Housing Projects, where he grew up. Queensbridge is 
located on Long Island and is the largest housing project in North America.25 
The back features another photograph with the projects in the background, 
as well as the album “chapters” “40 side north” and “41st side north,” repre-
senting the avenues on either side of one of the Queensbridge buildings—
likely the one he grew up in. Whereas the tenth anniversary vinyl reissue of 
Illmatic has the same image on the cover, now in black and white, the new 
back cover features contemporary contact sheet–style images of the artist 
returned to Queensbridge, also in black and white to create a “classic” look. 
Views of Riverside State Penitentiary and the Ben Franklin Bridge in New 
Jersey make up the foreground and background, respectively, on the back 
cover of the Fugees album The Score. The photograph is a striking negative 
image created by black photographer Marc Baptiste.
This trend continues all the way on the other side of the nation. Ice Cube’s 
AmeriKKKa’s Most Wanted cover features six legible Los Angeles and Los 
Angeles Raiders hats among an endless crowd of black males standing in the 
background behind his image in the foreground. Los Angeles’s Orpheum 
Theatre and the Anjac Fashion Building are also in the background, on the 
South Broadway block his entourage is standing on. Similarly, The D.O.C. 
wears a Los Angeles Kings hat and LA T-shirt on the cover of his album No 
One Can Do It Better. Alan Light’s liner notes on Cube’s Death Certificate 
further narrate the black and Korean tensions that climaxed in the wake 
of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, which Cube expresses in his lyrics to “Black 
Korea.” Light also notes that “after Los Angeles started burning . . . it could 
never again be denied as a social force.” The very title of N.W.A.’s Straight 
Outta Compton signifies. Dr. Dre’s 200 lists the title of his single “Some L.A. 
Niggaz.” Finally, 2Pac, who is not even from California but experienced a 
sort of regional rebirth following Suge Knight’s Death Row Records con-
tract, holds up a “W” sign for the West Coast on the cover of All Eyez on 
Me. Notably, with respect to the linked fate of American inner-city hip-hop 
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participants, Pac also shouts out “all [his] komradz in every borough of every 
city of every state,” in his “thanxs.”
In rapper-producer Dr. Dre’s “Let Me Ride,” he represents for Southern 
California cities such as Los Angeles, hip-hop’s second prominent regional 
center.26 “Let Me Ride” includes scenarios of both armed robbery and murder, 
but Dre is careful to disassociate himself from the gang activity for which 
Los Angeles is notorious. “But I don’t represent no gang bang,” Dre raps, 
“Some niggaz like lynching but I just watch them hang.” Here the historical 
“markers” of African American heritage are present, but in a disturbing way. 
By connecting gang activity in Los Angeles to lynching in the South, Dre 
distances himself from white male perpetrators of lynching but aligns himself 
with white southern lynch mobs by announcing that he “watches them hang.” 
In many ways, Dre fashions himself in this instance as the deviant spectator, 
less guilty than the lynchers who are actually enacting the violence, but less 
than innocent because he does not intervene to save the victim.
Comparatively, one photograph in Richard Wright’s Twelve Million 
Black Voices depicts a lynched black male in the foreground and a mob of at 
least thirteen white males in the background standing proudly and looking 
stoically at the camera. The man located directly behind the lynched male is 
impeccably dressed in a three-piece suit and tie with a matching, modified 
beaver hat. The suit, at least for me, is what Roland Barthes defines as the 
photograph’s “punctum,” the “accident that bruises.” This man in the suit, 
with his arm leaning against the tree the lynched man is hanging from, is 
the only one “dressed up” for the occasion. Similar to the suit and the man 
wearing it, Dre’s privileged arrogance represents an unconscionable “sting” 
for the listener. Malcolm X notes that southern lynchings were spectacles 
where whites were witnessed “getting their kicks, the thrill, while they [did] 
it.” He contrasts this form of murder with that committed by blacks by stat-
ing, “We kill because we need to, either for food or to defend ourselves.” Of 
course, blacks do commit murder for reasons other than self-defense, but 
X writes the notion of spectacle out of black homicide.27 In his lyrics, Dre 
articulates both homosocial (within the group that witnesses the violence) 
and heterosocial (outside the group that commits the violence) representa-
tion, as well as regional Los Angeles representation. This position he carves 
out for himself is in stark contrast to Malcolm X’s depictions. 
Significant to the sense of nationalism derived from the exploitation 
of inner-city ills is the collective cultural critique of state apparatuses that 
fostered some of these realities in the first place, particularly regional police 
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departments and national government administrations. S. Craig Watkins 
notes, “The ghettocentric imagination . . . produces representations of the 
urban ghetto as a theatre for state coercion and militarization.”28 When Dr. 
Dre asserts an analogy between gang violence and state-sanctioned lynch-
ing, then, he is correct.
I previously discussed a “politics of representation” that serves as an 
umbrella, if you will, for the “burden of representation” and for what Tricia 
Rose defines as a “crisis of representation.” Therefore, if the politics of rep-
resentation incorporates all the various politicized types of representation 
that black cultural participants engage, the burden of representation is but 
one of these types, and the crisis of representation is another. This crisis is 
related to what Watkins identifies as the stake the American news media 
and politicians have in the mass-marketed representation of black deviance. 
Just as rappers function as community spokesmen for crime and violence, 
Rose reminds us, “monopolistic tendencies in commercial enterprises seri-
ously constrain access to a diverse flow of information.”29 Therefore, despite 
the fact that many rappers critique drug and alcohol abuse and lament vio-
lence, commercial industries fail to support critical artists in the same ways 
they financially endorse those glorifying these behaviors. This process is a 
frightening effort on the part of the police, politicians, corporate America, 
and, notably, a host of “regressive” rappers and hip-hop consumers.30 The 
crisis of representation that Rose outlines goes back to the idea of “interests” 
and presents a specific divide between the predominant voices presented in 
mainstream media and those whose interests receive adequate representa-
tion in these same “corridors of power.”31
“It’s Yours”
Two “classic” hip-hop singles—Nas’s “The World Is Yours” (1994) and Jay 
Z’s “Dead Presidents” (1996)—are connected not only by the T La Rock “It’s 
Yours” sample that informed the former song’s title but also by the greater 
investment in capitalism the two raps represent, helping us to understand 
the more problematic forms of representation in hip-hop culture.32 Although 
both these songs exhibit accomplished lyricism and production, and both 
singles contributed significantly to the rappers’ still rising prominence as 
culturally celebrated (“Greatest Rappers Alive”) and financially successful 
artists, the greed they articulate represents a larger politics of capitalism with 
which hip-hop culture is obsessed. These two songs are excellent examples 
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of how songs can be artistically and financially viable but politically regres-
sive. Nas’s song begins:
Nas: I’m out for presidents to represent me!
Say what?
I’m out for presidents to represent me!
Say what?
I’m out for dead presidents to represent me!
T La Rock: It’s Yours!
“The World Is Yours” begins with a modified twelve-bar, standard blues 
format “remixed” with a call-and-response conversation. “I’m out for presi-
dents to represent me,” he calls. “Say what?” the song answers. This refrain 
repeats. Then, slightly differently, “I’m out for dead presidents to represent 
me!” “Dead presidents” refers to those whose faces appear on dollar bills of 
various monetary increments. Following this call and response, “The World 
Is Yours” mixes in a T La Rock sample, “It’s Yours.” From the first seconds of 
“The World Is Yours,” the song conveys the musical and lyrical sophistication 
of a rap classic, borrowing and using not only the musical tropes of twelve-bar 
blues, call and response, mixing, and the rap sample but also illustrating a 
rap lyric standard of new linguistic phrasings to symbolize popular items. In 
this case, of course, “dead presidents” is introduced as new African American 
vernacular English (AAVE) lexicon for representing money.
The narrative of the song promotes Nas and other black males taking 
over the world by capitalistic exploits. Nas establishes himself as a deviant 
black male (“Aimin’ guns in all my baby pictures”) who incites resistance 
with housing police and provides a musical sound track for thieves and 
murderers. Nas does express some disaffection with the image he represents. 
“I need a new nigga for this black cloud to follow / ’Cause when it’s over 
me it’s too dark to see tomorrow,” he explains, loosely addressing his own 
dissatisfaction with the bleak realities of his existence. When he notes, “I 
need a new nigga for this black cloud to follow,” he is willfully calling for his 
present hardships to be visited on another black person. More explicitly, Nas 
raps, “The fiend of hip-hop has got me stuck like a crack pipe.” The rather 
astute formal elements of this statement demonstrate its meaning. Hip-hop 
is personified in this statement as a crack user. Nas’s own subjectivity as a 
rapper is described with the simile “stuck like a crack pipe.” Therefore, Nas 
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might be arguing that his investment in capitalism, articulated by his desire 
to have “dead presidents,” or money, “represent” him, is actually a forced 
agency that he is stuck in.
Forced or not, the larger investment in capitalism and its companion 
evils that Nas articulates is quite troubling. Elsewhere, Nas rhymes, “And 
I’m amped up / They locked the champ up / Leaving my brain in hand-
cuffs / Heading for Indiana / Stabbing women like a phantom.” Here, Nas 
announces his disapproval that heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson 
was locked up in Indiana for raping Desiree Washington. His avowal of 
Tyson’s innocence is similar to that of other prominent black male celebri-
ties and religious leaders.33 Furthermore, Nas announces his hypothetical 
plan to go to Indiana, the site of Tyson’s crime, and “stab” women, a double 
entendre for a physical assault by knife and an aggressive act of male sexual 
penetration.
Nas’s misogyny is linked to capitalism because his dissatisfaction with 
the verdict in Tyson’s case likely results from the far too pervasive opinion 
that black women are out to “trap” prominent black male athletes, rappers, 
and other celebrities. Therefore, when black women and other economically 
marginalized women of all races come forward with allegations of sexual 
assault against prominent male athletes and entertainers in particular, the 
American public often critiques those allegations as being efforts made by 
those women to get monetary awards.34 Nas’s investment in capitalism, as it 
may foster the financial benefit of himself, Mike Tyson, and other black male 
celebrities, extends to a regressive gender politic. This causes him to either 
deny the possibility that Tyson may actually be guilty, or worse, to advocate 
for a culture that would ignore rape as a crime worthy of punishment.
Jay Z’s “Dead Presidents” begins with another revision of the twelve-
bar blues format by sampling Nas’s hook: “Presidents to represent me / I’m 
out for presidents to represent me [two times] / I’m out for dead fucking 
presidents to represent me.”35
Nas: Presidents to represent me!
Jay Z: Rock
Nas: I’m out for presidents to represent me!
Jay Z: On! Rocafella yo
Nas: I’m out for presidents to represent me
Jay Z: The saga continues
I’m out for dead fucking presidents to represent me!
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Throughout his single, Jay Z brags of capitalist success. “I’m still spending 
money from ’88,” he boasts, then refers to himself as “The Dead Presidential 
Candidate,” a title that collapses formal political power into solely economic 
power. For Jay Z, “’Nough dollars make sense [cents],” and “Dead Presidents” 
advocates an upward mobility that has historically left black elites (rappers 
notwithstanding) sharply divided, economically, from the black masses. 
Jay Z compares himself with other rappers by challenging, conventionally, 
“Mic machet(ed) your flow / your paper fall slow like confetti / mine’s will 
steady grow.” Finally, when Jay Z announces, “Dead presidential / politics 
as usual,” he signals the most popular form of hip-hop politics historically 
addressed by emcees and possibly by the surrounding culture as well—that 
of contemporary capitalism. If black cultural representation has always been 
about mass-marketed symbols of black life, hip-hop representation is often 
about black males “cashing in” on that market.
Elsewhere, however, the representational politics that hip-hop offers 
is more progressive. Consider, for example, Sarah Jones’s “Whose War?”36 
Although “Whose War?” is arguably a spoken word recording and not a rap 
record, I still believe it is an important case to introduce here because of the 
interesting ways she too samples Nas’s recording “The World Is Yours.”37
I want a President to represent me!
I want a President to represent me!
I want a President to represent me!
I want a real President to represent me!
Sarah Jones begins, like both Nas and Jay Z, with an almost identical, remixed 
twelve-bar blues, call and-response refrain: “I want a President to represent 
me!” and she answers, “I want a real President to represent me.” Jones’s 
exchange of the words “dead” and “real” is especially significant here. As 
previously discussed, there is a preoccupation with “realness” inside black 
cultural representations, Jones notwithstanding. When Jones calls for a “real” 
president to represent her, she is speaking specifically about the failures of 
actual American presidents, present and former, who have failed to address 
her adequately as a black female progressive. Instead of asking, “Whose world 
is this,” as Nas does, she uses the remixed phrase, “Whose war is this?” to 
voice opposition to the current war in Iraq initiated by President George 
W. Bush. “Look under ‘W,’” she remarks, “it stands for war instigator.” She 
extends her critique to the inner-city, crack-era Reaganomics “wars”; the 
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U.S. support of apartheid; and the first Iraq war promoted by George H. W. 
Bush. Jones also refers to the “corporate ties” and news media monopoliza-
tion of wartime. And finally, Jones opposes the Bush-supported war against 
the pro-choice position. “No W. should decide when and whether we have 
to give birth / Not when the executioner can’t even spell what a human life 
is worth,” Jones mocks. Throughout the song, she advances progressive 
politics that are racialized, classed, and gendered.
Furthermore, Jones remixes the language of war to address a politics 
of representation. Conservatives call for a “divide and conquer and divide 
some more” approach that negates the political strategies of community 
and collectivity that black historical oppositions have, at least theoretically, 
offered up. What Jones supports instead, and what she attempts to effect 
when addressing her largely black public, is unity and the fair representa-
tion of black political concerns.
The politics that Jones advances is an enactment of formal politics. 
Although Jones did not explicitly campaign against Bush’s reelection in 
2004, the subtext for her argument, “I want a real president to represent 
me,” and the timeliness of her recording (during the 2004 election season) 
supported these politics. 
“My President” 
Fast-forward four years, and Young Jeezy and Nas’s “My President” is on 
the airwaves, prematurely celebrating Barack Obama’s victory as the forty-
fourth president of the United States. The song was written in June 2008 
and features the two black male rappers, principally Jeezy, critiquing Bush’s 
“stolen” ascendancy in Florida, as well as the war in Iraq and its oil-centered 
motivations, and proposing Obama as the realization of Dr. Martin Luther 
King’s “dream.” The video was recorded after election day and was set in front 
of the famed Ebenezer Baptist Church. Uncompromisingly reminiscent of 
Spike Lee’s video for Public Enemy’s “Fight the Power,” which aired nearly 
twenty years earlier, the crowd is armed with placards supporting the newly 
elected Obama, along with Malcolm X, Gandhi, and deceased rappers Jam 
Master Jay, Pimp C, and Biggie Smalls.
The song’s lyrics and video imagery are a mixture of Black National-
ist rhetoric, self-aggrandizement (as the song chiefly represents for Jeezy 
himself), and capitalist braggadocio. The hook, “My President is Black / 
My Lambo[rghini] is blue,” simultaneously champions Obama’s historic 
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win and Jeezy’s celebrated victory as “the first nigga to ride through [his] 
hood in a Lamborghini.” “I’m important too,” Jeezy admits. At the same 
time Jeezy presents himself alongside Obama, he also questions the general 
representation of contemporary emcees. After shouting out black historical 
figures such as Jackie Robinson and Booker T. Washington, he questions 
his listeners, “Oh you ain’t think I knew that shit?” The hypothetical query 
reflects an earlier bar in which Jeezy interrogates the position of emcees 
as politicians: “Just because you got opinions, does that make you a politi-
cian?” Throughout the song it seems as though he answers by presenting 
himself and Obama as pop icons, although he admittedly wrestles with 
the significance of Obama’s presence in American government at such a 
critical juncture in history, given the state of the American economy (the 
album the song appears on is entitled Recession). Nas’s verse in the song 
calls for putting Obama’s face on the $5,000 bill (dead presidents), and 
there is imagery that supports this as well graffitied onto the platform 
Jeezy stands on in the video. The closing title states: “Pray for Barack and 
Family.”
Whereas hip-hop does not always challenge its investments in American 
capitalism, it does argue for fairer access to American wealth, particularly 
for black and Latino males. Cultural theorists critique black male capital-
ism in hip-hop culture, but it warrants mentioning that these same black 
male capitalists are in fact constituting the ethos of the economic system 
by allowing the poor to get richer while the rich get richer as well. Black 
female rappers such as Lil Kim, Foxy Brown, and Trina respond similarly. 
Although there are certainly other more progressive economic ideologies, 
these platforms are not as well marketed.
Hip-hop has been introduced by Chuck D as the “black CNN” and by 
Selwyn Hinds, former editor in chief of Source magazine, as a “lens” to the 
black American world. It has been more than thirty years since hip-hop’s 
birth in the South Bronx, and it shows no signs of fading; in fact, despite the 
current “hip-hop is dead” rhetoric, it has grown into a global phenomenon. 
New extensions of hip-hop performance, including Reggaeton, krumping, 
hyphy, and digital (MP3) DJing, are constantly emerging. With the ever-
growing prominence of hip-hop cultures around the world, new definitions 
of hip-hop politics continue to emerge as well. Hip-hop provides a research 
framework for interrogating black diasporic national, gender, racial, and 
class politics, and the national, gender, racial, and class politics of hip-hop 
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scholars relates to the desire to produce the work and to see that work, like 
that culture, advance.
Through the process of research and critique, we can improve on the 
current state of hip-hop politics and black contemporary politics in general. 
Central to these efforts will be changing the nature of black representations 
as they currently exist. Although hip-hop presents several ideas for the 
development of a political consciousness, very little work has been done 
to imagine how we might organize these ideas into collective action. If we 
advance the politics of hip-hop culture so that it does not oppress any mem-
bers of the hip-hop generations, the youth who are continuing to grow up 
in the culture can be even more affirmed by its existence.
I began my own path as a hip-hop scholar, like all others who do work 
in the field, by insisting on the legitimacy of hip-hop as a topic. This was an 
important and vital step for my intellectual development and professional 
growth. However, hip-hop scholarship has taken on new meaning for me 
now. I want to use it to affirm the cultural identities of hip-hop heads because 
I know that despite the past and present deficiencies in hip-hop politics, 
the culture has the potential to effect change in the lives of marginalized 
American youth and young adults.
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“thIngs In thIs Country Are 
gonnA ChAnge Pre t ty FAst”
Dissent, Mobilization, and the Politics of Jericho 
Isabel Pinedo
This government is corrupt and illegitimate. . . . It lied about who attacked 
us so it could seize power.
—Heather Lisinski, “Patriots and Tyrants,” Jericho
Five years after the September 11 attacks, a television series imagined a 
large-scale nuclear strike against the United States. Witnessed from the small 
Kansas town of Jericho, a mushroom cloud appears on the horizon in the 
direction of Denver. Like the 1983 telefilm The Day After, set in Lawrence, 
Kansas, Jericho is a nuclear narrative that portrays the country devastated 
by an attack. But unlike the cold war–themed The Day After, in which the 
attack emanates from a foreign state, Jericho depicts a homegrown terror-
ist attack masterminded by a faction of the U.S. government, intent on a 
covert coup d’etat.1
The nuclear attack is used to sow panic and social disorder, which allows 
a new government, the Allied States of America (ASA), to install itself over 
roughly half the country, west of the Mississippi. The new president is allied 
with Jennings & Rall (J&R), a giant conglomerate whose subsidiary, Raven-
wood, is assigned to help the military reinstate order. The series resonates 
with several recent events, including the 9/11 attacks. In the pilot episode, 
the mushroom cloud on the horizon stands in for the devastating blow to 
242 Isabel Pinedo
the nation, later referred to in the series as the “September attacks.” Its full 
extent is revealed obliquely in the second episode, “Fallout,” as Hawkins, a 
newly arrived resident of Jericho who knows more than he is telling, places 
pushpins on a map of the mainland: Denver, Atlanta, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
San Diego. The camera lingers on the pushpins in the drawer as, in a heart-
sinking moment, Hawkins’s hand returns to it again and again and again.
Jericho was also influenced by Hurricane Katrina, when a delinquent gov-
ernment response and mismanagement led to social breakdown and reliance 
on private security contractors such as Blackwater. In the show, survivors flee 
the FEMA camps, where provisions are scarce and conditions dangerous. 
Residents of the fictional town hang on the fleeting images of a television 
transmission about the attacks, just as we did after 9/11 and Katrina. Here, 
the producers tap into “the idea of being a spectator to a disaster, while not 
quite being part of it,” so familiar to us from these experiences.2
Last, the show resonates with Iraq, most obviously in the government’s 
reliance on private security contractors to maintain services and in the 
town of Jericho’s experience of occupation in the second season. Less obvi-
ous is the parallel with the “retaliatory” strike against a foreign state by the 
government, under false pretenses. In the case of Jericho, Iran and North 
Korea are falsely blamed for the September attacks. The critical narrative 
themes of the series resemble real-world events: the fallacious case made 
by the U.S. government for the invasion of Iraq; the erosion of democracy 
for the sake of security, instigated by the Patriot Act; the privatization of 
government functions.
But verisimilitude has its limits on network television. By locating the 
story in a town that was not hit and is strategically placed to avoid fallout, 
the producers avoid the body horror and bleak tone of earlier apocalyptic 
dramas such as The Day After and Testament (1983). Jericho’s critical nar-
rative themes play out the “what if ” scenario through the action genre. 
Genre elements lend sufficient distance to the depiction of a postapocalyptic 
world to permit the audience to take pleasure from the show, to which its 
loyal fan base can attest. Thus the program, at least temporarily, staves off 
the box-office failure of the recent spate of films about Iraq. The producers 
of the program acknowledge the real-world political correlates of Jericho. 
So do the fans.
When CBS canceled the series after one season, fans mobilized online 
to demand a second season. Modeling the protest campaign specifically on 
a pivotal line in the season 1 finale and, more generally, on the program’s 
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insistence on the need to fight for democracy, fan activists convinced the 
network of the value of their loyal viewership, which led to an abridged sec-
ond season. It is here that we most clearly see the series’ relevance to view-
ers not merely as entertainment but as a model for politics. Yet without its 
strong genre-centered entertainment elements, the series would not have 
developed a loyal following.
Jericho as a Post-9/11 Action Genre Narrative
Like many action films since the 1990s, Jericho is an action serial that inte-
grates elements of melodrama. The stunned residents of Jericho, cut off 
from communication and aid, find themselves struggling for survival and 
trying to make sense of what happened, although survival changes from 
literal survival in season 1 to the survival of a democratic society in season 
2. Jake Green (Skeet Ulrich), a prodigal son with a dubious past, returns 
home after five years for what would have been a brief visit had the attacks 
not occurred. He and Robert Hawkins (Lennie James), a recent arrival who 
claims to be a former St. Louis police officer, are the heroes whose hyper-
masculine efforts drive the action.
In the first season, the action revolves around securing resources such as 
food and fuel for the coming winter. This pits town residents against a crimi-
nal gang, rogue mercenaries, and, most important, the neighboring town of 
New Bern, which has a munitions factory and is desperate to appropriate 
resources. The season 1 cliffhanger, “Why We Fight,” leaves the two towns 
poised for armed conflict. Jericho is outnumbered and underequipped, but 
the residents, including refugees who have sought shelter there, are prepared 
to fight for their home. Melodramatic elements are interspersed and include 
romantic triangles, family estrangement, and heightened emotionality. The 
abridged, seven-episode-long second season jettisons most of the melodra-
matic elements revolving around intimate relations to focus on action elements 
and accelerate the narrative development. The action in season 2 pits Jericho 
against the new government based in Cheyenne, Wyoming, as embodied by 
the military, private contractors, and top-ranking government officials.3
Jericho negotiates its action elements in both conventional and uncon-
ventional ways. Conventionally, it presents fast-paced violence as entertain-
ing spectacle and as the solution to seemingly insurmountable problems. 
Action elements, including torture, chase sequences, explosions, and shoot-
outs, are used to create suspense. Although women play a substantive role 
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in the narrative, including wielding guns and undertaking risky missions, 
the action is largely male centered, and men are responsible for most of the 
violence and intrigue that drives the narrative. Violence and danger are 
aestheticized through framing and lighting, starting with the mushroom 
cloud that looms on the horizon and changes everything.
Though these scenes create suspense, they are enjoyable to watch and 
place the heroes at the center of the action. Consistent with the action genre, 
Jake and Hawkins are “men masquerading as supermen” with remarkable 
physical abilities and special skills, such as the ability to fly a plane, drive a 
tank, or kill with one blow. Neither the violence nor the solutions are real-
istic, and both are escapist in tone. The escapist elements balance out the 
elements of realism and clear a space for pleasure.4
Some of the suspense centers on moral ambiguity. Throughout most of 
season 1, both Jake and Hawkins are presented as morally ambiguous char-
acters. Jake’s sordid background and the reason for his estrangement from 
his father, as well as Hawkins’s unexplained knowledge about the attacks 
and his store of military supplies, which he keeps secret even from his wife, 
throw their moral caliber into question. Though there are hints in season 
1 that Jake was involved with Ravenwood and may have been involved in 
the death of a friend in town, it is not until season 2 that we learn the true 
extent of Jake’s guilt for which he is atoning.
Similarly, it is late in season 1 (episode 18, “A.K.A.”) that we learn 
Hawkins’s backstory, as he relates it to Jake. He is a CIA undercover agent 
who, with his handler Sarah Mason, was assigned by Thomas Valente (Daniel 
Benzali) of Homeland Defense to track the nuclear bombs that were even-
tually used in the attacks. The bombs had been brought into the country by 
the U.S. government, after the military in the satellite republics of the former 
Soviet Union put them on the black market. A few years back, a shipment 
went missing en route to the federal storage facility. “Those warheads were 
converted into twenty-five small, high-yield devices,” Hawkins tells Jake. 
In an attempt to prevent the attacks, he infiltrated the terrorist cell that 
had acquired the devices, but the mission failed; Sarah betrayed him, as 
we later learn. Twenty-three bombs were detonated and killed 15 million 
people, though his intelligence prevented the attack on New York. Hawkins 
is in possession of the undetonated bomb, which can be used to prove that 
Iran and North Korea were not behind the attacks. It’s the “smoking gun” 
that can expose Cheyenne’s involvement in the attacks, and that is why the 
government is trying to track Hawkins down.
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When Hawkins reveals all this to Jake, it forges the partnership that 
becomes the central relationship of season 2. Much to its credit, the series 
avoids homophobic humor, which the action genre typically uses to medi-
ate the homosocial bond of the male buddy relationship. Furthermore, the 
centrality of the African American Hawkins is not at the cost of his subor-
dination. This is a departure from the biracial buddy dynamic, which tends 
to render nonwhite characters subordinate to their white counterparts. Until 
the season 2 finale, when Hawkins is wounded, he often leads the action and 
plays the omnipotent action hero on an equal footing with Jake.5
Even more unconventional for the action genre, there is a surprisingly 
high level of realism to the mythology of the show. The larger political 
conflicts Jericho depicts refer to a recognizable social reality. The political 
cause of the enemy, who is homegrown, is recognizable and intelligible as 
a neoconservative agenda, although Jericho leaves the audience to fill in 
some of the gaps.
Jericho as Political Dissent
Over the course of twenty-nine episodes, the story of the conspiracy, before 
and after the attacks, unfolds as the residents of Jericho fight against the 
forces of tyranny in the new government. At the opening of season 2, the 
town becomes an occupied territory. The army puts a forcible end to the 
battle between Jericho and neighboring New Bern. Major Edward Beck 
(Esai Morales) is the officer in charge. He arrives with orders from Valente, 
now head of Cheyenne’s Department of Homeland Defense, to suppress the 
“border skirmish,” restore order, and hunt down a terrorist—Sarah Mason. 
Valente incorrectly believes she succeeded in her mission to kill Hawkins 
and take possession of the bomb and is now hiding from him. She is in 
fact dead. When Beck’s investigation does not yield quick results, Valente 
orders Ravenwood, under the command of John Goetz (D. B. Sweeney), to 
return to “administer” Jericho, so Beck can devote his attention to hunting 
the terrorist.
Jake, whom Beck appoints sheriff, objects to Goetz’s command, tell-
ing Beck that Goetz is responsible for a massacre in the town of Rogue 
River and for several murders in New Bern, the subject of earlier episodes. 
Beck counters, “What I heard is that a sanctioned government contractor 
attempted to enter this town and you opened fire, killing one of his men.” 
Goetz taunts Jake by alluding to his own troubled history working for J&R 
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in Iraq. It is here that Jake’s backstory is finally revealed, when he confides 
in his brother Eric (Kenneth Mitchell).
Jake: One day in Iraq our convoy was ambushed. A couple of our guys 
were killed. We had no rules of engagement, and we had seen the 
village they fell back to, so we just, we just went in. And we started 
shooting. After it was done, there were six gunmen dead along 
with four bystanders. One of them was a twelve-year-old girl. 
[Long silence.] The only reason I tell you this is because there were 
no repercussions. None. The army had no authority over us; the 
police didn’t. Most of the guys, they just went back to their jobs. 
The company? The company wanted it quiet, so it was. . . .
Eric: Jake, this isn’t Iraq.
Jake: Maybe. Maybe, but the rules are the same.
Ravenwood, as a private contractor, is above the law in the ASA, as pri-
vate contractors are in Iraq. Although this episode, “Jennings and Rall,” aired 
on February 26, 2008, the plotline was in the works months before Black-
water, a private security firm, was in the news concerning its involvement in 
the deaths of seventeen Iraqi civilians on September 16, 2007. Ravenwood 
is fashioned after Blackwater, which, along with other private contractors 
such as KBR, operates in Iraq with little government oversight and with 
immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law, thanks to Paul Bremer, who 
issued Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17. This has led to enormous 
resentment among the Iraqis, for it does nothing to discourage violence 
against Iraqi civilians by frightened contractors.6
Jericho subjects Americans to conditions of occupation that include 
economic monopoly, lack of due process, and violence. Ravenwood, J&R’s 
private army, enforces the company’s monopoly as supplier to merchants, 
farmers, and clinics. With monopoly comes price gouging. Businesses that 
fail to comply and seek goods on the black market are closed down. When 
residents get word that, contrary to official reports in the media, the Hudson 
River virus has jumped the Mississippi, Dale Turner (Eric Knudsen), the 
town’s principal trader, secures the generic vaccine through unsanctioned 
channels. Acting to enforce J&R’s stranglehold on the town, Goetz relies on 
an informant to identify who is behind the contraband. He arrests Dale, a 
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teenager, and intends to send him to “prison with no judge, no trial, noth-
ing,” as Jake puts it in “Oversight.” Jake asks Beck to intercede. He secures 
Dale’s release by labeling him crucial to the hunt for a terrorist, the only way 
to trump Ravenwood’s authority.
J&R exercises not only economic monopoly but also information monop-
oly; in Orwellian fashion, it rewrites history to suit its political agenda. Its revi-
sionist history textbook, A New America: A Comprehensive History, is issued to 
schools. In “Condor,” schoolteacher Emily Sullivan (Ashley Scott) complains 
to the mayor: “The section after World War II is called ‘The Decline and Fall of 
the First Republic.’” Eric elaborates: It “talks about how the United States died 
because we got weak. That the Cuban Missile Crisis was a failure because we 
didn’t attack the Russians; that we pulled out of ’Nam in ’75 too early. I mean, 
it goes on!” This book expresses the aggressive militarism and prointerven-
tionist stance of neoconservatism, associated with both the Republican Party 
and the Bush administration. The title even evokes the name of the influential 
neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century.
The residents of Jericho are appalled by these and other changes insti-
tuted by J&R. They finally revolt after Goetz commits murder to cover up 
his embezzlement, a violation for which, unlike the murder of civilians, J&R 
has zero tolerance. When they attack J&R headquarters with Molotov cock-
tails, the show presents insurgency in a sympathetic light. The corporation’s 
tyranny and violence provide the moral alibi necessary to frame the insur-
gents’ violence as righteous. Indeed, the show has prepared us for this by 
having Valente label Hawkins, who is a righteous man, a terrorist, as well 
as with the episode titled “One Man’s Terrorist,” which implies the tagline, 
“is another man’s freedom fighter.”
There is little sympathy in the United States for any facet of the insur-
gency in Iraq, including for people who have been radicalized to resist 
occupation by incidents such as the massacre of civilians by Blackwater. 
The mainstream media, which fail to differentiate between the different 
threads of resistance to coalition forces, is in part responsible for this. For 
Jericho to present insurgency in a sympathetic light by showing the injus-
tices perpetrated by occupation forces is akin to what post–World War II 
“problem pictures” did when they cast white actresses to play “mulatto” 
female characters who could “pass” as white. When such a character was 
subjected to racist violence, the white audience could identify with her, 
and the film elicited sympathy for (white) victims of racism. Whether this 
sympathy extended to black victims of racism is unclear, but that was the 
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problem picture’s socially conscious intent.7 Similarly, not all viewers who 
sympathized with the residents of Jericho would see the parallels with Iraq 
or extend their sympathy to any of the antioccupation insurgents. Neverthe-
less, it was a bold move. And it was not their only one.
Jericho raises the specter of the United States occupied by private contrac-
tors working for a firm with covert ties to top members of the administration 
intent on subverting democracy for political and economic gain. Like Black-
water and KBR, the fictional Ravenwood operates with impunity. Moreover, 
the employees of these firms, operating in war zones, are in effect mercenaries 
whose loyalty is not to the nation but to the profitability of the firm. KBR, until 
2007 a subsidiary of Halliburton, had ties to Vice President Cheney (chair-
man and CEO of Halliburton until 2000) and other top members of the Bush 
administration. Likewise, Ravenwood is a subsidiary of Jennings & Rall, a 
major donor to the political career of President Tomarchio, who once worked 
for J&R. Cronyism characterizes his administration; his cabinet and advis-
ers are drawn from J&R. Halliburton is even named in “The Day Before,” the 
episode that first suggests Jake’s involvement with Ravenwood. A prospective 
employer asks Jake, applying for a job as a pilot, which independent contractor 
he worked for in Afghanistan and Iraq: “Halliburton? Blackwater?”
Halliburton and Blackwater were among the major recipients of the Bush 
administration’s commitment to the privatization of government services, 
including war. KBR has received more than $20 billion since the Iraq war 
began; Blackwater, $1 billion. Both these firms were politically connected to 
the Bush administration, which was extremely receptive to allowing corpo-
rations to set policy, as was the case with Cheney’s energy policy report.8
Jericho’s “what if ” scenario takes this reality further. The Cheyenne 
government holds a Constitutional Convention to rewrite the basic law of 
the land. J&R is at the core of this process. In “Patriots and Tyrants,” Jake 
characterizes it as J&R building its “own private country,” to which Gray 
Anderson (Michael Gaston), Jericho’s mayor, responds: “And when it’s done, 
I don’t think there’s anything that this government is not going to have the 
power to do in the name of national security,” an assessment that echoes 
concerns raised about the Patriot Act.
Jericho’s political subtext is critical of the Bush administration’s “culture 
of deception.” Its doppelganger, the Cheyenne government, promotes lies 
and misinformation to further its neoconservative agenda. Government 
officials propagate the lie that the attacks were backed by North Korea and 
Iran (elements of Bush’s “axis of evil”). The casus belli not only deflects 
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attention from their own complicity but also empowers them to wage war. 
Any evidence to the contrary is censored or met with retribution. As copro-
ducer Matt Federman put it, “Essentially, the press has been neutered. Not 
unlike our own press in this world.” Details about the Bush administration’s 
“culture of deception” have emerged from former insiders, most recently 
from former press secretary Scott McClellan. Jericho merely exaggerates our 
government’s misdeeds. Both the Cheyenne government and ours exploit a 
sneak attack to enlarge the power of the presidency. They make false allega-
tions to justify an invasion. They rely on private security contractors without 
holding them accountable for their actions in a war zone. They stifle dissent 
and erode civil liberties.9
Like the Morse code message that opens every episode, the program 
embeds a political code that enriches the meaning of the show and makes 
it relevant to our lived political reality. Episode titles allude to real-world 
political situations: “One Man’s Terrorist,” “Casus Belli,” “Coalition of the 
Willing,” “Why We Fight,” “Patriots and Tyrants.” As star Skeet Ulrich com-
ments on the season 2 DVD, “Everything felt very pertinent and relevant to 
what the country—our country was dealing with and what . . . our country 
in Jericho is dealing with. It sort of meshed in a weird way.”10
At the start of the second season, executive producer Jon Turteltaub 
publicly acknowledged both the political nature of the show and the calcu-
lated risk this entails on broadcast television: “People, and by people I mean 
our bosses, probably prefer to not get all political. But that said, Jericho is 
not ignoring the political and social landscape.” Likewise, Skeet Ulrich 
commented: “I feel like we were really making a statement to some extent. 
You always want to hold up a mirror, but you don’t want to let people know 
you’re doing it. Hopefully it’s just enough for people to draw the parallels.”11 
Fans drew the parallels, as evidenced by online fan discourse about the show 
and its meanings.
Fan Activism and the Mobilization of Dissent
On the Web site Television without Pity, fans took note of the political paral-
lels and filled in the gaps in blogs and postings. Jericho had the distinction 
of being “the only scripted CBS [show] to have its own recap page on [the] 
popular chat site Television Without Pity.” Recappers are professional fans 
who have turned their fandom, specifically the writings they produce about 
a show, into a source of income. One recapper who covered seventeen epi-
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sodes, including all of season 2, Stephanie Vander Weide (aka “Keckler”), 
expressed her unadulterated enthusiasm for the show in the last recap: “I 
love that I’m totally dumb where this show is concerned! I love that I can’t 
predict it!” Thus, she identifies the series’ surprisingly effective dense plot-
ting as a key component of the pleasure it affords fans.12
When Keckler interviewed Lennie James (Hawkins), she expounded on 
the compelling nature of the show:
One thing that a lot of our Jericho posters seem to have in common is 
that we are completely obsessed with the show, but part of us is still 
wondering, “Why? What is it about this show that is so compelling?” 
Recently, I was at a grocery store—I don’t even know how this came 
up, I think I made a joke about growing beets in my bathtub—and 
the checker said, “Do you watch that show, Jericho? I think it’s the 
most important show on television!” So, what do you think it is 
about this show that has the power to compel and excite?
James ultimately said he did not know, but the generous helping of political 
commentary sprinkled throughout Keckler’s recaps, especially in the more 
politically explicit season 2 episodes, seems to suggest that she did.13
In keeping with the self-described “snarky” tone of the Web site, Keckler 
uses humor to draw parallels—sometimes directly, sometimes allusively. Her 
take on the television news broadcast circulating the story about Iran and 
North Korea’s involvement was succinct: “Lying liars who LIE!” an allusion 
to Al Franken’s book Lies (And the Lying Liars Who Tell Them).14 
Bush and Cheney come into her direct line of fire. When Emily objects 
to the revisionist history books and asks, “How should we handle this?” 
Keckler quips: “Well, first, get Bush out of office.” Her comments, embedded 
in program descriptions, reveal and pass on her command of political affairs: 
“Hawkins . . . [says] that Valente is in the Cheyenne government now, but 
Hawkins doesn’t know in what capacity. Vice Prez? Dude can’t look like Dick 
Cheney for nothing. And where are the Cheneys from? CHEYENNE!”15
Halliburton, KBR, and Blackwater are named several times, with a coat-
ing of humor: “Jake with his Ravenwater-Blackwood background.” She notes, 
“[President Tomarchio’s] cabinet and advisory board are lousy with former 
J&Rs. ‘At the highest levels, that government and this company are one and 
the same,’ Smith [Hawkins’s inside informant] reveals. Oh, the Halliburton 
of it all!” Other times, the connections she draws take on a more sober tone: 
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“Oh, those ‘sanctioned government contractors’—they’re so impudent with 
their murder and their multiple Halliburton/KBR rape cover-ups. I wonder 
if the Allied States of America finds rape and torture acceptable during times 
of war.”16 And, like newspaper critics, she connects Jericho to occupied Iraq. 
When Jake declares that the contractors answer to no one, “Eric tries to say 
that Jericho isn’t Iraq. Don’t fool yourself, Eric; the Usurper President is Paul 
Bremer, and you all are the beaten-down insurgents.”17
Keckler’s reading of the show received explicit support from Steve Scaia, 
executive story editor and writer. In an e-mail, Scaia described himself as a 
“huge” fan of her recaps, adding, “You liked the things we worked the hardest 
on.” He and cowriter Matt Federman tried to give her a shout-out, naming 
one of the characters “Trish Keckler,” but it did not get clearance, presum-
ably because someone by that name lived in Kansas. Keckler notes the irony 
of the timing. “When writers/executive producers of a show I recap finally 
write me with glowing praise, it would have to be a doomed show.”18
The cancellation of Jericho incited heated protest and debate about the 
reasons for it. Of the 115 comments posted on the Internet Movie Database, 
two attribute its cancellation to the critical political nature of the program. 
On March 26, 2008, newmoonofsedona (U.S.) posted, “It’s definitely NOT 
the ratings,” a comment that was rated as useful by 74 percent of the users 
(83 out of 112) who rated it. S/he objects to Jericho’s cancellation and attri-
butes CBS’s lack of promotion for the show to government pressure to pull 
it due to its thinly veiled references to real-world events.19
This was a true reality show and not like the other drivel they push 
on us as such. I believe, as many other fans do, that the show was 
canceled by pressure from the U.S. government. (Oh, you naive 
ones, do you really think there is no censorship here in the U.S.?) 
It is too close to what is going on with references to Blackwater 
(Ravenwood) and Halliburton (Jennings and Rall) that make one 
think that these supposed patriots are NOT GOOD! This is true. 
This show has won awards, has had a large outcry of fans, bring-
ing it back and was NEVER PROMOTED by CBS. Instead we get 
these idiotic things like “Big Brother” (hmmm. . . . who is the real 
big brother?). . . . That this shows [sic] scenario, which involves 
the CIA, Homeland Security, etc., is just not appreciated by this 
administration and that is the REAL reason it was canceled. . . . Its 
canceling is in line with Dan Rather’s firing, whist [sic] he had been 
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on CBS for DECADES, as soon as he mentioned some unflattering 
FACTS about G. Bush’s military record, POOF, he was gone. . . . The 
so-called “Patriot Act” is anything but, and more like a reneging of 
our freedoms in the Bill of Rights!20
CBS’s scheduling strategy was to air the first half of season 1 from Sep-
tember through November 2006, then air the second half from February 
through May 2007. During the three-month hiatus, a different show was 
aired rather than repeats of Jericho. Here, CBS seems to have been follow-
ing ABC’s lead, which NBC also followed. This strategy resulted in audience 
loss in the spring not only for Jericho but for Lost and Heroes as well. But in 
addition to the long hiatus, Jericho had to contend with the fact that in the 
spring it was scheduled against Fox’s ratings powerhouse American Idol, 
something the more established Lost did not have to face in 2007.21
Another factor that adversely affected Jericho’s ratings is that its “fiercely 
loyal” audience often viewed the show on DVR or online. Jericho “consis-
tently [ranked] as the CBS scripted program whose [audience] grew by the 
largest percentage when DVR playback [which is factored into the ratings 
when viewers play it back within a few days after broadcast] was included. 
Such a [statistic] indicates a sizable [audience] went out of its way to make 
sure it didn’t miss an episode.” The cancellation of the show led not only to a 
multifaceted protest campaign to bring it back but also to a spirited critique 
of the Nielsen ratings system as unreliable in the digital age.22
The millennial generation, also referred to as the Internet generation, is 
more likely to watch online, and this group constitutes a key component of 
Jericho’s viewership. Millennials are also more receptive to criticism of the 
government from a leftist perspective. According to a study by the Center 
for American Progress, which defined millennials as those aged eighteen 
to twenty-nine, “Millennials mostly reject the conservative viewpoint that 
government is the problem, and that free markets always produce the best 
results for society”— the linchpin of the neoconservative drive to privatize 
everything, including the military. “Millennials are more likely than other 
age groups to disapprove of George W. Bush’s handling of his presidency, 
which could be fueling a rejection of the larger conservative agenda and 
driving [their] support for progressive policies.” This is a population for 
whom Jericho’s dystopian depiction of the neoconservative agenda might 
be particularly appealing.23
The millennial generation is net savvy and likely to be engaged in “pro-
“Things in This Country Are Gonna Change Pretty Fast” 253
sumer” activities such as blogging, posting to forums, and creating video 
mashups. The successful online campaign to save Jericho from cancellation 
featured Web 2.0 activism: videos posted to YouTube, Web sites devoted to 
sharing information and mobilizing volunteers, and, in a deal with Ama-
zon, a drive to send Jericho DVDs to U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
One campaign took its cue from the “Why We Fight” episode, which uses a 
quote from the Battle of the Bulge. When the American commander of the 
outnumbered and underequipped forces was asked by the Nazis to surren-
der, he responded, “Nuts!” This was also Jake’s response to New Bern’s siege 
of Jericho and the fans’ response to CBS when the show was canceled. The 
online campaign resulted in the delivery of more than twenty tons of nuts to 
CBS. On the season 2 DVD extra “Nut Job,” Nina Tassler, president of CBS 
Entertainment, credits the campaign as having “a profound influence on [their] 
decision” to renew. After the campaign succeeded in bringing about a second 
season a mere three weeks after cancellation, the SaveJerichoCoalition site 
asked, “How does it feel to make history?” These words were echoed in the 
series finale, when Hawkins asks Jake, “How does it feel? . . . Making history,” 
in what Keckler calls “one of the sweetest shout-outs to fandom ever.”24
Among the most creative strategies deployed in the campaign were vid-
eos produced by fans. In an act of digital poaching, some denounced CBS by 
visually aligning the network with New Bern, as Jericho gets ready to take it 
on in battle, or with Valente, as Hawkins spies on his forces. One of the best 
approaches, however, takes a different tack. In “Dear CBS,” LisiBee positions 
the network as the recipient of a Dear John letter. She recounts the travails 
of their on-again, off-again relationship and poses Jericho as the epitome of 
their closeness. Feeling betrayed at having it taken away, she attacks CBS 
where it really hurts: “I hope your ratings shrivel up and fall off.”25
Fans like LisiBee are taking affective marketing, which tries to forge an 
intense attachment between program and consumer, and turning it back on 
the network. Fan engagement is valued not only for ratings but also because 
engagement is assumed to cross over from program to ad, making viewers 
more attractive to advertisers and thus serving network interests. However, 
it also empowers fans to make demands on networks. They own the show. 
And the narrative of Jericho, which centers on the moral imperative to resist 
tyranny and protect democracy, provides a model for fan activism.26
Fans rightly celebrated their power to have the show reinstated. Their 
desire for renewal prevailed for a time, and a dissident perspective on 
political affairs aired on network prime time. It is fitting, given that Jericho 
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endorses citizen engagement and the importance of dissent, that they made 
their voices count. And by depicting real-world events from a progressive 
perspective, Jericho was able to expand the terms of political discourse and 
make a political intervention.27
The Jericho campaign was both a victory for fans and a symbolic victory 
for democracy and dissent; as fans claimed, it was a demonstration of the 
power to change history. Some might argue that this form of fan activism is 
a distraction from real-world politics rather than an engagement with it. But 
what if the tactics for engagement with a politically inflected program cross 
over to real-world politics? Look at the strategies and tactics of the Obama 
presidential campaign—specifically, the way it combined centralized Web-
centered action (fund-raising, distributing speeches, recruiting volunteers) 
with decentralized forms of organizing (YouTube videos that turned viral, 
such as the one featuring Obama Girl)—all working toward a common goal. 
This was the political repurposing of tactics developed to make demands on 
entertainment. Fans developed these tactics to make successful demands in 
the relatively low-stakes, high-pleasure realm of entertainment.
The Jericho campaign demonstrates the engagement of the millennial 
generation, whether or not they were fans of Jericho. This form of social 
engagement, widespread in the millennial demographic, set the stage for the 
Obama campaign, which so effectively mobilized the engagement strategies 
of the Internet generation. Organizing of the sort that mobilized around 
Jericho allowed people to develop a novel set of interventions that was then 
harnessed and redirected toward overtly political ends by the Obama cam-
paign, constituting a form of political innovation that not only engaged more 
voters and deepened investment in the political process but also elected this 
country’s first African American president. After eight years of a failed Bush 
presidency, Obama was elected with the hope that “things in this country 
are gonna change pretty fast.”28
Notes
My thanks to David Gallagher for urging me to watch Jericho and for valuable comments 
on an earlier draft. I am indebted to Heather Levi for her careful reading and help in 
thinking through the more difficult aspects of this chapter. 
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It’s not Funny ’CAuse It’s true
The Mainstream Media’s Response to Media Satire 
in the Bush Years
Carl Bergetz
At the start of the new millennium, a phenomenon began troubling mem-
bers of the mainstream national news media (imprecisely but efficiently 
shortened here to MSM).1 They were becoming increasingly defensive about 
their ratings, image, and standing in the community inside and outside the 
Upper East Side. A perception existed—mainly among the MSM—that the 
MSM was under attack.
Of course, the MSM had been assailed before and lived to report on it. The 
confrontations have typically come from technological changes, manifested in 
competing alternative media outlets.2 From print to radio to television to cable, 
the old guard has substantially subsumed each new threat into the protean 
MSM agglomeration. Even the wild World Wide Web, teeming with bloggers 
living in their moms’ basements and writing in their pajamas, has not been 
immune, as the MSM has copied, co-opted, or otherwise moved erstwhile 
indie writers out of their parents’ homes and into some classier sleepwear.3
But during the Bush years, a different threat to the MSM emerged that 
needed no technological advancement. It was something truly no-tech, 
something as old as the Romans, something powerful enough to shake the 
very idea of the MSM itself: clowns. Yes, clowns were breaching the MSM 
gates. At least that was a conclusion drawn from a 2004 Pew Research Center 
study on viewing habits, which showed a growing number of people getting 
their news from clowns (more precisely, “satirists”) on Saturday Night Live, 
The Daily Show, and similar after-hours comedy programs.4
Will Ferrell’s parody of President George W. Bush on Saturday Night Live contin-
ues a long tradition of late-night satire’s strong influence on popular perceptions 
of political figures. (MovieGoods)
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A roiling feud between satirists and MSM news personalities (more pre-
cisely, “journalists”) was poised to explode into an all-out war in 2004 and 
divert our attention from the real threat in Afghanistan. Journalists alleged 
that satirists were encroaching on their turf and generating cynicism about 
democracy. But the satirists were fighting back, contending that journalists 
were abdicating their professional duties.
In keeping with the “Comedy Rule of Three,” this chapter examines (1) 
some notable satirical jabs thrown at the MSM in the past decade, (2) the 
response from the MSM to those punches, and (3) the effect of this conflict 
on the satirical and journalistic professions.5
Whose Job Is It Anyway?
The contention that late-night comedy is somehow replacing serious news 
has been studiously debunked.6 Simply put, if people didn’t get the news, they 
wouldn’t get the comedians’ jokes. And if people laugh in such situations, 
the laughter is purely symptomatic of the same nervous energy that elicits 
giggles of fear when real clowns who wear makeup appear in circuses and 
nightmares. Here is the truism: satirists need journalists. When journalists 
fail to do their job (i.e., aggressively pursuing the truth and holding powerful 
politicians to account), satirists can’t do theirs (i.e., satirizing politicians). 
And then the Republic is put at risk. Seriously.
The job of the journalist is arguably the most important to the proper 
functioning of our democracy.7 In its ideal, the press seeks the truth, objec-
tively yet aggressively, and holds those in power to account for that truth.8 
Getting at the truth is a difficult and daunting task, particularly in times 
of strife.9 Indeed, while America has a history of enshrining the press’s 
importance to democracy, it also has a countervailing history of chilling 
the press’s effect.
Thus, even the greatest of superheroes (to wit, Superman, a serious 
journalist in his day job) would have difficulty measuring up, but through 
earnest pursuit of the ideal, the press earned the public’s trust during the 
twentieth century. As such, the words on the pages of the New York Times 
and other national papers were implicitly truthful; America’s network news 
was serious, dignified business (albeit not too profitable); and “Edward R. 
Murrow” became a synonym for the journalistic ideal itself.
However, a funny thing happened on the way out of Watergate. The 
MSM at the time may have won the battle against Nixon, but Nixonian 
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politics won the war. As much as he derided the press as liberal elites, Nixon 
understood that politics could be theater, and the MSM could serve as its 
stage. In 1968 Nixon and his team, including a young Roger Ailes (future 
Fox News mastermind), developed a media plan that focused on emotion 
and impression, not reason, and cast people in unidimensional, broadly 
drawn roles for a narrative that audiences could easily follow.10 Television 
could serve as a proscenium arch, within which a political theater could be 
performed. MSM journalists, in time, would become theater critics. Instead 
of reporting and commenting on policy, the MSM critiqued performances 
that the campaigns scripted. In so doing, the MSM helped facilitate “cari-
cature campaigns.”
Ironically, a courageous press that had exposed Nixon’s corruption 
slowly devolved into what Nixon’s team had scripted—an MSM whose real-
ity slipped away from its ideals and the public’s expectations. And whenever 
the distance between reality and ideals opens wide in any industry, another 
group of professionals has the job of filling the gap: satirists.
Satire is an art in which “human . . . shortcomings are held up to censure 
by means of ridicule, derision, burlesque, irony, or other methods, ideally 
with the intent to bring about improvement.”11 As Twain, Mencken, and 
others have shown, politicians have always been needful subjects of satire 
throughout American history. However, whereas the distance between politi-
cal ideals and reality was always somewhat apparent and became painfully 
clear during Vietnam and Watergate, the gap between journalistic ideals 
and reality was relatively minor. Consequently, satire directed at the MSM 
was less prevalent.
That’s not to say news parody was nonexistent. In the early 1960s the 
BBC produced the influential and controversial That Was the Week that 
Was, a comedic sketch show that goofed on topical stories.12 In the United 
States the late 1960s saw Rowan and Martin’s Laugh-in (1968–1973) and 
The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour (1967–1969) satirize political events. 
Laugh-in specifically had overt news parody routines, including “Laugh-in 
Looks at the News” and “News of the Future.” And of course, since 1975, 
“Weekend Update” on NBC’s Saturday Night Live (SNL) has parodied tele-
vision news.
But in most instances, the faux news provided a framing device to poke 
fun at the politicians and celebrities in the real news. To the extent these 
programs ridiculed television journalists, much of the comedy was mockery 
of either all-too-serious commentators or stereotypical local newsreaders. 
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Take, for instance, Ted Knight’s dim, sexist, and pompous Ted Baxter from 
The Mary Tyler Moore Show or Chevy Chase’s goofball anchor on SNL or 
Paddy Chayefsky’s “angry prophet” of the airwaves Howard Beale in Net-
work.13 These characters worked because they played against the general 
perception of journalists as dignified, fearless seekers of truth. Network’s 
mad-as-hell Howard Beale and his corporate puppeteers still had a backroom 
of sagacious newsmen. Behind the blowhard Ted Baxter was a serious Lou 
Grant pushing his staff to uncover material so that he could spin off his own 
dramatic program. And while the childish Chevy Chase could mock her to 
hilarious effect, Jane Curtin was not going to be deterred from her earnest 
editorializing on the environmental dangers of aerosol cans.
But during the Bush years, the MSM (and perceptions and expectations 
about it) began to change. The distance between journalistic ideals and reality 
widened in the run-up to the Iraq war, with contrived shout-fests spreading 
like contagion around MSM cable outlets, anemic inquiries about the casus 
belli further spinning the spin of the Bush administration, and reporting on 
politics generally turning into caricature coverage.
The prophecy of Chayefsky (and Nixon’s own Roger Ailes) was being 
fulfilled (perhaps self-fulfilled, in the case of Ailes). The MSM was not so 
much losing ground to satirists as it was stepping away from its ideals; 
therefore, satirists were not encroaching on any territory not already ceded. 
Rather, incrementally, journalists were joining the campaign carnival, and 
someone needed to tell the audience—and the MSM itself.
Crossfires and Hardballs
In 1999 comedian Jon Stewart became the host of Comedy Central’s The 
Daily Show and turned the show’s aim toward political issues and figures.14 
After several years of success, including the presciently titled “Indecision 
2000” segment on that year’s presidential election, The Daily Show became 
a leader in late-night comedy and, according to the Pew study mentioned 
earlier, an alternative news source.
Not long after the MSM’s hackles rose up, and ABC’s Nightline host Ted 
Koppel confronted Stewart at the July 2004 Democratic National Conven-
tion to grouse about the MSM’s potential obsolescence. “A lot of television 
viewers—more, quite frankly, than I am comfortable with—get their news 
from . . . The Daily Show,” Koppel charged, as if reading straight from the 
Pew study. He then complained about Stewart’s contention that the conven-
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tion was “like a product launch.” Stewart corrected him: “Not ‘like a product 
launch’—it is a product launch.” Stewart emphasized that Koppel, as a seri-
ous journalist, could get more accountability and speak more truth to power 
without humor because of his “credibility and gravitas.” Koppel rained on the 
wishful thinking and ended the exchange by saying, “You’re finished.”15
Stewart saw the dynamic differently from Koppel and other MSM man-
darins: satire wasn’t displacing news; news was displacing itself with unseri-
ous newslike product, playing far too large a role in the political theater. 
Now Stewart was taking aim at the MSM itself.
Stewart took his case directly to one of the premier MSM theatrical 
stages: CNN’s Crossfire. Ostensibly there to promote his new book, Stewart 
nearly immediately made a plea to Tucker Carlson and Paul Begala to “stop 
hurting America” (actually, to “stop, stop, stop, stop hurting America”). And 
of course, he wasn’t referring just to Carlson and Begala but to all similar 
programs—Stewart listed “Crossfire . . . or Hardball or I’m Gonna Kick Your 
Ass,” the last of which could have been the name of any number of Fox 
News’s Beale-like programs.16
Stewart overtly called on the MSM to fulfill its “responsibility to the public 
discourse” and live up to its ideal, suggesting, tongue only partially in cheek, 
that its members “come work for us.” Poignantly and humorously, he implored, 
“See, the thing is, we need your help. Right now, you’re helping the politicians 
and the corporations. And we’re left out there to mow our lawns.” If democracy 
was going to work, the press needed to hew more closely to its ideals.
Carlson fought back, chastising Stewart for his questioning of politi-
cians and “suck[ing] up to” presidential hopeful Senator John Kerry. Carlson 
essentially claimed that Stewart had the same duty as the press. If Stewart 
was going to interview politicians, he was encroaching on journalistic ter-
ritory and needed to assume journalistic responsibilities. In other words, 
satirists couldn’t have their pie and throw it too.
However, Stewart disagreed. His job was to entertain. The MSM had a 
more serious and important job for our country, but it had become “theater”: 
“You’re part of their strategies,” Stewart stated, and “[you could] actually get 
politicians off their marketing and strategy.” Carlson sat in disbelief.
Carlson: Is this really Jon Stewart? What is this, anyway?
Stewart: Yes, it’s someone who watches your show and cannot take 
it anymore.
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Instead of the newsman being “mad as hell” at politicians, the satirist had 
had enough of the newsmen. And near the rancorous end of the discussion, 
Stewart betrayed why the target of today’s satire is moving from politicians, 
whose failure to live up to ideals we have come to expect, to the MSM, 
which until relatively recently had engendered the opposite expectation. 
When asked which candidate for president, Kerry or Bush, “would provide 
better material” for comedy, Stewart responded: “The absurdity of the sys-
tem provides us the most material. And that is best served by the sort of 
theater of it all, you know, which, by the way, thank you both, because it’s 
been helpful.”
Stewart’s lambasting of CNN’s signature program preceded its can-
cellation by only a few months. Whether his appearance caused the end 
of Crossfire is unclear, but statements from interested parties show that 
Stewart’s jibes had some effect. The first spin from CNN came shortly after 
the show when former host Robert Novak said he didn’t think Stewart was 
funny and called him “uninformed.” James Carville, Democratic strategist 
and CNN contributor, admitted that Stewart was funny but a “pompous 
ass.”17 However, after Bush’s reelection, Carlson was dispatched from CNN 
to MSNBC, and Crossfire was canceled. CNN/US president Jonathan Klein 
said his network wanted to leave behind “head-butting debate shows.” On 
the subject of Stewart’s appearance, Klein said he agreed “wholeheartedly 
with Jon Stewart’s overall premise.”18
Whatever effect Stewart may have had on one corner of the MSM block, 
he clearly had more work to do elsewhere. In a 60 Minutes interview just 
weeks after the CNN confrontation, Stewart chastised the CBS News pro-
gram for failing to verify Dan Rather’s story about Bush’s National Guard 
service or the lack thereof.19 But Stewart put that controversy into perspec-
tive for the MSM: “I can’t believe that the National Guard memo scandal is 
the only scandal in four years that has gotten elevated to the state of having 
a ‘gate’ attached to it. ‘Rather-gate.’ For God’s sake, we launched a war based 
on forged documents. That doesn’t get a ‘gate.’ How do you not get a ‘gate’ 
out of that?”20
The contrast between the MSM’s investigation of Watergate and its role 
in the lead-up to the Iraq war provides evidence of the problem Stewart was 
highlighting. In Watergate, journalists courageously pursued the truth and, 
in so doing, exposed governmental corruption and the grievous distance 
between our political ideals and our political reality. In the Iraq war, jour-
nalists were not aggressive or courageous and, in some instances, played 
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into the theater created by the politicians. When the truth finally leaked 
out, drip by painful drip, the MSM exposed another chasm between ideals 
and reality—its own.
Loaded Colbert
If politicians and the MSM had become one meta–political theater, then 
Stewart had become the meta-critic—observing and commenting on the 
theater actors (the politicians) and the theater critics (the MSM). The Daily 
Show did this by surrounding a bemused Stewart with faux journalists who 
displayed no acquaintance with journalistic ideals. One such phony reporter, 
Stephen Colbert, took the satire a step further, leaving behind any reality-
based mooring and conveying his satire in character at all times. His pro-
gram, The Colbert Report, delivered something novel: method satire.21
Tossing aside any pretense of objectivity, courage, dignity, or self- 
reflection, Colbert’s never-out-of-character character was everything Stewart 
had been deriding. Each night his studio became the nadir of the modern 
MSM. But on April 29, 2006, Colbert ventured out of his den to attend the 
White House Correspondents’ Association dinner, and the bar for satirists 
everywhere was raised.
This junket is usually a low-temperature roast, with the comic host 
kidding the press and the president. However, Colbert, the method satirist, 
addressed the dinner guests without any winks or nods and illustrated the 
problem of the MSM playing in the political theater. He first chastised the 
media for recently reporting on “secret prisons,” which he said had been 
kept “secret for a very important reason: they’re super-depressing.” He then 
“commended” them for their dereliction of duty in the previous five years 
and reminded them of their role: “But listen, let’s review the rules. Here’s 
how it works. The President makes the decisions. He’s the decider. The press 
secretary announces those decisions, and you people of the press type those 
decisions down. Make, announce, type. Just put ’em through a spell check 
and go home. Get to know your family again. Make love to your wife. Write 
that novel you got kicking around in your head. You know, the one about the 
intrepid Washington reporter with the courage to stand up to the adminis-
tration? You know, fiction!”22 With these lines, he sent a missile into that gap 
between the ideal of an intrepid press and its MSM reality. The reaction (or 
lack thereof) to Colbert’s appearance has been fairly well chronicled, but not 
without some dispute. Many Colbert fans and progressive bloggers hailed 
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Colbert’s combination of bomb throwing and sniper fire at the administra-
tion and the MSM. Some made allegations that the MSM, smarting from the 
assault on its lack of courage in the face of the Bush administration, ignored 
his direct hits in its subsequent coverage of the event.23 In fact, over the next 
few days, ABC’s This Week, CNN’s American Morning, and the NBC, ABC, 
and CBS morning programs each referenced the dinner and Bush’s comic 
stylings but made no mention of Colbert’s routine.24 The New York Times 
initially didn’t make any reference to it either. Eventually it was covered 
far more broadly by the MSM, but many journalists and commentators, 
including Carlson on his new MSNBC show Tucker, deemed it “unfunny.” 
The Washington Post’s Richard Cohen called the act “rude.”25
Interestingly, Ana Marie Cox, a former independent blogger who later 
became a writer for Time, scoffed at the significance of the speech and theo-
rized, “Comedy can have a political point but it is not political action.”26 
However, her own point is suspect. The allegations that the MSM refused to 
cover Colbert’s speech, true or not, resulted in far more coverage—or at least 
more coverage of the allegations of noncoverage—than would have resulted 
had the allegations not been made. And since the MSM plays a large role in 
the political theater that voters follow and to which they respond, comedy, 
in this case, was political action.27
Of course, how much “action” it caused is speculative. Columnist Frank 
Rich called the performance a possible “defining moment” of the 2006 
midterm campaign.28 Whether Colbert’s wise tomfoolery inspired some 
voters to help return Congress to the Democrats later that year is of course 
unknowable (as Colbert might say, it feels like it did). His routine certainly 
coincided with a wave of books and articles about the Bush administration’s 
secrets and spinning during the Iraq war and the war on terror and just how 
derelict the MSM had been. And from the tone of the blogosphere, Colbert’s 
roast emboldened those critical of the press to press on, and it may have 
even emboldened the press itself into some action.
But, as the next election cycle displayed, satire is a dish best served 
continuously.
The Bitch Is Back
The 2008 election offered opportunities for the MSM to seek the truth from 
a clean slate of power seekers, to avoid playing a part in the political the-
ater, and to expiate the failures of the now-waning Bush era. One problem: 
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the Clinton era was returning. Despite the throng of hopefuls, coverage of 
election 2008 focused for much of 2007 on Hillary Clinton, and although 
her proposals and achievements were covered, the MSM repeatedly fell into 
re-covering old memes and perpetuating a caricature campaign tinged with 
sexism.
From her days as first lady to her Senate run, Clinton had been cari-
catured simultaneously as an undeserving beneficiary of her husband’s 
achievements and as a tough, heartless Machiavellian. Certainly, many male 
politicians have benefited from connections to successful spouses and family 
members, and many more have displayed calculated heartlessness without so 
much as a peep from the press. But for this female politician, the caricature 
meant one thing: it could be hinted at many different ways, but, recalling 
Barbara Bush, they all rhyme with “rich.”
At the start of Clinton’s presidential run, ABC’s Charles Gibson kept 
the meme alive when he asked her, “Would you be in this position were 
it not for your husband?”29 Around that same time, MSNBC’s Chris Mat-
thews repeatedly referred to Clinton as “uppity.”30 Later in 2007 and in early 
2008 the comments kept coming, and they kept getting stranger. MSNBC 
personalities in particular emitted egregious examples of sexist caricature 
coverage. Matthews and Tucker Carlson each used weird allusions to “castra-
tion” when talking about Clinton. Mike Barnicle drew cackles from the boys 
on MSNBC’s Morning Joe when he said Clinton looked “like everyone’s first 
wife standing outside a probate court.” David Shuster questioned whether 
Clinton had “pimped out” her daughter Chelsea in the campaign. And Mat-
thews infamously opined, “The reason she’s a U.S. senator, the reason she’s 
a candidate for president, the reason she may be a front-runner is her hus-
band messed around.”31 Perhaps in this climate, even Senator John McCain, 
a man with a tough, irascible reputation and an extremely wealthy spouse, 
felt it acceptable to commend a supporter’s question as “excellent” when she 
asked him, “How do we beat the bitch?”32
Interestingly, most of these incidents happened during a television 
writers’ strike, when late-night comedy programs were either on hiatus or 
without scriveners. So it was fitting that a writer, from NBC no less, would 
return to punch the MSM in a place that rhymes with “guts.”
Tina Fey, the first female head writer of SNL and creator of the critically 
acclaimed comedy 30 Rock, assumed SNL hosting duties on February 23, 
2008. The cold open was a satire of a presidential debate between Clinton 
and Senator Barack Obama. CNN’s Campbell Brown, John King, and others 
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in the MSM were deemed “in the tank” for Obama, tossing him softballs 
and dismissively deriding a shrewish Clinton.33 Later, during the “Weekend 
Update” segment, Fey humorously harangued the sexist caricaturing of 
Clinton as a “bitch.” With the memorable line “Bitch is the new black,” Fey 
satirically “took back” the word and made it a badge of honor for people 
who “get stuff done.”34
Of course, the extent of the MSM’s “bitchiness” toward Clinton and sup-
portiveness of Obama could be debated endlessly; such criticisms are always 
something of a Rorschach test.35 Nonetheless, as with most good comedy, 
a truth was at the core. In the wake of the episode, Howard Kurtz of CNN 
and the Washington Post noted that a study from the Center for Media and 
Public Affairs found that from December 16, 2007, to February 19, 2008, 
“the three network newscasts aired reports that were 84 percent positive for 
Obama and 53 percent positive for Clinton.”36 Further, after Obama secured 
the nomination, some members of the MSM admitted to sexism in their 
coverage.37 But most pertinently, like Stewart and Colbert, Fey and SNL had 
again called out the MSM for playing in the political theater as opposed to 
reporting aggressively to get beneath the simplistic campaign narratives.
The question of sexism and caricature coverage continued to rear its 
head like Vladimir Putin over Alaskan airspace after McCain announced 
that Governor Sarah Palin would be the GOP’s first female vice presiden-
tial nominee. In the few days between her national introduction and her 
nomination acceptance speech on September 3, 2008, the MSM had little 
opportunity to investigate her, allowing the McCain campaign to script a 
narrative of a tough but sexy “maverick.” In a speech that bitterly mocked 
Obama, Palin drew her own caricature broadly, joking that the difference 
between a “hockey mom” (as she described herself) and a “pit bull” (as her 
speech portrayed her) was “lipstick.”38
The next week Obama claimed in a stump speech that McCain and 
Palin represented more of the same, referencing the old saw that you could 
put “lipstick” on a pig, but it was still a pig.39 Perhaps because of his use of 
the word “lipstick,” the McCain campaign, through adviser Carly Fiorina, 
decried Obama’s comment as “sexist.”40 Later that week ABC’s Charles Gib-
son interviewed Palin, and her performance caused some people to wonder 
whether she offered much more than pit bull rhetoric and lipstick. In par-
ticular, Palin’s answer to Gibson’s question about the “Bush doctrine” made 
it appear that she had never heard the term.41
Just a few days later, Fey debuted her now-famous impression of Palin 
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on the 2008 season premiere of SNL.42 In an opening sketch that paired her 
with Amy Poehler as Clinton, two forms of sexism were illustrated—“bitch” 
contra “bimbo.”
Clinton/Poehler: But, Sarah, one thing we can agree on is that 
sexism can never be allowed to permeate an American election.  
. . .
Palin/Fey: So, we ask reporters and commentators, stop using words 
that diminish us, like “pretty,” “attractive,” “beautiful.”
Clinton/Poehler: “Harpy,” “shrew,” and “boner shrinker.”
But beyond that dichotomy, the sketch, like Fey’s previous bit on SNL, wound 
up punching the MSM in the same old place:
Palin/Fey: So, in the next six weeks, I invite the media to be vigilant 
for sexist behavior.
Clinton/Poehler: Although it is never sexist to question female 
politicians’ credentials. Please ask this one about dinosaurs. So, I 
invite the media to grow a pair. And if you can’t, I will lend you 
mine.
The sketch called on the MSM to be more aggressive in its quest for the truth—
or, for that matter, any information—about Palin, a relative unknown with a 
significant actuarial probability of becoming the leader of the free world.
So, did the MSM take Poehler/Clinton up on the offer? Although the 
McCain campaign made Palin remarkably unavailable to the press, she did 
agree to a series of interviews with CBS’s Katie Couric in late September 
2008. Refusing to be part of the strategies or theater of a caricature campaign, 
Couric was appropriately aggressive (more so than typical MSM inquiry in 
the Bush years), asking follow-ups when answers seemed deficient and forc-
ing Palin off her talking points. The result was so risible that on September 
27, 2008, Fey was back with Poehler on SNL parodying the interview, letting 
the sketch write itself.43
After this one-two punch from the satirists and a journalist, Palin’s lack 
of qualifications was apparent. Almost immediately, even many conservatives 
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began acknowledging the problem,44 and by election day, polling showed that 
a majority of the public considered Palin unqualified to be vice president.45
Couric got to Palin in numerous ways (Palin later said she was “a bit 
annoyed with some of the questions”).46 But Couric (like Fey and Poehler) 
was just doing her job—a critical endeavor when faced with a campaign 
intent on creating caricatures and keeping reality from the electorate. For 
instance, Carl Cameron of Fox News had uncovered even more embarrass-
ing stories about Palin, but they were embargoed, like Palin herself, and not 
open to public disclosure until after the election.47
The Nation of Networks
Over the past decade, a pattern has emerged in the discourse between satirists 
and MSM journalists. As opposed to the politicians they have historically 
targeted, satirists have more recently aimed their fire at the MSM for falling 
short of its expected responsibilities relative to those politicians. Comedians 
such as Stewart, Colbert, Fey, and Poehler have satirized members of the 
MSM for contriving confrontations that were more broad comic theater than 
dignified political debate, for lacking the courage to uncover the truth, and 
for partaking in caricature coverage of politicians.
In response to these satirical attacks, the MSM has had moments of 
denial, acknowledgment, and change. Of course, some in the MSM still 
haven’t gotten the joke—or the truth behind it. After former Bush press 
secretary Scott McClellan explained that “the national press corps was prob-
ably too deferential” to the Bush administration on the decision to invade 
Iraq and that the “country would have been better served” had the “liberal 
media” lived up to its reputation,48 one would expect acknowledgment and 
change to be forthcoming.
However, when the anchors of the three main MSM newscasts appeared 
on NBC’s Today Show in 2008 and were asked whether the media had aban-
doned its responsibilities in the lead-up to the war, Charles Gibson actually 
said, “It was just a drumbeat of support from the administration. And it is 
not our job to debate them. It’s our job to ask the questions.” Not surprisingly, 
only Couric admitted the MSM could have been more aggressive.49
Given the cultural and economic changes of the past generation, expec-
tations of a return to the journalistic ideals of Murrow are as unrealistic 
as they are unfair. The MSM has become a player in the political theater 
because so much of politics has indeed become theater, because the public 
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has grown to view the world in theatrical terms, and because the MSM is 
part of a complex corporate entertainment industry. So now we have comedy 
programs with thick slices of news, and news programs with small helpings 
of humor, such as Keith Olbermann’s “Worst Person in the World” segment 
on MSNBC’s Countdown.50
The line has blurred, and there is no going back. As newsman–enter-
tainer–angry prophet Howard Beale harangued, “We are in the boredom-
killing business. If you want truth go to God, go to your guru, go to yourself 
because that’s the only place you’ll ever find real truth. But man, you’re 
never going to get any truth from us.”51 However, to say that no truth can 
be offered, extracted, or expected is in itself not true. Some narrowing of 
the distance between journalistic ideals and reality is not impossible and 
should be demanded, given the importance of the MSM to democracy. If 
the past eight years have taught us anything, it is that real live humans, not 
caricatures, feel the ramifications of any dereliction of duty, whether by our 
government or by our press. Political theater has entertainment value, but 
at some point the show must stop and real life must go on. And when it 
does—as satirists such as Stewart, Colbert, and Fey point out through their 
funny business—the press must engage in the unfunny business of coura-
geously demanding that those in power not simply put on a good act for 
the public, but act for the public good.
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Revisiting Star Trek: The Next Generation
Diana M. A. Relke
Star Trek departed this galaxy in 2005 when Enterprise, the last of the five 
television series, was canceled after only four seasons due to poor ratings. 
The sci-fi television audience of the new millennium had moved on. We 
had become globalized, postmodernized, posthumanized: we now preferred 
something edgier—something darker, less predictable, less high-minded—
and definitely something less humanist. But we were also discovering that 
humanism—that quintessential white, Western, masculine construction of 
subjectivity—could not simply be discarded like last season’s unfashion-
able overcoat. As Neil Badmington notes, “Humanism has happened and 
continues to happen to ‘us’ (it is the very ‘Thing’ that makes ‘us’ ‘us,’ in fact), 
and the experience—however traumatic, however unpleasant—cannot be 
erased without trace in an instant.”1 So it’s hardly surprising that we are 
haunted by afterimages: Star Trek in syndication across the cable TV uni-
verse. More revealing, the release of an eleventh feature-length film in 2009 
suggests that rumors of Star Trek’s death may have been exaggerated. This 
chapter looks back at an earlier resurrection miracle—the one that returned 
Star Trek to television screens as The Next Generation after eighteen years 
in the wilderness.
My own engagement with Star Trek began in 1988, when The Next 
Generation was in its second season. Teaching a course in gender imagery 
in popular culture, I found those early episodes full of teachable moments. 
Were these episodes an accurate reflection of second-wave feminism’s prog-
ress in consolidating its achievements of the 1970s? Or could they be read as 
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reflective of the feminist backlash of the 1980s and a deepening ambivalence 
about women’s aspirations? What did it mean that the Starfleet men were 
so studly and the women so femme? Was the blackness of the black actors 
intended—however unconsciously—to say something about the status of 
the characters they played? And where were the black women? Interestingly, 
the answers to these questions changed over the next five years, not just 
because students were changing with the times but also because The Next 
Generation was evolving—and so were its critics.
In 1994 The Next Generation completed its seventh and final season. That 
fall, while surfing the Internet, I splashed upon an article on Star Trek in the 
online journal Postmodern Culture. The article reaffirmed my decision to stay 
as far away from paranoid academic interpretations of Star Trek as I did from 
those sophisticated misinterpretations of Madonna as a feminist that were 
ubiquitous in the 1990s. In that article, literary critic Valerie Fulton rolled 
out the heavy artillery—namely, Foucault and Derrida—to tell us what every 
adolescent Trekkie already knew: namely, that Star Trek is made in America, 
For many, Dr. Beverly Crusher (Gates McFadden) is a hero of popular feminism. 
A single mother, career medical officer, and scientist, she transforms traditional 
notions of gender and ideas of a feminine ethic. (MovieGoods)
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by Americans, and thus exhibits a uniquely Americocentric point of view.2 
After stating the obvious about the racism, sexism, and American imperi-
alism that Star Trek could be seen to reinforce, Fulton went on to analyze a 
particular episode of The Next Generation that features Mark Twain as one 
of its characters and sets about proving to us that “Star Trek encourages its 
viewers to contextualize [Twain’s] work in a way that undermines the full 
complexity even of those aspects it engages.” This observation was hardly 
illuminating, since as Harold Bloom had told us, every textual borrowing 
is inevitably a map of misreading. Perhaps the only way to capture the “full 
complexity” of any text is to photocopy it.
Articles like Fulton’s were making me exceedingly uncomfortable with 
some of the ways in which cultural studies scholars were approaching popular 
culture. Star Trek, like virtually all television drama, is a laughably easy target 
for Foucauldian analysis and Derridian deconstruction. Killing a fly with a 
sledgehammer is not merely an abuse of the fly; it is a ludicrous misuse of 
the hammer. Surely, Foucault and Derrida were meant for tougher things! 
More disturbing, Fulton’s article provided the dominant critical establish-
ment with even more ammunition against postmodernist cultural studies. 
Her article could be deployed as “proof ” that postmodernist analysis offers 
nothing but a convoluted and jargon-ridden way of saying what traditional 
“high-culture” scholars have always known—that popular culture is a simple-
minded and contemptible form unfit for academic decency.
What Fulton sidestepped completely was the possibility that Star Trek: 
The Next Generation may well have been conceived as a legitimate response 
to certain varieties of postmodernism itself—those ahistorical, apolitical, 
and relativistic varieties that used to trickle down from the lofty academy 
and into popular magazine articles, self-help literature, and advertising—in 
short, those varieties of postmodernism that, purporting to critique con-
temporary culture, actually helped construct it. Here is what Peter McLaren 
had to say about that emergent postmodernist culture and its subjects in the 
closing decade of the old millennium:
The rapture of dislocation, disruption and displacement of the 
citizen/subject brought on by what has been called the postmodern 
condition has ushered in a view of de-objectified identity in which 
the secure, autonomous agent of history . . . has been sheared away 
from its former originating anchor points to be revealed as perpetu-
ally in composition. We are living at a time of moment-to-moment 
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apocalypse; we are in the future anterior where we feel nostalgia 
for a time that has not yet arrived and whose realization is struc-
turally impossible. . . . The new postmodern self is patterned on 
the cathedral of capitalism, that sanctuary of consumption where 
we find a strange convergence of our fragmented identities in the 
signifying structure of global amusement culture which we know 
as the shopping mall. The shopping mall self (the self as the rhetori-
cal effect of image value) has become the quintessential model of 
panic identity.3
Given this construction of the late-twentieth-century postmodern subject, 
trapped as she is between a history that’s up for grabs and a future that’s 
structurally impossible, is it any wonder that Star Trek, with its postconsum-
erist, post-postmodernist vision of a future that cherishes the supposed best 
of the past while rising above the worst, was enjoying such unprecedented 
popularity?
The Next Generation was conceived in the mid-1980s. This was a period 
characterized by a postmodernist critique that dismantled the master nar-
ratives of our culture, its institutions, and its codes yet still ended up being 
complicit with them because it had no program for change. Indeed, in its 
celebration of moral and ethical relativism, it often refused to take a stand 
on issues of human oppression and social injustice and hence played right 
into the hands of the Reagans and the Thatchers—not to mention all the 
bank presidents and corporate executives we did not have the opportunity 
to mistakenly vote for. Star Trek creator Gene Roddenberry leaped into this 
intellectual vacuum with an alternative to that pastless, futureless, malaise-
ridden postmodernist present. Whatever the limitations of his vision, it 
seemed to me grossly unfair that it should now be shat upon by the very 
intellectuals whose own lack of vision probably contributed to its creation 
in the first place.
I did not exclude feminism from my indictment of the postmodernism 
of the 1980s. The women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s had left 
many of us in search of new ways of being women and men, but by about 
1982, just as we were beginning to take the women’s movement seriously as 
a possible source of answers to this search, feminist scholars in large numbers 
began abandoning the search as naively and hopelessly essentialist. These 
feminist postmodernists were so busy producing esoteric deconstructions 
of terms such as patriarchy, gender, and even feminism itself that they forgot 
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about actual, embodied women and men. They swooned over Lacan, the 
ladies’ man who awarded tenure to the phallus as the universal signifier, and 
they listened raptly when Derrida, in his deconstruction of women and men 
as merely linguistic categories, proclaimed, “I am a woman.” In the wake of 
this abandonment, the search for gender alternatives fell in part to popular 
culture, including television, which took up that task as best it could. So I 
found it unsurprising that Mr. Roddenberry’s starship Enterprise had been 
commissioned to “seek out” not “new worlds” or “new civilizations” but 
rather new forms of masculinity. If these new forms were a bit too reminis-
cent of the old forms, postmodernism had no one to blame but itself.
It’s easy for us academics, with all our sophisticated training, to take 
cheap shots at Star Trek, but if you were teaching a course in popular culture 
during the height of Trek’s popularity, you took those shots at your own peril. 
There were more Trekkies among students than you might imagine, so it was 
far more rewarding to help them toward a more complex understanding of 
why they were watching it. For me, getting students to help me figure out 
why I was watching it was even more rewarding. Today, I still find that the 
best approach to Star Trek, as to all mainstream popular culture, is to begin 
with the simple observation that if popular culture told us things about 
ourselves we didn’t want to know, popular culture wouldn’t be popular for 
long. If Star Trek had overturned all the myths of gender by which we live 
our lives, we would not have tuned in, and corporate sponsors would have 
withdrawn their support.
In other words, even if Roddenberry had been the most radical of 
feminist television writers, he would have been obliged to remain within 
the severe limits placed on television by both its audience and its sponsors. 
Perhaps this is why all ships in the Star Trek universe are referred to as “she,” 
while all Starfleet officers, whether male or female, are addressed as “Sir.”4 Yet 
the original pilot episode of the original Star Trek in 1966 featured a highly 
rational woman as second in command on the Enterprise. Roddenberry cre-
ated her to balance out his passionate and impulsive starship captain. But 
he was coerced by the network to scrap that pilot and create a new one in 
which the logical Mr. Spock of the planet Vulcan replaced the Earth woman 
as executive officer. The network’s excuse was that acceptance of a woman 
of intelligence and authority was too much to ask of the American public; 
an extraterrestrial was supposedly more believable.
What Roddenberry succeeded in retaining in his second pilot was a 
communications officer who was not only female but also black. Back then, 
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in those prefeminist days, I was no fan of television and had even less inter-
est in the silly genre of science fiction, yet I can distinctly remember sitting 
up and taking notice. This was an important first for television in an era 
when we had little understanding of the relationship between racism and 
representation and had not yet invented the word sexism.
The point I’m making is that no matter how limited Roddenberry’s 
depiction of gender equality was in the original Star Trek and continued to 
be in The Next Generation, his instincts about the inevitability of women’s 
professionalism and authority earned Star Trek a substantial female follow-
ing. In the context of this alone, it was easier for female Trekkers to forgive 
Roddenberry for The Next Generation’s three regular female characters—all 
of whom are caretakers and good listeners and thus function as a feminine 
context within which masculinity can be showcased more strikingly. Unlike 
other action-adventure series, most of which exclude women as important 
central characters, there is no need for Star Trek to feminize one or two male 
characters to underscore the exemplary masculinity of its heroes.
It’s a simple matter to see Dr. Crusher, Counselor Troi, and bartender 
Guynan as measuring up to the long-standing stereotype of women as 
exclusively nurturant. This gives us an excellent excuse to dismiss The Next 
Generation as hopelessly sexist. It’s an equally simple matter to dismiss it on 
the grounds of racism, for Star Trek can be seen as merely translating racial 
issues to the level of humanoid species, so that, for example, the odious, 
profit-mongering, physically diminutive race known as the Ferengi is no 
longer a critique of the excesses of Western capitalism but rather is analo-
gous to the Japanese. Undoubtedly, Star Trek fans of the 1980s and early 
1990s who worried about the globalization of unfettered capitalism leaned 
toward the former reading, while fans who resented Japan’s unrivaled eco-
nomic prosperity in those decades would have favored the latter. However, 
it seems to me that there is more racism in the latter interpretation than 
there is in the Ferengi themselves. Thus, it’s more interesting and perhaps 
a bit more challenging to get The Next Generation to yield more useful and 
congenial meanings.
To return to the question of feminine caretaking, it’s not caretaking 
per se but rather the feminization of it that’s the problem. Forty years of 
feminist scholarship has by no means convinced everyone that caretaking 
is not genetically encoded in women. It could be useful to keep this in mind 
when looking at The Next Generation’s three female characters. Of the three, 
only Crusher is human, and one could argue that she comes by her caretak-
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ing skills largely through medical training, not genetics. Troi’s exaggerated 
feminine intuition—her empathic power—is attributed to her nonhuman 
genetic inheritance, as is Guynan’s facility for listening to the troubles of her 
customers, for she’s described as a member of a mysterious race of listeners. 
For all we know, Roddenberry and his team were on some level aware that 
if men in the twenty-fourth century still longed atavistically for a genetic 
guarantee of these stereotypically feminine qualities in their women, they 
would have to leave home to find it.
So does genetically encoding caretaking exclusively in nonhuman races, 
thereby feminizing them, make The Next Generation racist? As with the 
capitalist Ferengi, it depends on who’s doing the interpreting.
If you had eavesdropped on the many Internet newsgroups devoted to 
Star Trek at the height of its popularity, as I was wont to do, you would have 
had a pretty good idea of what appealed to women viewers. To them, as to 
many of my students, Beverly Crusher was the superwoman of popular 
feminism: a single mother, a career officer, and a scientist in her own right. 
The fact that actress Gates McFadden’s face harkens back to Hollywood 
goddess Greta Garbo didn’t hurt either. As for Counselor Cleavage, as male 
Trekkers liked to call Deanna Troi, viewers had little respect for this charac-
ter until the show’s last season, when she finally donned a regular Starfleet 
uniform, passed the bridge officer’s exam, and was promoted to the rank of 
commander. Actress Marina Sirtis, who plays this character, said that these 
long-overdue changes had a miraculous effect on the writers of subsequent 
episodes, who suddenly began putting intelligent lines in her mouth. As 
for Whoopie Goldberg’s Guynan, even Captain Jean-Luc Picard defers to 
her superior wisdom. Moreover, the fact that Goldberg went public with 
her belief in The Next Generation as transcending dysfunctional attitudes 
toward gender and race encouraged women viewers to overlook Guynan’s 
reinforcement of the antique stereotype of women as the possessors of darkly 
mysterious superhuman (or subhuman) powers.
It is important to point out that although women in the Star Trek uni-
verse have freedoms not enjoyed by many in the show’s female audience, 
these characters are permitted to exercise that freedom only in the service of 
Starfleet’s hierarchical, almost priestly order. In this way, they are reminiscent 
of medieval nuns, who escaped the oppression of marriages of convenience 
and multiple life-threatening pregnancies by opting for the celibate life. So 
long as they remained in the service of the patriarchal church and its male 
priesthood, these women could learn to read and write, pursue scholarly 
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interests, and even rise to relatively powerful positions within their religious 
orders. Marriage to a mortal man is hardly a sacrifice when you’re married 
to Christ, the bridegroom who never disappoints. Many of these religious 
must have regarded themselves as among the most liberated and fortunate of 
women. And given the alternatives, they probably were. Similarly, when we 
compare Crusher, Troi, and Guynan with some of the females we encounter 
among alien civilizations scattered throughout Star Trek’s galaxy, females 
whose status is more like that of most contemporary Western women, these 
Starfleet nuns appear remarkably liberated and fulfilled.
For many female Trekkers, Starfleet was the patriarchal order, but minus 
its abuses and excesses. Similarly, for Roddenberry, the United Federation of 
Planets was the United States of America, minus its excessive militarism, its 
xenophobia, and its economic injustice. Here is how science fiction author 
and Star Trek fan Ursula Le Guin described The Next Generation on the 
occasion of its final episode:
The Next Generation never had a simplistic concept of Us/Nice/Real 
People vs. Them/Ugly/Villains. Of course, there are bad guys out 
there. When the Klingons turned into real people, the Romulans 
and Cardassians were waiting; but they keep turning into real people 
too. . . . Violence, on The Next Generation, is shown as a problem, 
or the failure to solve a problem, never as the true solution. This is 
surely one reason why the show has such a following. . . . On the 
Enterprise, we see the difference of racial and alien types, gender 
difference, handicaps, apparent deformities, all accepted simply as 
different ways of being human. In this, The Next Generation has been 
light-years ahead of its predecessors, its imitators, and practically 
everything else on TV.5
Indeed, seen in this way, Star Trek becomes a highly refined interpreta-
tion of the American Dream fulfilled. Roddenberry subscribed to the belief 
that the founders had left a viable blueprint for a “more perfect union,” but 
Americans were far from realizing its promise. An eternal optimist about the 
future, he could hardly be described as a voice of political dissent, but he did 
believe in the inspirational power of utopian vision, and he believed in the 
American potential for achieving the Good Society. But Roddenberry was 
no different from the vast majority of American patriots who did not—and 
still do not—recognize that, like patriarchy, the American Dream itself is 
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the problem. This is why Le Guin’s positive reading of The Next Generation 
can be countered by equally convincing negative readings.
But if the United Federation of Planets were merely America writ large, 
there would not have been such pronounced international interest in it. For 
many non-American viewers, the Federation’s allusion to the United Nations 
was at least as obvious as Star Trek’s Americanism. For that reason, I find 
it more useful to view the Star Trek universe as the fulfillment of the goals 
of Western humanism—which is truer to Roddenberry’s stated intentions 
than the oppressive American imperialism attributed to his vision by its 
postmodernist critics. Despite the plot’s utter dependence on space technol-
ogy and the quantities of technobabble written into every episode, scientific 
knowledge in The Next Generation is merely technical; science serves the 
practical necessities of everyday life and work aboard the Enterprise, and 
basic technological literacy within the Federation is taken for granted. The 
humanities, in contrast, are represented as a higher form of knowledge 
and the real avenue to truth and wisdom. Picard is the embodiment of this 
higher, more valuable knowledge, and he is often contrasted to the rest of 
his bridge crew, who, though they all possess scientific and technological 
expertise, pale in comparison to Picard, who knows his history, his archae-
ology, his Shakespeare, his Mozart, and his Plato. Like Leonardo’s Vitruvian 
Man, the famous sketch that serves as the emblem of humanism, Picard is 
the measure of all things. Indeed, he is the image of man in his ideal form.
Picard represents Soul, which appears on the middle rung of early 
humanism’s five-rung universal hierarchy as translated from Plato by Renais-
sance humanist Marsilio Ficino. Above Soul, Ficino put God in first place 
and the Angels in second; below it, he put Quality in fourth place and the 
Body in fifth. Quality gave man the dignity that differentiated him from 
lower forms of matter, and I use the term man advisedly, for Ficino defined 
dignity in part as masculine beauty. The soul in its Western humanist incar-
nation may have been what inspired this insight from Le Guin: “The Borg 
[a race of technologically determined cyborgs] was a great embodiment of 
Evil—mechanical evil, absence of soul. Hence the power of the episode where 
Picard, the very soul of the Enterprise, became a Borg: anybody, even the best 
man, can lose his soul. This is a genuinely scary idea, a mature concept.”6
Again with reference to the humanist fondness for hierarchy, the Starfleet 
chain of command, which draws on Anglo-American naval tradition, is only 
the most obvious hierarchical structure. Masculinity in The Next Generation 
is also constructed hierarchically and is measured on a reason-emotion scale 
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that mimics Ficino’s five-rung model. Again, Picard is halfway between top 
and bottom because he is central and most ideally human; he represents 
the near-perfect integration of reason, which is highly valued, and emotion, 
which is also valued but only when under the control of the “higher” faculty 
of reason. Lieutenant Commander Data, the totally unemotional android, is 
the perfect embodiment of reason and reason’s highest achievement, while 
Lieutenant Worf, the Klingon warrior, takes up his position at the bottom, 
where he represents volatile emotion. In the spaces between these three we 
can slot Commander Riker, who is next to Picard in human perfection but is 
also a stud, with a girl in every spaceport, and Lieutenant Geordie LaForge, 
who is a genius in quantum mechanics but can’t get a date.
If we turn the hierarchy on its side, it becomes a spectrum along which 
the five masculine ways of being run from superhuman at one end to subhu-
man at the other. I find it significant that hyperrationality and violence are 
represented as remote from the human ideal at the center: Data flatters us 
with his desire to be more like us in our spiritual and emotional complexity, 
while Worf earns our respect largely in direct proportion to his success in 
curbing his aggressive impulses. Despite the glaring absence of homosexual-
ity in this five-category spectrum, as an orderly representation of multiple 
masculine subjectivities, it might be precisely what many male viewers of 
The Next Generation still find attractive, as it provides them with a simple 
(if oversimplified) tool for measuring what it is to be a heterosexual man in 
gender-obsessed humanist culture.
Women fit into The Next Generation in the same way they fit into 
humanism. But where do they fit? We find a clue in humanist Lorenzo Valla’s 
Renaissance tract De Voluptate, which redeems from medieval Christian 
condemnation the value of earthly pleasure: “Only pleasure is the authentic 
good of man. All the other goods can be reduced to pleasure. It is the end that 
nature herself has indicated to man, furnishing him also with the means of 
obtaining it. Courtesans and harlots are more deserving of humankind than 
holy and chaste virgins.”7 Clearly, in Lorenzo’s view, courtesans, harlots, and 
virgins are the objects rather than the subjects of pleasure. They are not the 
deserving; they are what man deserves—or, more accurately in the case of 
withholding virgins, what he does not deserve. Similarly, the excellent medi-
cal and psychotherapeutic services of the nurturant Crusher, the empathic 
Troi, and the commiserating Guynan are no less than what the men on the 
Enterprise deserve. Female admirals, of which there are many in The Next 
Generation, get to remain on Earth and keep the home fires burning.
Gender, the Final Frontier 287
To my mind, the most successful female character in The Next Genera-
tion is K’Ehleyr, the half-human, half-Klingon mate of Lieutenant Worf and 
the mother of his son. She is an accomplished and respected Federation 
ambassador to the Klingon Empire, and she harbors no illusions regard-
ing the Klingons’ propensity to cloak their violent practices in claims of 
honor, glory, and duty. She is as fierce as she is tender, as intelligent as she 
is beautiful, as autonomous as she is relational. Thus she embodies the best 
of both genders. Consequently, there is no continuing place for her within 
the humanist structure that gives The Next Generation its gender coherence, 
and she therefore appears in only two episodes. In response to her brutal 
murder by the treacherous Klingon Duras, we are so swept away by our 
admiration for her that, unlike Captain Picard, we are in complete accord 
with Worf as he crosses the thin line of his restraint, gives in to his Klin-
gon rage, and kills Duras in a violent duel. In other words, K’Ehleyr is one 
of those female figures whose primary function is to render justifiable the 
ultimate expression of traditional masculine power.8
At the opposite end of the feminine spectrum is the character of the 
telepathic extraterrestrial Lwaxana Troi, the hormonally crazed, meno-
pausal mother of Deanna. Whereas characterization in The Next Genera-
tion is encoded and hence decoded according to the conventions of realism, 
Lwaxana’s character is rendered in the exaggerated conventions of burlesque 
comedy and hence comes across as a tasteless sexist joke. She is not only the 
bane of her daughter’s existence but also a sexual predator who functions as 
justification for the latent misogyny of the scripts she inhabits. In addition, 
as she repeatedly reminds us in her imperious way, she is the daughter of 
the Fifth House, holder of the Sacred Chalice of Rixx, and heir to the Holy 
Rings of Betazed. She is also notorious for her rude and dismissive remarks 
about other humanoid species. Thus, as the exaggerated focus of elitism and 
racism, she draws our attention away from these qualities as they exist in 
their normative form in the other characters. Indeed, in one episode Captain 
Picard and the other officers, whose male protection she seeks, can abandon 
her with impunity to a repulsive and lecherous Ferengi kidnapper.
Whereas many father-son relationships are explored throughout the 
series with dignity, sensitivity, and compassion, the crudely comedic con-
flict between Lwaxana and Deanna represents the only mother-daughter 
interchange to receive sustained treatment in The Next Generation. Thus, 
in striking contrast to the multiplicity of diverse father-son interchanges, 
the Troi burlesque becomes by default the implicit paradigm case for all 
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mother-daughter relationships. However, in fairness to the Trek writers, 
as the series progressed, the burlesque was muted, Lwaxana’s character 
was rendered less misogynistically, and her relationship with Deanna was 
given more complexity. However, she never entirely rose above her initial 
depiction as an embarrassment to the feminine gender. Perhaps this is why, 
unlike K’Ehleyr, Lwaxana enjoyed a continuing place in the Star Trek saga, 
appearing in episodes of the later Deep Space Nine series. However, some 
might claim that this had more to do with the fact that Majel Barrett, the 
actress who played Lwaxana, was the wife of the late Gene Roddenberry and 
the custodian of his lucrative Star Trek empire.
The Next Generation is not merely a useful device for introducing into the 
classroom a critique of the gender-encoded discourse of Western humanism; 
it is more obviously useful for deconstructing the binary opposition of high 
versus popular culture, for Roddenberry and his team consciously created 
The Next Generation as the legitimate heir to both. Roddenberry sold the 
original Star Trek to the network by calling it “a wagon-train to the stars,” 
and indeed, The Next Generation contains multiple allusions to the Holly-
wood western. Six-guns have become phasers, horses have become starships, 
and saloons proliferate along the final frontier. Gambling has evolved into 
the more civilized activity of the weekly poker game in Commander Riker’s 
quarters; although nothing so crass as money changes hands, the high-risk 
stakes of American frontier exploration are repeatedly evoked in the allu-
sion to poker as analogous to the chancy adventure of space exploration. 
Cheek by jowl with these elements of the Hollywood western are elaborate 
allusions to William Shakespeare, Charles Dickens, John Masefield, Mark 
Twain, Agatha Christie, and Arthur Conan Doyle. Picard’s reverence for 
Shakespeare is rivaled only by his love of a pulp fiction novelist whose pri-
vate eye character Dixon Hill is Picard’s holodeck alter ego. Two American 
cultural studies scholars identify Dixon Hill as an allusion to the novels of 
Philip K. Dick.
I came across this reference to Philip K. Dick in an unpublished con-
ference paper by Sarah Hardy and Rebecca Kukla entitled “Staging Narra-
tive and the Narrative Stage: Exploring Space on the Starship Enterprise.” 
A postmodernist reading of The Next Generation, but unlike the Fulton 
article mentioned earlier, this paper is completely free of paranoia. Instead, 
Hardy and Kukla explore space within the starship Enterprise in much the 
same spirit as its Starfleet crew explores the interstellar space outside of it. 
Hardy and Kukla begin by noting that “an episode in which the Enterprise 
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becomes a sentient being makes explicit its ongoing role as a protagonist in 
the Star Trek saga.” They go on “to take the Enterprise as an example illus-
trating the thesis that fictional spaces can constitute and control the forms 
of subjectivity . . . they contain.” They also note what I believe to be a most 
important observation for anyone trying to understand the phenomenal 
appeal of Star Trek: “The importance placed upon the purely physical char-
acter of both the old and the new Enterprise, by both the show’s creators 
and the audience alike, is evident from the publication for fans of whole 
books of extraordinarily detailed ‘blueprints’ for each ship. Viewers know, 
and have proven that they want to know, a great deal about the technologi-
cal capabilities, physical workings, and spatial and functional divisions of 
each Enterprise.”9
As someone who sleeps beneath a two- by four-foot glazed cutaway rep-
resentation of the Enterprise-D, I exemplify audience fascination with this 
object as the most important protagonist in The Next Generation. Perhaps for 
the whole viewing audience, no less than for me, the Enterprise is analogous 
to the self, in that it contains a multiplicity of interacting subjectivities. Male 
or female, there is no character on the bridge of the Enterprise who cannot 
be experienced as a projection of some aspect of the self, some fragment 
of subjectivity in a dynamic relationship of oscillating harmony-conflict-
resolution with all other fragments. I think Carl Jung would have been well 
pleased with the Enterprise and would have embraced it as yet more evidence 
in support of his theory of archetypes—in contrast to the cultural critics who 
have denounced the Enterprise for its crew of stereotypes.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this character called Enterprise is 
her vivid imagination expressed through that most wonderful of all twenty-
fourth-century technologies, the holodeck. Representative of the ship’s rich 
fantasy life, the holodeck is evidence of the Star Trek creators’ belief that 
not even the galaxy is a large enough arena for the human imagination. 
The holodeck is an excellent metaphor for introducing into the classroom 
an analysis of the human propensity for discursively constructing reality, 
for that process is analogous to the transformation of energy into matter. 
One only has to speak to the voice-activated holodeck computer to create a 
simulation of any environment of any shape in perfect detail. The fact that 
no hologram can exist outside the holodeck in its material form can be used 
to suggest that reality as discursively constructed by any one individual or 
group is always subject to impingement by other realities.
Indeed, in their discussion of the holodeck as providing individual crew 
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members with the opportunity to realize the kind of fantasies that most view-
ers feel constrained to keep under wraps, Hardy and Kukla note, “Although 
the holodeck doors are not kept locked and anyone can enter anyone else’s 
fantasy at will, people’s antics on the holodeck are clearly treated as personal 
business and beyond judgment.” This leads them to conclude that “the holo-
deck challenges our distinction between the included and the excluded, the 
contained and the out of bounds, at the physical, cultural, and normative 
levels.” Thus, “in each case, the narrative presence of the holodeck makes 
the provocative claim that we can imaginatively extend our world into an 
open, accessible space, containing even those possibilities which must be 
excluded from everyday life and traditionally understood space-time. Yet 
at the same time, the holodeck is used in several episodes to problematize 
and reveal the limits of the myth of a radically inclusive space.”10
What is permissible and what is out of bounds is constantly being rene-
gotiated where the holodeck is concerned. Just as Data, that other marvel of 
twenty-fourth-century technology, gives his android offspring the chance 
to choose its own gender and species identity, the holodeck implies this 
potential as well. Indeed, Data takes his offspring to the holodeck to “try 
on” several thousand available subjectivities before a holographic mirror. 
Although, with the exception of Data himself, no character has actually 
been transformed into the so-called opposite sex, many characters use the 
holodeck as a temporary escape from the restrictions—gender and other-
wise—of real space-time, and the holodeck computer instantly adjusts and 
responds to these alternative subjectivities. Thus, the holodeck is useful for 
initiating a classroom discussion about the construction of subjectivity and 
the fluidity of representation.
In an episode called “Conundrum,” contact with an alien probe leaves 
the Enterprise crew and the ship’s computer with amnesia. The crew can 
only guess who they are by interpreting external clues in the context of 
their emotional self-awareness, which is all they have left of their identi-
ties. Thus Data, who has no emotional awareness and just happens to be 
behind the bar in Ten-Forward when the probe strikes, assumes that he is 
the bartender and begins to act accordingly. Commander Riker and Ensign 
Ro, who, under normal circumstances, are constantly at odds with each 
other professionally, interpret the tension between them as sexual. Worf 
interprets the Klingon ceremonial sash he wears as signifying his status 
as ship’s captain. This seems to make sense in the context of his aggressive 
warrior feelings, for the computer’s reprogrammed memory tells them that 
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the Federation is at war with a race called the Lysians, and their orders are 
to attack and destroy the Lysian Central Command. But more fragmentary 
evidence retrieved from the computer soon corrects them as to the proper 
chain of command. Picard resumes his place as captain, and the crew pro-
ceeds to carry out its mission of destruction. In the end, it’s a variation on 
the humanist balance of reason and emotion that saves the day. Picard’s 
ethical instincts, working in tandem with his finely honed logic, tips them 
off: they are the victims of an insidious plot. An unscrupulous race called 
the Satarrans has inflicted this pastless and futureless condition on them 
in an attempt to use the Enterprise as a weapon to destroy the Lysians, with 
whom the Satarrans are at war.
On the surface, this episode appears to be one of the sillier ones, yet it 
can be seen as an apt analogy for the postmodern condition as described 
in the passage by McLaren quoted earlier. Like the Enterprise crew, we have 
been transformed from humanist to postmodern subjects: robbed of our 
past, and without a vision for the future, we are helpless and vulnerable to 
perpetual, moment-to-moment manipulation by the ideologies that circulate 
through and around us like some invasive, malevolent force. We have only 
this highly misinterpretable, malaise-ridden, discursively tangled present 
to guide our trajectory, which is just as likely to be toward destruction as 
toward preservation. Is it any wonder, then, that Roddenberry’s vision of the 
future as not merely ensured but enhanced by the triumph of the humanist 
spirit enjoyed such phenomenal appeal?
Like all the other permutations of the Star Trek saga, The Next Generation 
was not conceived as a subversive text, as, for example, All in the Family and 
M*A*S*H* were iconic texts of the much more liberal and liberating decade 
of the 1970s. Nor was it conceived in staunch support of the status quo. The 
humanist assumptions on which it rests ensure that for every progressive 
idea that appears to inform it, there are at least two others that seem disap-
pointingly conventional. What’s important about Star Trek is the loyalty it 
inspired in its millions of active fans, who refused to be marginalized for their 
textual preferences, either by the gatekeepers of high-cultural taste or by a 
postmodern present in which meaning is eternally deferred. And although 
there are far fewer Trekkers among the students in our gender studies and 
cultural studies classrooms these days, they have by no means disappeared 
completely. Indeed, at the time of this writing, they eagerly await the release 
of the eleventh feature-length Star Trek film.
Clearly, much has changed in the Star Trek universe since The Next Gen-
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eration. Though its humanist framework remains intact, it has undergone 
postmodernization in many of its details. In terms of gender, we’ve had Voy-
ager, with its tough female captain, its even tougher female chief engineer, 
and a cyborg whose technological prowess is one up on the kick-ass women 
of Japanese cyberpunk. This trio of Alpha Babes cruising the Delta Quadrant 
provided an opportunity to study how Star Trek’s gender imagery evolved. 
Although Voyager did not enjoy the same level of popularity as The Next 
Generation or even Deep Space Nine, this had less to do with its feminine 
troika than with Voyager’s competition—namely, the several other space-
fiction series for which The Next Generation had blazed the way into prime 
time. Nevertheless, Voyager had a substantial female fan base whose loyalty 
almost certainly played a role in preventing the series’ cancellation when, 
in its third season, ratings took a dangerous dip. What made the humanist 
character of Janeway important was not so much her admirable projection 
of female authority as the opportunity she gave the writers to explore the 
limitations of humanism in a posthuman universe.11
As a key to what might be generalized as the dominant Western psyche, 
Star Trek rivals the legends of King Arthur. Its translation into such languages 
as Hindi and Japanese suggests that, for better or worse, it may also rival 
Coca-Cola and McDonald’s as a globalizing phenomenon. For that reason 
alone its potential for generating multiple readings needs to be exploited in 
our cultural studies classrooms. It is available in seemingly eternal syndica-
tion, beaming into households across North America and perhaps beyond, 
offering us a way to approach gender issues as we negotiate the cultural 
terrain between humanism and the posthuman. Not to take advantage of 
it would be to miss a powerful opportunity to deconstruct and reconstruct 
the cultural myths by which we are destined to live our lives.
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including gender, race, religion, class, the 
environment, and sexual orientation. Kate 
Mulgrew, who played Captain Janeway in Star
Trek: Voyager, offers her own story in the book’s
foreword, describing the societal pressures of being
the first female captain in the Star Trek franchise.
In today’s fragmented society, audiences are met
daily with thousands of messages competing for
their attention. Homer Simpson Marches on 
Washington offers an entertaining and insightful
look at how popular culture can break through
the clutter and bring about profound changes. 
Timothy M. Dale, assistant professor of political
science in the Department of Social Change and
Development at the University of Wisconsin–
Green Bay, is coauthor of Political Thinking, 
Political Theory, and Civil Society. 
Joseph J. Foy, assistant professor of political 
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Homer Simpson Marches on Washington
Dissent through American Popular Culture
Edited by Timothy M. Dale and Joseph J. Foy
The Simpsons consistently questions what is 
culturally acceptable, going against the grain of
popular culture by showcasing controversial issues
like homosexuality, animal rights, the war on 
terror, and religion. This subtle form of political
analysis is entertaining and great for television 
ratings, but it also can be an effective means of
changing opinions and attitudes on a large scale.
To consider another example, what does Star Trek
teach viewers about feminist politics? Do comedy
programs like The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and
Saturday Night Live advance democracy in ways
the mainstream news media cannot? Can horror
films contribute to a contemporary understanding
of environmentalism?
Homer Simpson Marches on Washington: Dissent
through American Popular Culture explores how
popular culture influences political agendas,
frames audience perceptions, and changes values
and ideals on both the individual and collective
levels. Editors Timothy M. Dale and Joseph J. Foy
have assembled a top-notch team of scholars from
the fields of political science, history, women’s 
and minority studies, film and media studies,
communication, music, and philosophy to 
investigate the full spectrum of popular culture 
in a democratic society.
Homer Simpson Marches on Washington examines
television shows such as Star Trek: The Next 
Generation, The X-Files, All in the Family, The
View, and The Colbert Report, as well as movies
and popular music, demonstrating how covert 
political and social messages affect the cultural
conversation in America. The contributing authors
investigate a wide range of controversial topics, 
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